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INTRODUCTION: REACTING TO THE NEW SCHOLARLY CONSENSUS
Until the early 1980s the Second Amendment had received little attention
or interest from legal scholars.' In 1981 Northwestern University law pro-
fessor Daniel D. Polsby ridiculed the individual rights view of the Amend-
ment as "a lot of horsedung."2 But as of 1994, having acquainted himself
with the rather substantial literature of the intervening years, Polsby com-
mented:
[A]lmost all the qualified historians and constitutional-law scholars who
have studied the subject [concur]. The overwhelming weight of authority
affirms that the Second Amendment establishes an individual right to
bear arms, which is not dependent upon joining something like the Na-
tional Guard. It goes without saying that like all constitutional rights, the
right to keep and bear arms is subject to reasonable regulation consistent
with its purposes.3
Research conducted through the 1980s has led legal scholars and historians
to conclude, sometimes reluctantly, but with virtual unanimity, that there is
no tenable textual or historical argument against a broad individual right view
of the Second Amendment.
4
The Second Amendment reads: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CoNsT. amend. II.
2 See Mike Royko, Guns and the Constitution, CHI. SUN-TIMES, March 20, 1981 (quoting Polsby as
"describing this gun lover's belief as 'a lot of horsedung."').
ATLANTC MONTHLY, June 1994, at 13. See also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DE-
FENSE: BERNHARD GoETz AND THE LAw ON TRIAL 156 (1988) ("[E]ven though the prevailing interpretation
is that the [Second A]mendment merely guarantees a right to the states to maintain a militia, convincing
evidence indicates that the framers had an individual right in mind.").
' Whatever value one accords textual or historical evidence for constitutional interpretation, as will be
discussed below, those who advocate a militia-centric interpretation of the Second Amendment have relied
mainly, if not exclusively, upon textual or historical arguments.
1996] 1141
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According to the broad individual right view, the right of the people to
keep and bear arms is to be treated the same as the other rights of the people
specified in the Constitution-no more and no less. Like the other rights
mentioned in the Bill of Rights, it is a right to be asserted by individuals
against infringement by government. Like other rights in the Bill of Rights, it
is not absolute, but neither is it a hollow shell which legislatures can ignore
with impunity. Nor does it merely refer to the right of a state to have a mili-
tia, as many, perhaps most, law professors assumed before there was serious
scholarship on the Second Amendment.
Despite this scholarship, on May 2, 1994, the broad individual right view
was denounced as a gun-lobby "fraud on the American people" by twenty-six
law professors in an advertisement sponsored by an anti-gun group which ap-
peared in the American Lawyer and other publications.' The only authority
they cited supporting their view was a quotation from an article by former
Chief Justice Burger in Parade magazine.6 Though a number of signatories
are distinguished scholars, significantly, none had ever delved into the issues
sufficiently to publish a scholarly article on the subject.
One of them has repaired that deficiency by writing (the all-too-appropri-
ately named) Gun Crazy,7 the first article to appear in an important law re-
view in almost thirty years disputing this now-predominant individual right
view of the Second Amendment. As Gun Crazy presents it, the near-unani-
mous consensus among historians and legal scholars who have researched the
issues is an artifact of a sinister concerted effort by pro-gun professors and
fellow travelers. Gun Crazy argues that the gullible legal and scholarly com-
munities are falling victim to a gun-lobby-organized conspiracy "to flood the
law reviews with friendly scholarship from sympathetic law professors."'
Our aim in this Article is two-fold: First, we intend to put the academic
discussion of the Second Amendment back on its constructive path by rebut-
ting charges made in Gun Crazy against scholars who have contributed to the
new consensus that the Second Amendment protects an individual right. To
that end, in Part I, we discuss in detail the false charges of dishonesty and
AM. LAW., June 1994, at 96 (advertisement).
Warren Burger, The Right to Bear Arms, PARADE, Jan. 14, 1990, at 4-6.
Andrew D. Herz Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic Re-
sponsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57 (1995) [hereinafter Gun Crazy].
' Id. at 138.
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conspiracy that Gun Crazy levels against scholars whose views it finds uncon-
genial. In Part II, we examine the factual errors in Gun Crazy.
Second, we present the textual, structural, historical, and criminological
evidence that supports this new consensus; evidence about which most aca-
demics, even those who write about other areas of constitutional law, are
largely unaware. In Part III, we examine the merits of the interpretation pro-
ferred by opponents of an individual right to keep and bear arms: the militia-
centric conception of the Second Amendment. We analyze how textual, his-
torical, and structural considerations each argue against such an interpretation
and in favor of an individual rights approach. Finally, in Part IV, we consider
the issue that is really motivating those who reject an individual rights inter-
pretation in favor of a militia-centric conception of the Second Amendment:
the allegedly adverse effect of gun ownership on public safety. Here we pres-
ent the latest findings of criminologists on the effects of guns and gun owner-
ship on violence.
I. AD HOMINEM ATTACKS ON LEGAL SCHOLARS
Gun Crazy portrays the near-unanimous scholarly literature as "pro-gun
lobby" propaganda. One of Gun Crazy's tactics is to reject twenty-five law
review articles defending the individual right view as biased per se. These are
articles by nonacademics whom Gun Crazy identifies as employees of the
NRA and other pro-gun groups or whom Gun Crazy denigrates as "[g]un-
rights litigators and activists,".9 "leading gun-rights litigators and lobby-
ists,"" and "warhorses."" At the same time, Gun Crazy derives its substan-
tive arguments on the Second Amendment from the handful of articles on the
other side which it cites without ever informing readers that their authors are
officers or paid employees of anti-gun groups."
Id. at 69.
, Id. at 138.
Id. at 138 n.356.
22 Since 1980, five articles have appeared championing the states' rights view of the Second Amend-
ment. They are: Richard M. Abom, The Battle over the Brady Bill and the Future of Gun Control Advocacy,
22 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 417 (1995) (article by president of Handgun Control, Inc.); Keith A. Ehrman &
Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?,
15 U. DAYTON L. REy. 5 (1989); Samuel Fields, Guns, Crime and the Negligent Gun Owner, 10 N. KY. L.
REv. 141 (1982) (article by Coordinator of Legal Affairs for the National Coalition to Ban Handguns); Den-
nis A. Henigan, Arms. Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 107 (1991) (Dennis A.
Henigan was the Director of the Legal Action Project at the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence); Warren
19961 1143
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It is unnecessary to quibble over the matter for, even when the articles by
nonacademics are deducted, the consensus among full-time law professors and
other academics who have studied the matter still overwhelmingly supports
the broad individual right view of the Amendment. 3 Based on the criteria it
Spannaus, State Firearms Regulation and the Second Amendment, 6 HAMLNE L. REv. 383 (1983) (article
by anti-gun state attorney general).
" Counting only post-1980 articles, the most recent publications are Nicholas J. Johnson, Shots Across
No Man's Land: A Response to Handgun Control, Inc.'s Richard Aborn, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 441
(1995); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995);
Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States' Rights: A Thought Experiment,
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737 (1995); James E. Ely, Jr., Book Review, 52 WM. & MARY Q. 212 (3d se-
ries) (1995); Jeremy Rabkin, Constitutional Firepower: New Light on the Meaning of the Second Amend-
ment, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231 (1995) (book review).
We annotate pre-1995 publications that appeared before Gun Crazy was published with a dagger (t)
to indicate the ones Gun Crazy fails to cite, while an asterisk (*) indicates those by historians rather than
law professors: FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 156t; LEONARD M. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMERS' CONSTrIUrION 341 (1988)'*; JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS
OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994)'* [hereinafter MALCOLM, ORIGINS]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992)t [hereinafter Amar, Fourteenth Amend-
ment]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991) [hereinafter
Amar, Bill of Rights]; Robert J. Cottrol, Second Amendment, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992)t [hereinafter Cottrol, OXFORD COMPANION];
Robert J. Cotrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Public Safety and the Right to Bear Arms, in AFTER 200 YEARS:
THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA (D. Bodenhamer & J. Ely eds., 1993)t [hereinafter Cottrol &
Diamond, Public Safety]; Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEo. L.J. 309 (1991) [hereinafter Cottrol & Diamond, Afro-Ameri-
canist Reconsideration]; Edward F. Leddy, Guns and Gun Control, in READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN
HISTORY 477-79 (Eric Foner & John A. Garrity eds., 1991)'*; Stephanie A. Levin, Grassroots Voices: Lo-
cal Action and National Military Policy, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 321 (1992)t; Sanford Levinson, The Embarrass-
ing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty
and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103 (1987); Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of the Peo-
ple to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tradition, 10 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983)t* [hereinafter
Malcolm, Common Law]; William Marina, Weapons, Technology and Legitimacy: The Second Amendment In
Global Perspective, in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE (Donald Kates ed., 1984)t*; Robert E. Shalhope, The
Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 125 (1986)'*; William Van Alstyne, The
Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994)t; David E. Vandercoy, The
History of the Second Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1007 (1994)t; Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T.
Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE L.J. 995 (1994)t (book review) [hereinafter Cottrol & Dia-
mond, Fifth Auxiliary Right]; F. Smith Fussner, Book Review, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 582 (1986)'*; Joyce
Lee Malcolm, Book Review, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 452 (1986)'* [hereinafter Malcolm, Review]; David
Wootton, Disarming the English, LONDON REV. BOOKS, July 21, 1994, at 20-22t*; see also MICHAEL KENT
CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986)t;
Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE LJ. 57
(1993)t; James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Con-
stitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 328 (1990); Elaine Scan-y, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear
Policy, Distribution, and the Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257 (1991)'*; John Choon Yoo, Our
Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967 (1993)t; Glenn H. Reynolds, The Right to Keep and
Bear Arms Under the Tennessee Constitution: A Case Study in Civic Republican Thought, 61 TENN. L. REV.
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selects, post-1972 law review articles by law professors, Gun Crazy and just
one other law review article deny the broad individual right view.4 Several
more law professor-authored articles catalog positions taken by each side
without themselves supporting either, 5 and there is also student work on
both sides.' 6 After our manuscript was written, but before its publication, we
became aware of the existence, or impending publication, of several more law
review articles. Though the authors are not associated with the gun lobby, all
support the broad individual right position. 7
647 (1994) (extensively discussing the Second Amendment in relation to the Tennessee Constitution).
Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 138 n.359, classifies two other articles as being "Coln the broad individu-
al right side" though they attempt to reconcile this right with gun prohibition: David C. Williams, Civic
Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Tern'ing Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991) (argu-
ing that the Amendment is an individual right but may not be applicable to a present in which only one-half
of households are armed, as its purpose was to ensure that the entire populace would be armed) and Donald
L. Beschle, Reconsidering the Second Amendment: Constitutional Protection for a Right of Security, 9
HAMLINE L. REV. 69 (1986) (conceding that the Amendment does guarantee a right of personal security, but
arguing that this can constitutionally be implemented by banning and confiscating all guns).
" Gun Crazy, supra note 7, fails to mention one other law professor's article supporting its position:
George Anastaplo, Amendments to the Constitution of the United States: A Commentary, 23 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 631, 688-93 (1992).
" Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights ". A Bicentennial Per-
spective, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 453 (1992); Andrew Jay McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U. L.
R .53 (1992).
" The following student works support the individual right view: T. Markus Funk Comment, Gun
Control and Economic Discrimination: The Melting-Point Case-In-Point, 85 J. CIuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
764 (1995); Kurt F. Kluin, Note, Gun Control: Is It a Legal and Effective Means of Controlling Firearms in
the United States?, 21 WAsHBURN L.J. 244 (1982); Eric C. Morgan, Note, Assault Rifle Legislation: Unwise
and Unconstitutional, 17 AM. L. CRIM. L. 143 (1990); Robert A. O'Hare, Jr. & Jorge Pedreira, Note, An
Uncertain Right: The Second Amendment and the Assault Weapon Legislation Controversy, 66 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 179 (1992); Kevin D. Szczepanski, Comment, Searching for the Plain Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 197 (1996); Jay R. Wagner, Comment, Gun Control Legislation and the
Intent of the Second Amendment: To What Extent Is There an Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms?, 37
VILL. L. REV. 1407 (1992).
The following student works support the anti-individual right view: Daniel Abrams, Topic, Ending the
Other Arms Race: An Argument for a Ban on Assault Weapons, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 488 (1992);
Scott Bursor, Note, Toward a Functional Framework for Interpreting the Second Amendment, 74 Tax. L.
REV. 1125 (1996); Michael T. O'Donnell, Note, The Second Amendment: A Study of Recent Trends, 25 U.
RICH. L. REV. 501 (1991) (suggesting that, whatever the actual intent of the Amendment the lower federal
courts have refused to enforce it to invalidate gun control laws); Mark Udulutch, Note, The Constitutional
Implications of Gun Control and Several Realistic Gun Control Proposals, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19 (1989).
" Thomas McAfee & Michael J. Quinlan, Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do
Text, History or Precedent Stand in the Way?, 75 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997); Brannon Denning, Can
the Simple Cite Be Trusted: Lower Court Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the Second
Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961 (1996); Nicholas J. Johnson, Plenary Power and Constitutional Out-
casts: Federal Power, Critical Race Theory, and the Second Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1555 (1996); Inge Anna Larish, Why Annie Can't Get a Gun: A Feminist Perspective on the Second
Amendment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 467 (1996); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual's Right
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Gun Crazy suggests that "one's scholarly views of the Amendment are
determined primarily by one's position on gun control."' 8 This is demonstra-
bly false, at least with respect to those scholars who support the individual
right interpretation. The great majority of historians and law professors who
have written on the subject have never owned a gun in their lives and do not
desire to own guns or to have any association with the gun lobby. Their mo-
tivation is primarily one of simple intellectual integrity, but there is a second-
ary motivation as well: the need to take rights seriously, even rights with
which they may not agree. 9
Many of these professors have long been closely associated with the ACLU
and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. As former ACLU
national board member Alan Dershowitz has said:
Foolish liberals who are trying to read the Second Amendment out of
the Constitution by claiming it's not an individual right or that it's too
much of a public safety hazard don't see the danger in the big picture.
They're courting disaster by encouraging others to use the same means
to eliminate portions of the Constitution they don't like.2"
to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 1997); Michael J. Quinlan, Is There a Neutral Justification for
Refusing to Implement the Second Amendment or Is the Supreme Court Just "Gun Shy"?, 22 CAPITAL U. L.
REv. 641 (1993); Gregory Lee Shelton, Comment, In Search of the Lost Amendment: Challenging Federal
Firearms Regulation Through Utilization of the "State's Right" Interpretation of the Second Amendment,
1995 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105 (1995); T. Markus Funk, Is the True Meaning ofthe Second Amendment
Really Such a Riddle?: Tracing the Historical "Origins of an Anglo-American Right," 39 HOWARD L.J. 411
(1995) (book review).
IS Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 144.
SVan Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1254:
The difference between [people who take civil liberties seriously] and others... is that such
serious people begin with a constitutional understanding that declines to trivialize the Second
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment, just as they likewise decline to trivialize any other
right expressly identified elsewhere in the Bill of Rights. It is difficult to see why they are less
than entirely right in this unremarkable view. That it has taken the NRA to speak for them, with
respect to the Second Amendment, moreover, is merely interesting-perhaps far more as a com-
ment on others, however, than on the NRA.
Cf. Levinson, supra note 13, at 657-58:
As Ronald Dworkin has argued, what it means to take rights seriously is that one will hbnor them
even when there is significant social cost in doing so. If protecting freedom of speech, the rights
of criminal defendants, or any other part of the Bill of Rights were always (or even most of the
time) clearly costless to the society as a whole, it would truly be impossible to understand why
they would be as controversial as they are .... "Cost-benefit" analysis, rightly or wrongly, has
come to be viewed as a "conservative" weapon to attack liberal rights. Yet one finds that the ta-
bles are strikingly turned when the Second Amendment comes into play.
2 As quoted in Dan Gifford, The Conceptual Foundations of Anglo-American Jurisprudence in Rell-
To discriminate among the constitutional rights that one is willing to defend
is ruinous to the credibility of those who exhort or hector public officials to
honor rights with which those officials may disagree or which they may wish
to disregard.2
We recognize, incidentally, the novelty and inappropriateness of discussing
such personal matters in a scholarly forum. That only illustrates the unfortu-
nate effect of Gun Crazy's descent into falsehood, guilt by association, and
character assassination as modalities of legal analysis. Of course, some of the
scholars Gun Crazy assaults do entertain views on firearms policy that differ
from those of Gun Crazy's author, but this does not impugn their scholarship
on the Second Amendment. Moreover, Gun Crazy misrepresents their views
by portraying them as "gun lobby" stooges and champions of pro-gun irre-
dentism. In fact, at least two scholars it so assaults argue that the great major-
ity of the public, including most gun owners, recognize the need for sensible
gun controls-and that this majority is dissipated because gun owners are
driven into the arms of the NRA by the extremist anti-gun goals and vituper-
ative rhetoric that Gun Crazy epitomizes.'
Gun Crazy describes itself as "an Article about.., deceit, misperception,
and dereliction of responsibility.... ."' As we shall show in this Part and in
glon and Reason, 62 TENN. L. REV. 759, 789 (1995).
"s This view was also advanced by the Warren Court in defense of its controversial Bill of Rights
decisions:
As no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference, so none should suffer subordination or deletion.
[Consider] ... Senator Albert J. Beveridge['s warning] ... in 1920, a time when there was also
manifested impatience with some of the restrictions of the Constitution in the presumed interest
of security. His appeal was to the Constitution-to the whole Constitution, not to a mutilating
selection of those parts only which for the moment find favor.
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,428 (1955) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the
Court quoted the Beveridge speech:
If liberty is worth keeping and free representative government worth saving, we must stand for
all American fundamentals-not some, but all. All are woven into the great fabric of our national
well-being. We cannot hold fast to some only, and abandon others that, for the moment, we find
inconvenient. If one American fundamental is prostrated, others in the end will surely fall.
Id. at 428 n.3.
' See Cottrol & Diamond, Public Safety, supra note 13, at 85-86; see also Don B. Kates, Jr., The
Battle over Gun Control, 84 PUB. INTEREST 42 (1986); Don B. Kates, Jr., Bigotry Symbolism, and Ideology
in the Battle over Gun Control, 1992 PuB. INTEREsT L. REv. 31; Lance K. Stell, Guns, Politics and Reason,
9 J. AM. CULTURE 71 (1986).
' Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 57.
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Part II, Gun Crazy is projecting its own deficiencies onto those who share the
individual right view of the Second Amendment. First, Gun Crazy repeatedly
harps on the need for truth, the virtues of truth, and the "dialogic
responsibility"' 4 of scholars, politicians, and journalists to tell the truth. But
the truth is that Gun Crazy presents a pastiche of ignorant and/or careless
factual errors, outright lies, half-truths, suppressed facts, tendentious reason-
ing, ad homines, epithets, and assumed premises conveyed in hyper-emotional
verbiage. The most charitable view that may be taken of many of Gun
Crazy's assertions is that the article is beset by its own slovenly research and
by credulous dependence on partisan sources whose partisanship Gun Crazy
conceals from its readers.
Second, Gun Crazy solemnly speculates that the reason so few law pro-
fessors have been willing to speak out against the gun lobby may be that
"real political controversy and ugly cross-talk, may simply be too off-putting
for the taste of many in the legal academy."' The fact is that Gun Crazy is
a paradigm of irrelevant "ugly cross-talk" and ad homines in the law review
debate over the Second Amendment. Its apparent purpose is to deter the pub-
lication of politically incorrect scholarship by heaping calumny and vitupera-
tion on scholars whose research has led them, however reluctantly, to conclu-
sions it finds uncongenial.
Although Gun Crazy also advances arguments for its militia-centric view of
the Second Amendment (which we examine below), 6 these consist in a re-
hash of the points made in more obscure articles published by paid advocates
for anti-gun groups-whom Gun Crazy does not so identify, though it takes
great pains to so identify articles by NRA employees. Indeed, we hasten to
note that, despite the notorious acrimony of the popular gun debates, rival
expositions of the Second Amendment by paid employees of anti-gun and
pro-gun groups are far more honest and intellectually compelling than is Gun
Crazy, and they have in the main not resorted to the epithets, ad homines,
and falsehoods that mar Gun Crazy. Gun Crazy represents a departure from
standards of civility and scholarship that heretofore have prevailed in the
legal literature on the Amendment.
2 Id. at 62. By our count Gun Crazy uses this term 14 times, not including in its subtitle. See gen-
erally, id. at 117-48.
" Id. at 139.
26 See infra Part Ill.
' Compare Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12 (activists defending the militia-centric approach), and
Henigan, supra note 12 (same), with Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., The Second Amendment Ain't About Hunting,
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To discredit the overwhelming consensus of scholarly opinion supporting
the politically incorrect view of the Second Amendment, Gun Crazy employs
techniques most often associated in this country with the late Senator Joseph
McCarthy (R-WI). The charge of McCarthyism is often so lightly made that
we hesitated before making it. Yet, as we show in this Part, there is no more
descriptive a label for the character assassination, guilt by association, and
conspiracism with which Gun Crazy defames law professors whose views it
finds uncongenial. We realize that these, like the accusations leveled by Gun
Crazy at Second Amendment scholars, are serious charges. To substantiate
them will require a detailed analysis of Gun Crazy's claims. For those who
find the detail in which we address these accusations tiresome, we suggest
skipping ahead after reading only as long as is necessary to satisfy themselves
of the falsity of Gun Crazy's charges.
Gun Crazy takes a two-step approach. The first step is to accuse the "gun
lobby"---referring to those associated with political activism in defense of the
right to own and possess guns-of consciously lying about the true meaning
of the Second Amendment. Gun Crazy is replete with such phrases as:
Dishonesty also dominates the gun lobby's discussion of [case law] on
the Second Amendment."
the gun lobby's dishonest manipulation of constitutional meaning 9
Second Amendment deception30
Fabricated Meanings of the Second Amendment'
the constitutional fish story told by the gun lobby
a monumental myth33
a constitutional deception
phantom constitutional barriers"
misinformation campaign"'
Second Amendment sleight-of-hand37
34 How. L.J. 589 (1991) (activist defending the individual right theory), and Thomas M. Moncure, Who Is
the Militia-The Virginia Ratification Convention and the Right to Bear Arms, 19 LINC. L. REV. 1 (1990)
(same).
2 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 104.
" Id. at 148.
I d. at 61.
31 Id. at 63.
11 Id. at 61.
11 Id. at 110.
Id. at 63, 110.
I d. at 61.
Id. at 103.
31 Id.
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the gun lobby's constitutional distortion3"
the gun lobby's Second Amendment misrepresentation39
The terms "fabrication, .... deception," and "deceit" appear repeatedly
throughout the article.
The second step is to charge or imply that seemingly neutral scholars have
reached the same duplicitous conclusions because of their concealed connec-
tions to the gun lobby.
The deception that leading constitutional scholars are accused of perpetrat-
ing on the American public is two-fold: First, they are accused of concealing
from their readers the supposed fact that courts have uniformly rejected the
individual right conception of the Second Amendment. Second, they are ac-
cused of deliberately distorting the historical evidence they cite in support of
the individual right conception, indeed of borrowing their distorted evidence
from gun-rights activists. As we shall see, when separated from the rhetoric,
the facts alleged to justify these serious charges-assuming they were
true-are remarkably thin. In any event, as we shall show, the facts alleged
are false.
In sum, Gun Crazy portrays major figures in constitutional law as propa-
gandists masquerading as scholars. Following their fixed agenda of erecting
"phantom constitutional barriers"" to gun control, they participate in duping
gullible legal scholars and the general public into accepting "the gun lobby's
well-orchestrated propaganda campaign";4 they know the truth, but deny it
in "dereliction of [their] dialogical responsibility"'42 as scholars to "speak the
'truth"'; 43 they are in the forefront of the "rabidly vocal minority"' being
"effectively mobilized"'45 by the NRA "to drown out and shout down virtual-
ly all other voices in the constitutional conversation."46 Even after being in-
formed of the falsity of these charges, Gun Crazy's author's unrepentant
commitment to this method of discourse is revealed by his subsequent state-
3sId. at I111.
I d. at 113.
41 Id. at 61.
"4 Id. at 148.
"1 Id. at 139.
I4Id. at 135.
" Id. at 61.
4S Id.
" Id.
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ment to a reporter that "[t]he majority of these articles could have been
spewed out of the N.R.A.'s word processor."'47
A. Deceitfully Ignoring Case Law
Gun Crazy's principal charge is that Akhil Reed Amar, Sanford Levinson,
William Van Alstyne, Robert Cottrol, and others deliberately deceive readers
by not acknowledging (or acknowledging "fully"4 ) what Gun Crazy re-
peatedly misdescribes as fifty years of unanimous federal court rejection of
the individual right view of the Amendment.49 "The failure" to tell the truth,
according to Gun Crazy, "lies in refusing to mention the scope of the case
law that confines the 'right to bear arms' to only the narrowest of circum-
stances."5
Notice the slippery nature of this charge: "refusing to mention" sounds like
the sanctionable violation of professional ethics committed by a lawyer who
deliberately omits relevant case law when making a legal argument."' But
when "the scope" is added, an element of judgment has been introduced. The
failure now may consist only of a disagreement about the significance or
meaning of the case law rather than a concealment of relevant data.
Moreover, Herz expresses an antiquated, if not completely idiosyncratic,
view of what he terms the "dialogic responsibility" of scholars. Even in areas
where the case law is far more settled than that which concerns the right to
arms, scholars are not limited to addressing issues in terms of "black letter
law." Many constitutional theorists understand their task as scholars to be to
substantiate their constitutional interpretations with the aim of influencing
" Gun Crazy's author as quoted in Scott Heller, The Right to Bear Arms, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUC., July 21, 1995, at A8 [hereinafter CHRONICLE] (responding to protests raised against Gun Crazy's
inaccuracy).
, Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 143.
Id. at 82 (referring to "more than fifty years of settled jurisprudence"); id. at 139 ("[The scholars]
inexplicably ignore, or summarily dismiss, the judicial consensus rejecting the broad individual right posi-
tion.") By our count Gun Crazy refers explicitly to a "judicial consensus" 14 times.
Id. at 139.
" FED. R. Civ. P., Rule 11. Analogous, particularly in light of Gun Crazy's innumerable references to
"fraud" and "deception," is the fraudulent sale of goods or securities. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1710
(WVest 1985) (actionable deceit includes "[tihe suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or
who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact ...
."); CAL CIVIL CODE § 1572 (West 1982) (Actionable fraud includes "[t]he suppression of that which is
true, by one having knowledge or belief of the fact...."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Chs. 22-23
(1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 160-61 (1981).
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future judicial decisions. The fact that courts may have decided questions
differently than would the theorist is precisely what motivates the research. It
is far from clear to us that scholars evaluating, for example, the original un-
derstanding of a statute or constitutional provision are ethically bound to
emphasize or even mention the fact that courts, which may not have even
considered the scholars' approach, have adopted a different understanding.
Whether the charge of "deceit, misperception, and dereliction of responsi-
bility," 2 is fair when referring to the omission of case law in a scholarly
article, in this case it is wrong on both counts. The cases are not monolithic
and Second Amendment scholars have not ignored them.
As we shall now show, Gun Crazy only attains its supposedly "broad," 3
"clear" and "striking judicial consensus" 5 by misstating opinions, miscon-
struing dicta as holdings, and failing to disclose contrary opinions. Moreover,
none of the opinions cited in Gun Crazy discusses the historical research that
has led to the prevailing scholarly consensus. In most of the cases no more
than a sentence or two is addressed to Second Amendment issues.
1. Supreme Court Discussions of the Amendment
Despite its claims about the definitive effect of judicial construction, Gun
Crazy eschews anything beyond brief reference to Supreme Court opinions
which concern the Amendment. This is necessary because neither the Court's
treatment of the Amendment discussed in Gun Crazy nor those treatments not
mentioned in Gun Crazy square with Gun Crazy's characterization of them as
monolithic.
a. Supreme Court Opinions Discussed by Gun Crazy
In United States v. Miller,56 the only Supreme Court case to consider ex-
plicitly the nature and scope of the people's right to keep and bear arms, the
Court held that an indictment should not have been dismissed on the blanket
theory that any law taxing and requiring registration of sawed-off shotguns
52 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 57.
I d. at 140.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 104.
- 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
1152 [Vol. 45
violated the Second Amendment ipso facto. Neither of the indicted defendants
were, or claimed to be, members of the militia, or of any military group.
Without suggesting that they needed to allege such a status, the Miller Court
reversed and remanded the case, stating that:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of
a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this
time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency
of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is
not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary
military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common de-
fense.57
Gun Crazy claims that the Court in Miller:
[W]ent only as far as was necessary to dispose of the case before it. The
Miller holding most plausibly means only that it is a necessary condition
that a firearm be useful to the militia and an individual's service therein,
not that military utility is a sufficient condition to grant constitutional
protection. The individual using the firearm still must be doing so in the
context of service in a government-organized (not independent) mili-
tia.58
Although we do not claim that the meaning of the opinion in Miller is
beyond dispute, this passage from Gun Crazy is revealing for a number of
reasons. First, its claim that the Court "went only as far as was necessary to
dispose of the case before it," would be plainly wrong had the Court accepted
Gun Crazy's "narrow, militia-centric" ' 9 theory of the Second Amendment.
To the contrary, the Court would not have had to go nearly as far as it did,
but could simply have reversed on the ground that the defendants lacked
standing to raise a Second Amendment challenge because they were not
members of a "government-organized" state militia." Unless the Court ac-
cepted that gun ownership by ordinary citizens not involved in a "govern-
ment-organized" militia is a right protected by the Amendment, the defen-
dants simply were in no position to challenge the law. The only reason the
" Id. at 178 (emphasis added). In support of this position, the Court then cites Aymette v. State, 21
Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158 (1840), a case which flatly held the right to arms to be an individual right, but
then held that it excluded nonmilitary arms, i.e., that a bowie knife is not the type of military weapon pro-
tected by the Tennessee State Constitution.
" Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 69.
s' Id. at 80.
' See Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Court had to remand to consider whether a sawed-off shotgun is the kind of
firearm the Amendment protects is that the Justices accepted, at least implicit-
ly, that individuals do have standing to invoke the Second Amendment. Thus,
Gun Crazy's claim that "[t]he Miller holding most plausibly means only that
it is a necessary condition that a firearm be useful to the militia and an
individual's service therein, not that military utility is a sufficient condition to
grant constitutional protection"6' is a highly implausible law office distinc-
tion.
Second, Gun Crazy claims that, "[t]he individual using the firearm still
must be doing so in the context of service in a government-organized (not
independent) militia."' Gun Crazy quotes no language to this effect because
there simply is nothing in the opinion that says any such thing. Nor has the
Supreme Court ever explicitly or implicitly adopted such a theory. Therefore,
it is improper to suggest, as we think the passage quoted above63 on the
whole does, that this was the holding of Miller. It is particularly improper in
light of the fact, which is neither acknowledged nor denied in Gun Crazy,
that its narrow militia-centric theory was argued to the Court. The brief for
the United States, the only brief filed in the case, "argued that the [Second
Amendment] right was a collective one that [only] protected the people when
carrying arms as members of the state militia."' The Court failed to adopt
this militia-centric theory despite the fact that the appellee-defendants filed no
brief in the case.
To us, it seems the "most plausible" interpretation of the Miller Court's
order to remand was that it rejected the view Gun Crazy advocates. 5 More-
61 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 69.
I d. (emphasis added).
" See supra text accompanying note 58.
6 ROBERT J. COTrOtL, I GuN CONTROL AND THE CONSITUTON xxvii (1993). See Brief for United
States at 15-16, Miller (No. 696). This fact was known to Herz because Gun Crazy cites Cottrol, supra. See
Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 143 n.390. Further, far from, "ignor[ing]" or "summarily dismiss[ing]," Id. at
139, this case, Robert Cottrol discusses it at greater length (two pages vs. one) than Gun Crazy, adds orig-
inal research (unlike Gun Crazy) examining the government's brief, and Cottrol reproduces the entire text of
this case (and two others) in his anthology. Nonetheless Gun Crazy accuses Cottrol of having "ignored what
the courts have said-omitting material in gross measure." Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 143.
6" Gun Crazy also does not inform readers that the Miller Court reached its basically individual right
result even though the individual right position was not argued to the Court. The matter went up from the
trial court on the government's appeal; by the time it was briefed one of the defendants had died, and the
other apparently did not engage counsel. The only brief filed was the government's.
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over, in contrast to Gun Crazy's use of the term "government-organized mili-
tia," the Court described a militia as follows:
The signification attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates
in the Convention, the history and legislation of [the] Colonies and [the]
States, and the writings of approved commentators. These show plainly
enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting
in concert for the common defense. "A body of citizens enrolled for
military discipline." And further, that ordinarily when called for service
these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves
and of the kind in common use at the time."
Once again, while far from clear, this passage is not inhospitable to the view
that it is a private individual right to keep and bear arms which is protected.
For only if there existed such a "body of citizens" in possession of "arms
supplied by themselves," could they, should the need arise, be "enrolled for
military discipline" to act "in concert for the common defense."
We consider the relationship between the Militia Clause and the individual
right to keep and bear arms at greater length below;67 at this juncture the
important issue is this: Is a scholar who disagrees with Gun Crazy's inter-
pretation of Miller, and says so, engaging in "deception"--a term that Gun
Crazy uses nine times in the article?' Would scholars who ignore this enig-
matic case to present their own view of "the debates in the Convention, the
history and legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved
commentators"'69 be engaging in "dereliction"--a term that Gun Crazy uses
twelve times-of their responsibility as scholars? 0
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) (emphasis added).
, See infra Part III.
6' See Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 62 (previewing a section of the article that focuses on "deception").
Miller, 307 U.S. at 179.
" Gun Crazy also emphasizes the continued refusal of the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to reverse
lower court cases in which the broad individual right theory was supposedly rejected. Gun Crazy, supra note
7, at 77 ("The Court has denied certiorari in at least nine cases in which the lower courts relied on Miller to
reject Second Amendment challenges.") (footnote omitted). while this may reflect the Court's "deep disin-
clination to disturb existing doctrine" as Gun Crazy asserts, id. at 77, it may also simply represent the
Justices' sympathy for gun control provisions and their inability to justify credibly a judicial repeal of the
Second Amendment or the fact that, in the main, the regulations under review applied only to convicted
felons. Because it is so difficult to interpret a refusal to grant certiorari, such denials are not considered a
comment on the merits, as Gun Crazy concedes. See id. ("orthodox understanding views a denial of certiora-
ri as making no comment on the merits"). Once again, is it a failure of "dialogic responsibility" to disregard
the Court's denial of certiorari when writing about the Second Amendment?
19961 1155
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Gun Crazy also discusses two nineteenth century Supreme Court cases,
United States v. Cruikshank,7  and Presser v. Illinois." Gun Crazy empha-
sizes that these nineteenth century cases hold, as they do, that the Second
Amendment does not apply against the states, either by its own force or by
incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment," and that the Supreme
Court "has not seen fit to revisit those earlier decisions, refusing to grant
certiorari in any of the cases dismissing Second Amendment challenges to
state regulations on nonincorporation grounds."' Then Gun Crazy criticizes
"gun-rights activists" for arguing "that these decisions are meaningless be-
cause they came prior to the onset of the modem incorporation doctrine."7
Gun Crazy fails to mention, much less address, the general agreement
among those scholars who have addressed the issue that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically intended to
incorporate the personal right to arms.76 By confining its discussion of these
two cases to the issue of incorporation, Gun Crazy misleadingly fails to note
that, in both cases, the Court refused to apply the right to keep and bear arms
to the states, not because it was a collective right or because it was a militia-
centric right, but because the Fourteenth Amendment did not empower the
courts to protect any individual rights mentioned in the Bill of Rights. That
is, the Court treated the Second Amendment as an individual right fully on
par with other parts of the Bill of Rights construed in the same cases." This
l' 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (right to arms and right to assemble constrain only governmental action not
private action).
116 U.S. 252, 265 (1885) (right to arms constrains only federal action not private action). Along
with Miller, the full text of this opinion appears in Robert Cottrol's anthology. See GUN CONTROL AND THE
CONSTrUTION, supra note 64, at 86.
" See Presser, 116 U.S. at 265:
(A] conclusive answer to the contention that this amendment prohibits the legislation in question
lies in the fact that the amendment is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the Na-
tional government, and not upon that of the States. It was so held by this court in the case of
United States v. Cruikshank ....
7 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 72.
I d. Notice the inconsistency between this claim and Gun Crazy's primary charge that "gun-rights
activists" and scholars have neglected to discuss these cases in their writings.
'6 CURTIS, supra note 13, at 104 ("Among the rights that Republicans in the Thirty-ninth Congress
relied on as absolute rights of the citizens of the United States were the right to freedom of speech, the right
to due process of law, and the right to bear arms:). See also id. at 52, 53, 56, 72, 88, 140-41 and 164 (cit-
ing different references to the right to bear arms in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment); Amar, Four-
teenth Amendment, supra note 13, at 1205-11, 1261-62 (same); Aynes, supra note 13, at 84, 98 (same); Van
Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1251-53 (discussing how the right to keep and bear arms figures in the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
" The Supreme Court cases holding the Second Amendment inapplicable to the states are: Miller v.
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fact undermines Gun Crazy's assertion that a judicial monolith, whose exis-
tence no honest scholar can deny or ignore, has consistently rejected a broad
individual right when construing the Second Amendment.
Gun Crazy assigns to a brief and misleading footnote one of the Supreme
Court's most important modem mentions of the Second Amendment. In Unit-
ed States v. Verdugo-Urquidez the Court noted that, as the phrase "right of
the people" is used throughout the Constitution, it always denotes citizens and
their rights against government. In focusing on the Fourth Amendment, the
case suggests that the words "the people" are to be interpreted in par! materia
as they appear in the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments,
and in the body of the Constitution as well.79 After suggesting this, the
Court proceeded to recognize, as it had to, that "the people" is used in con-
trast to the "state," and is equated at least to the entire individual citizenry
(although it may not include aliens who lack residency or other connection to
the country)."
Gun Crazy's sketchy description of the case in a footnote fails to explain
Verdugo-Urquidez sufficiently for readers to understand that the Court is
rejecting the textual contradiction inherent in any approach which, like Gun
Crazy's, requires giving "the people" a wholly different meaning in the Sec-
ond Amendment than in the rest of the Bill of Rights. Having ducked that
issue, Gun Crazy is able to get by with the following misleading response:
the Court's comment about "the people" does not even begin to address
the central question of the Second Amendment's scope: whether the
Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894) (also holding the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to the states); and Presser v.
Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265-67 (1886) (First and Second Amendments inapplicable to the states). The state-
ment to the same effect in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) is actually dictum because
the case's holding is that neither the right to arms nor the right of assembly is protected against private con-
duct but rather only against federal deprivation.
7s 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990). See also id. (referring, inter alia, to Art. I, § 2, cl. 1) (providing that the
House of Representatives is to be chosen "by the People of the several states"). It is noteworthy that the
dissent sought to define "the people" more broadly, not more restrictively.
"' Id. at 265. See also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) ("The first ten amendments
and the original Constitution were substantially contemporaneous and should be construed in par! materia"),
overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). Cf. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501
U.S. 868, 889 (1991) ("[Ihe Constitution's terms are illuminated by their cognate provisions.").
'0 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. See also id. at 266 (describing the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment as being "to protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Gov-
ernment").
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right to arms applies to "the people" for all purposes, or only in connec-
tion with militia service.8'
Of course, no affirmation of any broad individual right retained by the people
mentioned in the Constitution "address[es] the central question of [its] scope."
This is as true of the right to freedom of speech as it is of the right to keep
and bear arms.
Verdugo-Urquidez is both inconsistent with the commonly proffered
"state's right to form a militia" interpretation of the Second Amendment and
consistent with the broad individual right interpretation. In no manner can it
fairly be interpreted as part of a consistent judicial consensus that rejects the
broad individual right approach and that all honest legal scholars must ac-
knowledge when offering their own interpretation.
b. Supreme Court Opinions Omitted by Gun Crazy
In addition to distorting the cases it cites to make it appear that "the courts
have consistently found that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to
bear arms only for those individuals who are part of the 'well regulated Mili-
tia,"' Gun Crazy omits some cases as well.
Gun Crazy contains no discussion of the earliest mention by the Supreme
Court of the right to keep and bear arms in Chief Justice Taney's justly infa-
mous opinion in Dred Scott.2 As an argumentum ad horribilis, Chief Justice
Taney emphasized that to hold that blacks could be citizens would involve
accepting that they enjoyed all the rights of citizens: "the full liberty of
speech ... and to keep and carry arms wherever they went."83 Like the
Founders and the nineteenth century commentators we discuss below,"
Taney mentioned the right to arms without differentiating it from other con-
stitutional rights he mentions in the same passage, including freedom of
speech and assembly, jury trial, and against self-incrimination.85 And con-
trary to the militia-centric thesis advocated in Gun Crazy, Taney's opinion
" Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 73 n.56.
, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
Id. at 417.
'4 See infra at Part IlI.B.2.
11 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 417. See also id. at 450 ("Nor can Congress deny to the people
the right to keep and bear arms, nor the right to trial by jury, nor compel any one to be a witness against
himself in a criminal proceeding.").
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assumed that all white citizens then enjoyed the guarantee of an individual
right "to keep and carry arms wherever they went" 6 without making any
connection of this right to militia service. As discussed below, Taney's com-
ments represent a universal understanding in his generation-the generation
which followed that of the Founders-of the Amendment as an individual
right not necessarily connected to the militia. Though abolitionist legal theo-
rists disagreed with Taney on virtually everything else, they agreed with him
on this. 7
In addition, Gun Crazy omits any reference to two other nineteenth century
Supreme Court cases that assume the right referred to in the Second Amend-
ment is of an equal status to other constitutional rights.88 Of greater signif-
icance is that the latest Supreme Court opinion mentioning the Amendment
does the same thing. In their landmark joint opinion in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey 9 Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter quoted with approval
Justice Harlan's statement that the "full scope of ... liberty" is not limited to
"the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms;
the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures."'  Casey reaffirmed
the right of privacy, a right it viewed as belonging to an individual and that
can be asserted by the individual against the federal government or a state.
The Justices used this quote from Justice Harlan to convey the view that such
an unenumerated right had the same constitutional status as all the enumerat-
ed rights in this list. All these rights retained by the people are considered by
Id. at 417.
Two prominent lawyers of the day, Lysander Spooner and Joel Tiffany, argued that slavery was
unconstitutional using exactly the same reasoning as Taney, albeit in the converse. Slavery was unconstitu-
tional, in part, they argued, because the laws enforcing it deprived slaves of a host of constitutionally guar-
anteed personal rights including the right to arms, free speech, religion, and assembly. Far from seeing the
Amendment as confined to the militia (of which slaves were not members), they viewed it as founded on the
"natural right of all men 'to keep and bear arms' for their personal defence; and prohibit[ed] both Congress
and the State governments from infringing the right of 'the people'-that is, of any of the people-to do
so.... This right of a man- 'to keep and bear arms,' is a right palpably inconsistent with the idea of his
being a slave." LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 98 (rev. ed. 1860) in THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF LYsANDER SPOONER (Charles Shively ed., 1971). See also Joel Tiffany, TREATISE
ON THE UNCONSTFI1tJTONALrFY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 99 (1849) quoted in CURTIS, supra note 13, at 43
(listing the right to keep and bear arms among all those "guarantys, for personal security and liberty" se-
cured by the Constitution, without any militia qualification).
"7 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897) (equating the Second and First Amendments);
Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (equating the Second and Fourth Amendments).
'7 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 848 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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the Court to be on a par. No mention of a militia-centric qualification is
made.
None of these discussions receives any mention in Gun Crazy. Though all
are no more than very short dicta whose meaning or significance are open to
question, they should have merited particular attention in Gun Crazy, which
purports to show the existence of a clear, broad, and striking judicial consen-
sus that legal scholars are fraudulently ignoring.
2. Lower Federal Court Decisions
When criticizing Second Amendment scholars who have discussed Supreme
Court opinions, often at length though not to Gun Crazy's satisfaction, Gun
Crazy upbraids them for ignoring lower court decisions. "It requires an ad-
vanced case of Supreme Court-only tunnel vision" Herz says,
to ignore more than five decades of consistent interpretation from the
federal courts.... Every other federal court to consider the Second
Amendment subsequent to the Miller decision has adopted a narrow
militia-centric view of the right to bear arms. When scholars ignore that
consistent case law, they perpetuate the ignorant state of our gun control
discourse.9
According to Gun Crazy, there is a unanimous and unbroken consensus in the
lower federal courts:
Every federal appellate decision since Miller has rejected the broad-indi-
vidual-rights position and focused instead on whether use of a weapon
was related to maintenance of a well-regulated militia. Every such court
faced with the gun lobby's claim that Miller extends constitutional pro-
tection to all weapons with military utility has squarely rejected that
assertion.92
An examination of the cases Gun Crazy discusses-and those it does
not-fails to support this claim. Although most of its case citations are gener-
ally accurate, some of what Gun Crazy characterizes as holdings are actually
dicta; and it suppresses facts that crucially undercut its claims about how
dispositive this lower federal court case law is.
' Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 143-44.
2 d. at 74.
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Consider the dissonance between two things Gun Crazy asserts (though at
different points in the article and without noting their connection): (a) that
"firearms are virtually unregulated"'93 in the U.S., especially by the federal
government; and (b) that "more than fifty years of settled jurisprudence"
proves "no gun control law restricting or regulating any aspect of private pur-
chase, use, or possession of firearms should see invalidation on Second
Amendment grounds."'  Now if firearms are "virtually unregulated," how
likely is it that the cases are numerous and definitive enough to dispositively
exclude the possibility of constitutional invalidation?
This question is not merely a rhetorical one. For it turns out that almost all
the cases on which Gun Crazy relies involved firearms that were illegally
possessed by persons previously convicted of a felony." The proposition
that laws designed to disarm felons do not violate state or federal right to
arms guarantees is one that has been championed by the NRA since the
1910s-about 50 years prior to the existence of a national anti-gun move-
ment.' Although some of the cases Gun Crazy cites do ground their result
on the collective rights theory, many others simply affirm that the Second
Amendment does not bar laws against felons possessing arms. That is a posi-
tion fully acceptable to the NRA's leadership97 and to those who, in Gun
Crazy's view, "share the extreme views of the NRA." 8
Gun Crazy does address this interpretation of the cases, but terms it "dis-
ingenuous" because "it fails to take account of the handgun and machine gun
" Id. at 150 n.424. See also id. at 61 n.10 (quoting with approval Sugarmann & Rand to this effect);
id. at 113 (describing the U.S. legal system, as one "that permits virtually unrestrained access to unlimited
quantities of the most dangerous means of destruction").
Id. at 82.
" See, e.g., Marchese v. California, 545 F.2d 645, 646 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Johnson, 497
F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974); Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971); see also United
States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 1984) (illegal alien); United States v. Day, 476 F.2d 562 (6th
Cir. 1973) (person who was dishonorably discharged).
" For discussion of the NRA's promotion of the 1910s-20s Uniform Revolver Act and subsequent
gun control proposals see LEE KENNETr & JAMES LAVERNE ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA: THE ORI-
GINS OF A NATIONAL DILEMMA ch. 8 (1975); EDWARD F. LEDDY, MAGNUM FORCE LOBBY: THE NATIONAL
RIFLE ASSOCIATION FIGHTS GUN CONTROL ch. VI (1987). See generally, Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohi-
bition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 209-10 (1983).
" See the recent comment by the NRA's Executive Vice President: "Neither felons nor children under
eighteen, of course, have the right to own arms-any more than they have the right to vote. This restriction
is based on solid historical reasons ... [and the NRA] has for over seventy years supported laws to prohibit
gun ownership by those who have been convicted of violent crime." WAYNE R. LA PIERRE, GUNS, CRIME
AND FREEDOM 17 (1994).
" Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 57 n.2.
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bans upheld in Quilici and Farmer, respectively."" Farmer v. Higgins,'°°
however, does not uphold a machine gun ban against constitutional challenge.
Indeed Farmer says literally nothing about the Second Amendment. The issue
to which it expressly limits itself is statutory interpretation and the harmoniz-
ing of federal machine gun laws. °'0 Nonetheless, Gun Crazy thrice paren-
thetically characterizes this case as follows: "dismissing as without merit
appellee's claims that the Second Amendment provides a right to possess
machine-guns.""
In Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, °3 involving a municipal ordinance,
not a federal law, the court held, not that the Amendment permits such laws
(though its authors believed this to be case"°), but only that it does not in-
validate local legislation because of the nineteenth century Supreme Court
holdings that the Amendment is not incorporated against the states."S None-
theless, Gun Crazy parenthetically characterizes Quilici as follows: "finding
that a right to possess handguns is not guaranteed by the Second
Amendment.1' 1t6
In short, although some of the cases Gun Crazy cites do endorse its posi-
tion, almost all of these cases concern statutes that arguably are constitutional
even under the "broad-individual-right" view Gun Crazy denounces. In many
of these cases that Gun Crazy claims support its view, the opinions discuss
the Second Amendment so summarily that it is impossible to say that they are
adopting any position beyond their bare holding that the Amendment does not
give felons a right to own firearms. None rejects the evidence and arguments
presented by Second Amendment scholars in the recent law review literature.
Indeed, most were decided before that literature appeared.
Id. at 76 n.70.
907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990).
I Id. at 1045 ("[in light of the plain language of section 922(o), as well as its legislative history, we
hold that section 922(o) prohibits the private possession of machine guns not lawfully possessed prior to
May 19, 1986."). One of us has argued that machine gun ownership does not fall within the individual right
position and has so maintained since 1983. See Kates, supra note 96, at 261.
102 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 73 n.57, 74 n.59, & 79 n.85.
103 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982).
I0 In dictum, the opinion goes on to state what its authors "believe to be the scope of the second
amendment." Id. at 270.
"o See supra text accompanying notes 71-76, 88.
'o' Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 73 n.57.
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In the few cases where judges have displayed an awareness of the recent
literature, their treatment of the individual right view has tended to depart
widely from the pattern Gun Crazy represents to be universal and settled. For
instance, Gun Crazy cites a Ninth Circuit case which rejected the individual
right view in an opinion preceding the recent literature. 7 However, in the
1992 case of Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club v. Van de Kamp,' the court did
not reaffirmn the militia-centric theory. Instead, after being presented with
articles by both Sanford Levinson and David Williams, it rejected the
plaintiff's Second Amendment claim on the ground that the Amendment
applied only against the federal government (citing the preincorporation doc-
trine cases of Cruikshank and Presser) and not, as it had previously held,
because the Second Amendment protects only a collective right."° Never-
theless, in a later opinion in which it was not presented with the law review
literature, the Ninth Circuit rejected the individual right view."'
Gun Crazy also overlooks the concurring opinion in one Eighth Circuit
case it cites, which accepts the individual right view and explicitly rejects five
of the earlier opinions Gun Crazy cites."' Gun Crazy cites no Fifth Circuit
case supporting its view and, once again, fails to disclose that a recent Fifth
Circuit opinion, citing Sanford Levinson's article, suggests in dictum that the
Fifth Circuit would reject Gun Crazy's "narrow" militia-centric position."'
"' Marehese v. California, 545 F.2d 645, 646 (9th Cir. 1976).
' 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992).
"o Id. at 729 ("The Supreme Court, however, has held that the Second Amendment constrains only the
actions of Congress, not the states.... We are therefore foreclosed from considering these arguments.").
Although Gun Crazy cites this case, it fails to mention that the court cites and quotes from articles by both
Levinson and Williams. Levinson, supra note 13, and Williams, supra note 13, cited in Fresno Rifle and
Pistol Club, 965 F.2d at 730 n.8 (Levinson), 729 n.7 (Williams). Indeed the opinion quotes at length from
the latter article's description of both the militia-centric and the individual right view of the Amendment,
without commenting on the merits of the dispute. Id. at 729 n.7.
2' See Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir. 1996).
. United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 1992) (Beam, J., concurring):
I disagree ... that Cases v. United States ... United States v. Warin .... United States v.
Oakes,... and United States v. Nelson,... properly interpret the Constitution or the Supreme
Court's holding in United States v. Miller. . . insofar as they say that Congress has the power to
prohibit an individual from possessing any type of firearm, even when kept for lawful purposes.
22. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1364 nA6 (5th Cir. 1993), afJd on other grounds, 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1995):
It is also conceivable that some applications of section 922(q) might raise Second Amendment
concerns. Lopez does not raise the Second Amendment and thus we do not now consider it. Nev-
ertheless, this orphan of the Bill of Rights may be something of a brooding omnipresence here.
For an argument that the Second Amendment should be taken seriously, see Levinson, The Em-
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Most importantly, the principal problem with the lower federal court deci-
sions that Gun Crazy correctly cites as refusing to enforce the Second
Amendment is that they all derive from a questionable interpretation of Miller
and only Miller. Thus, "the vast caselaw""' that Gun Crazy touts so hyper-
bolically has greatly reduced, if any, weight if it turns out that it misconstrues
or departs from Miller. As to whether the case law does so, we quote one law
review treatment by an author whom Gun Crazy appears to hold in high es-
teem."14
At a minimum, then, Miller limits the scope of the Amendment to arms
suitable for use by militia.
Lower courts have suggested that Miller limits the right even further.
If the Amendment's purpose is only to assure the continuation and ren-
der possible the "effectiveness" of the militia, then it may protect state
governments against federal tampering with their militia, but it does not
guarantee individuals any rights at all. Some of Miller's language, how-
ever, is in tension with such a reading. In the eighteenth century, the
Court explained, the militia comprised all males physically capable of
acting in concert for the common defense, and "when called for service
these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by them-
selves." In other words, the Court strongly suggested that the Amend-
ment guarantees a private right to own guns, at least by all males of
arms-bearing age, so as to be ready for militia service."'
Can this group of sketchy opinions be considered a judicial consensus so
dispositive of the issue that no scholar can honestly address the Amendment
without both mentioning this consensus and conceding that it is dispositive?
Does the refusal of such scholars as William Van Alstyne, Akhil Amar,
Charles Cantrell, Robert Cottrol, Sanford Levinson, Nelson Lund, Nicholas
Johnson, and James Whisker,"6 to genuflect before these cases make them
part of "the gun lobby's well-orchestrated propaganda campaign to drown out
the judiciary's voice."?"7
barrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
.. Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 139.
"' See id. at 57 n.* (thanking David C. Williams for his "invaluable comments on earlier drafts").
Moreover, while Gun Crazy does not in any way disparage Professor Williams as it does other scholars, its
analysis of the Second Amendment, such as it is, is wholly at variance with Williams's analysis.
"' Williams, supra note 13, at 557-58 (emphasis added) (footnote citing many of the cases Gun Crazy
relies on omitted).
16 These are the persons identified by Gun Crazy as "failling] to acknowledge the contrary judicial
consensus." Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 143.
"I Id. at 148.
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3. Second Amendment Scholars Have Not Ignored Judicial Opinions
Even were this judicial record considered to be a consensus that no respon-
sible scholar could ignore, it is important to note that some of the professors
Gun Crazy assaults have not ignored the case law addressing the Second
Amendment. Professors Cottrol and Diamond, Lund, and Van Alstyne each
discuss it, though they concur in dismissing the case law as "scanty and utter-
ly undeveloped,""'  an "arrested jurisprudence,"" 9  "intellectually untena-
ble,""'2  "no useful body of law,"'2 ' and no "meaningful case law or
jurisprudence."'" As for Professor Johnson, although Gun Crazy taxes him
with not having cited relevant Second Amendment case law, his article in-
stead posits a right to gun ownership under the Ninth Amendment rather than
the Second," as Gun Crazy acknowledges.'24
Nor are those whom Gun Crazy traduces as exhibiting "pro-gun lobby
bias" alone in making such judgments. David C. Williams, whose academic
integrity is not questioned by Gun Crazy,'" treats these vaunted lower fed-
eral cases in the same perfunctory way for which Gun Crazy excoriates
Cottrol and Van Alstyne."6 Observing that the case law provides a "dearth
of judicial instruction,"'' Professor Williams cites a couple of the lower
federal cases as representative of the whole, and dismisses them as dubious
" Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1239.
I' ld. at 1240.
',' Lund, supra note 13, at 110.
.. Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1239.
" Cottrol & Diamond, Fifth Auxiliary Right, supra note 13, at 1000 n.18. See also id. at 999 ("The
Second Amendment also continues to be an arena ofjurisprudence from which the nation's highest court has
largely been absent.").
" See Nicholas 1. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms Viewed
Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1992).
"' See Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 143 n.391 where it parenthetically dismisses Johnson for "re-
viewing standard originalist sources-and ignoring contrary judicial interpretation-to locate a right to bear
arms in Ninth, rather than Second, Amendment." Gun Crazy cites no case law relevant to a Ninth Amend-
ment right to own guns---"contrary" or otherwise-nor are we aware of any. In what respect, then, are judi-
cial interpretations of the Second Amendment "contrary" to Johnson's analysis of the Ninth?
'" Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 57 n.* (thanking David C. Williams for his "invaluable comments on
earlier drafts").
"6 Gun Crazy's author has continued to characterize Amar, Levinson, Van Alstyne, Cottrol, etc., as
"totally irresponsible to ignore this judicial consensus." CHRONICLE, supra note 47 (quoting Andrew Herz).
"' Williams, supra note 13, at 558.
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and in conflict with the Supreme Court precedent they purported to be
folloking 2 8
Nevertheless, when Van Alstyne and Cottrol offer the same view of this
case law, Gun Crazy responds with a new contortion of its charge of deceit.
Whereas Amar, Levinson, and Others who ignore the case law (deeming it not
worth discussing) are guilty of deceit for not discussing it, Van Alstyne and
Cottrol who expressly dismiss the case law are deceitful in failing to ac-
knowledge (what Gun Crazy deems) its full importance:
Van Alstyne discusses only the scant Supreme Court case law, ignoring
the many state and lower federal court decisions of the last fifty-five
years.1
2 9
All of [Cottrol's writings on the Second Amendment] display a similar
disinclination to acknowledge filly judicial or scholarly views contrary
to the gun lobby's party line. 3'
It is on the basis of this type of hair-splitting that Gun Crazy disparages the
integrity of these prominent constitutional theorists. The leitmotif running
throughout Gun Crazy is that no scholar can honestly disagree with its view
of the right to arms. From that premise it follows that Akhil Amar, Sanford
Levinson, William Van Alstyne and others who disagree with Gun Crazy
must be stooges parroting "the gun lobby's Second Amendment misrepre-
sentation."'' We submit that reading these scholars' analyses will leave
quite a different impression. Indeed, University of Chicago law professor
Cass Sunstein, an observer whom no person could suspect of association with
the gun lobby, comments that Amar, Levinson et al. have made the argument
for a broad individual right view of the Amendment intellectually respect-
able.3 2 We must concede, however, that anyone who thinks Akhil Amar
and Sanford Levinson minions of the gun lobby will probably think the same
of Cass Sunstein.
'21 See id. at 557-58.
'9 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 141.
'Id. at 143 (emphasis added). See also id. at 142 ("Cottrol and Diamond's citation to only one of
dozens of like-minded decisions seriously downplays the broad judicial dismissal of any broad individual
right." (emphasis added)).
"3 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 112.
'32 As quoted in CHRONICLE, supra note 47, at AS. Professor Sunstein does not go so far as to endorse
the argument or take any position himself on the Amendment.
"' In fact, however, Professor Sunstein has never owned'a gun in his life, never wishes to do so, and
has no association with any gun rights organization. Personal communication (Aug. 22, 1995).
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4. A Bizarre Theory of Constitutional Meaning
In vilifying Second Amendment scholars for failing to acknowledge or
accord adequate weight to the opinions of courts, Gun Crazy advances, in
several places, a highly idiosyncratic theory of constitutional meaning:
Dishonesty also dominates the gun lobby's discussion of the judiciary's
read on the Second Amendment. Gun-rights advocates argue not only
that the Second Amendment should provide a broad, nearly absolute
individual right to bear firearms, but that the Amendment does in fact
guarantee all individuals a personal "right to bear arms" for all legal,
private purposes."
The gun-rights advocates' portrayal of the Second Amendment as
conferring a broad individual right is a monumental myth. It is a liber-
tarian pipe dream. It is a constitutional deception designed to further a
political agenda. It is an argument about what the Second Amendment
should guarantee-not a reflection of what it does guarantee in any
legally meaningful sense. 3'
Although it is perfectly natural and acceptable for pro-gun-rights
elected officials, media commentators, and scholars to argue that the
Second Amendment should be read to protect all private firearms owner-
ship, a dereliction of dialogic responsibility occurs when they claim that
the Second Amendment does provide broad constitutional cover for gun
owners.
136
Indeed, this claim lies at the very heart of Gun Crazy's charge that Second
Amendment scholars have acted deceptively. But what does this claim mean?
The legal positivist view of law that distinguishes between describing what
a law is and what it should be is commonplace, and perhaps that is what Gun
Crazy thinks it is adopting. But this distinction does not apply, at least not
easily, to a claim about what the Constitution means. A claim of constitution-
al meaning is normally spoken of the way we speak of facts: as either true or
false, correct or incorrect, probable or improbable, etc. Whether the positive
law agrees with that claim is another matter, but the fact that, at a particular
moment, positive law may disagree with a claimed constitutional meaning
does not in any way serve to refute or undermine that meaning."'
.. Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 104.
"I ld. at 110.
"' Id. at 118.
'" Except insofar as any consensus of thoughtful people tends to establish the plausibility of a particu-
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Anyone who reads the Constitution is entitled to render an opinion on what
it truly, correctly, or probably means-what it really does mean, not "should"
mean-and to support that claim with arguments and evidence. Second
Amendment scholars have done exactly that. They have not, or at least not
always, claimed that their interpretation has been accepted by courts and is
therefore "positive law." True, some treatments of judicial opinions by Sec-
ond Amendment scholars have attempted to show that judicial precedent is
not clearly in conflict with their interpretation, or is generally supportive of
it, and in this sense have claimed that their individual right interpretation is
supported by positive law. But whether those Second Amendment scholars
who make this argument are correct, they are clearly not guilty of ignoring
the case law.
Gun Crazy appears to be adopting as its interpretive methodology the legal-
realist-era aphorism that "the Constitution means what the Supreme Court
(and lower federal courts) says it means." But this aphorism was never meant
to be taken literally as a claim about meaning; it was simply a poetic state-
ment of the proposition that the Supreme Court has the last word as a matter
of positive law.
Let us put the matter another way: A lawyer representing a client might be
acting unethically if she represents to a court that the positive law concerning
the meaning of the Second Amendment is X when it really is Y. And a law-
yer might be acting irresponsibly if she recommends that a client bring a
lawsuit on the basis of what she thinks the Second Amendment really means
without telling the client that this interpretation had consistently been rejected
by the courts.
A lawyer is doing nothing unethical, however, by urging a court to adopt
what she believes in good faith to be a correct interpretation of the Second
Amendment, even though it is a meaning that courts had in the past consis-
tently rejected. When a lawyer makes such an argument she is not arguing
what the Second Amendment should mean (whatever that means), but what
the Second Amendment does mean.3 ' Indeed, that is the reason she is giv-
lar claim. For example, if a consensus of legal scholars who have studied the matter agree that the Second
Amendment protects a broad individual right, this may enhance the chances that this interpretation is correct.
It surely does not establirh its correctness, however, because the consensus could nevertheless be wrong.
" And this is so, regardless of one's theory of constitutional meaning, as long as one does not adopt
the view that the Constitution can actually mean whatever the court says it means. While this may indeed be
Herz's view, he should elaborate this novel theory of constitutional meaning before indicting other scholars
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hig for why the court should change its mind: because it has been wrong
about what the Constitution does mean. Note that this is precisely the dis-
tinction on which Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure turns, in
providing that a lawyer cannot be sanctioned for arguing for law reform or
change.
This is all Second Amendment scholars have ever argued with respect to
the meaning of the Second Amendment: that courts, law teachers, and others
are wrong about what the Constitution does mean, not what it should mean.
And, when making such a claim, there is no ethical imperative to discuss the
fact that some or even all courts have disagreed. In charging others with
scholarly deception for arguing what the Second Amendment does mean in
the face of disagreement by the courts-and this is its principal charge-Gun
Crazy manifests a serious intellectual confusion.
B. Other Supposed Scholarly Deceptions
Gun Crazy's accusations of willful duplicity by Second Amendment
scholars are not limited to the charge of concealing an alleged judicial con-
sensus. In perhaps the most scurrilous section of the article, Gun Crazy sin-
gles out three authors for special attention as examples of legal scholars who
fail to speak the truth: William Van Alstyne, Sanford Levinson, and Robert
Cottrol. a9 We consider the charges against each in turn.
1. William Van Alstyne
Gun Crazy discusses Duke University Professor William Van Alstyne in a
section entitled "Legal Scholars' Dereliction of Responsibility-Failure to
Speak the Truth."'" According to Gun Crazy, Van Alstyne "trots out a mis-
leadingly edited version" of a quote from The Federalist. Gun Crazy charges
that these quotes represent "standard NRA editing."''
Here is Van Alstyne's reference to The Federalist, No. 46:
Madison contrasted the "advantage... the American people possess"
(under the proposed Constitution) with the circumstances in "several
for being unfamiliar with it.
S' See Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 139-45.
"o Id. at 139.
"' Id. at 141 n.380.
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kingdoms of Europe ... [where] the governments are afraid to trust the
people with arms." 4 '
Here is the passage in full (with the passages excerpted by Van Alstyne em-
phasized):
Besides the advantage of being armed, which the American people pos-
sess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subor-
dinate governments, to which the people are attached and by which the
militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of
ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of
any form can admit. Notwithstanding the military establishments of the
several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public re-
sources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with
arms. 1
43
Now here is the problem with this editing according to Gun Crazy:
This passage discusses two different barriers against tyranny: a militia
and an armed populace. The Second Amendment, by its introductory
clause, is designed to preserve the militia. Indeed, Madison's words
strongly suggest that the first barrier, the "advantage" of an armed popu-
lace, is one ahreadypossessedat the time of the Constitution, as a conse-
quence of the frontier nature of American society, and as compared
against the more established nations of Europe. In any event, Van
Alstyne's editing, which is standard NRA editing, conveniently combines
two sentences into one, making the passage far stronger support than it
is objectively."
To the extent that this criticism is intelligible, Gun Crazy appears to be say-
ing that (1) Madison sees two differences, not one, between America and
Europe: an armed population and the existence of a militia;43 (2) the Sec-
ond Amendment applies only to the militia; and therefore (3) it is misleading
to edit this quote to suggest that the advantage of an armed population, an ad-
vantage possessed at the time the original Constitution was ratified and before
the Second Amendment was even proposed, is protected by the Second
Amendment.
' Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1245.
143 THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 299 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis added).
'" Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 141 n.380.
'41 The fill quotation identifies three differences, an armed population, subordinate government, and
militias, but as we show below. Hertz has a difficult time counting even his own lists. See infra at notes
240.47 and accompanying text.
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This is a pure non sequitur which assumes in step (2) what it purports to
show: that the Second Amendment does not protect the barrier against tyr-
anny provided by "the advantage of being armed" because it was intended
only to protect the militia. But apart from being illogical, it is "a bit sil-
ly.' 46 Madison is claiming that all three of the barriers he listed would be
protected, not by the Second Amendment, which had yet to be formulated,
but by the proposed Constitution (which is exactly what Van Alstyne quotes
him as saying). Moreover, all three barriers already existed at the time of the
Constitution, which merely preserves them, though each in a different way.
The right to keep and bear arms is protected-just as all the rights retained
by the people are protected by the unamended Constitution-by the fact that
the Constitution gives the federal government no power to dispossess the
people of their preexisting natural rights. Thus, when the Constitution was
criticized for being inadequate because it lacked a Bill of Rights to protect,
among other rights, the freedom of the press, Hamilton gave his famous re-
ply: "[W]hy declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to
do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not
be restrained, when no power is given by which restriction may be im-
posed?" 47
According to this argument, the right to keep and bear arms could not be
restrained by the federal government at the time of the Constitution's ratifi-
cation because "no power is given by which restriction may be imposed."
Those provisions in the Bill of Rights which expressly protected natural rights
retained by the people 48 were included, in Madison's words, "for greater
caution."'49 They added nothing new to the original Constitution.' Thus
146 This is the phrase Gun Crazy uses to describe Sanford Levinson's statement that the NRA position
on the Second Amendment should be included in academic discourse. See Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 141
("To describe the nearly inescapable drone of the NRA position on gun control as 'excluded' is a bit silly.").
"I THE FEDERALIST No. 64 at 559 (Alexander Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
4' As distinct from those which strengthened procedural rights provided by the Constitution.
' I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 452 (J. Gales ed., 1789) [hereinafter ANNALS OF CONGRESS] (speech of
Rep. J. Madison) [hereinafter Madison's House Speech]. Madison's speech is reprinted in fall in I THE
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 55 (Randy E.
Barnett ed., 1989).
250 Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger have argued that, prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights.
background natural rights, including the right to keep and bear arms, were protected by the Necessary and
Proper Clause. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, 7he Proper Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdic-
tional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). See also Randy E. Bamett, Neces-
sary and Proper, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 745 (1997). Lawson and Granger endorse the view of St. George
Tucker that "an executory law that infringed on the right to keep and bear arms would not be 'necessary and
proper' within the meaning of the Sweeping clause" because "laws that violate individual rights are not
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the fact that the American people "already possessed" the "advantage of being
armed" at the ,time of the Constitution is support for the proposition that the
Second Amendment was intended to protect their right to continued posses-
sion of arms.
Herz is apparently unaware of the elementary proposition... that "the
Framers of the Bill of Rights did not purport to 'create' rights. Rather, they
designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from infringing rights
and liberties presumed to be pre-existing."'' 2 One of the other rights includ-
ed in the Bill of Rights which Madison thought was one of the "preexistent
rights of nature"' 3 was freedom of speech."4
The fact that Madison and his colleagues believed individuals had a natural
right both to freedom of speech and to possess arms for self-defense is crucial
evidence that they meant exactly what they said in guaranteeing "the right of
the people to keep and bear arms." Thus, insofar as Gun Crazy's interpre-
tation of the meaning of the quotation has any force, it is to support the indi-
vidual right interpretation of the Amendment, the interpretation that Van
Alstyne was supposedly bowdlerizing the quotation to buttress.
In any event, Van Alstyne's edited quote accurately depicts the relevant
part of what Madison thought differentiated America from Europe, while
excluding the irrelevant parts. It is both characteristic and disturbing that Gun
'proper,' regardless of whether they are 'necessary."' Id. at 302-03. We discuss Tucker's views of the Sec-
ond Amendment infra notes 373-79.
s ' See Edward S. Corwin. The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARv.
L. REv. 149, 152-53 (1928) and citations there given; Thomas C. Grey. Origins of the Unwritten Constitu-
tion: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978) Philip A. Ham-
burger, Natural Rights. Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 908, 915 (1993):
Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1166, 1177 (1987).
112 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added). See generally Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 34 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("The law is perfectly well settled that the ... Bill of Rights, [was] not intended to lay down
any novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had
inherited from our English ancestors") (quoting Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897)) (Second
and Fourth Amendment case); Logan v. United States, 12 S. Ct. 617, 624 (1892) (distinguishing rights creat-
ed by federal law from preexisting constitutional rights, expressly including Second Amendment); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551, 553 (1875) (dealing with the right to assemble and the right to arms
and declaring them preexisting rights guaranteed by the Constitution. not rights created thereby).
"' Madison's House Speech, supra note 149, at 454.
' Madison's notes for his speech are reprinted in I RoTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note
149, at 64-65 [hereinafter Madison's Notes]. In the section discussing "Contents of Bill of Rhts," the fol-
lowing appears: "3. natural rights retained as speach [sic]." Id. at 64.
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Crazy charges Van Alstyne with adopting "standard NRA editing"I" with-
out providing any example of NRA materials using the same editing. But
even had Herz provided such an example, this would only bolster the credi-
bility of NRA editing.
2. Robert Cottrol and Raymond Diamond
Professor Robert Cottrol of George Washington University has edited a
three-volume text on the Second Amendment and has authored or co-authored
articles on it which appear, inter alia, in the Oxford Companion to the Su-
preme Court,"6 and the Yale"7 and Georgetown Law Journals."'8 Gun
Crazy charges that, like the others, he and his frequent co-author, Tulane
University law professor Raymond Diamond, "display a... disinclination to
acknowledge fully judicial or scholarly views contrary to the gun lobby's
party line."'59
We have responded to the supposed omission of judicial opinions
above. 6 As for their alleged failure to "acknowledge fully" contrary schol-
arship, anyone reviewing Cottrol's three-volume documentary history of the
Second Amendment will find that he reprints seven law review or other arti-
cles opposing the individual right view-including all the articles on which
Gun Crazy itselfprincipally relies.'6'
Gun Crazy does not inform readers of Cottrol's three-volume work, refer-
ring instead only to the highly compressed one-volume paperback. It com-
plains that this edition includes "only three essays out of ten offering posi-
tions contrary to the broad-individual-right view."' To a less jaundiced ob-
server, including three out of ten articles is not even remotely to be charac-
terized as hiding from the reader the existence of contrary views, in deroga-
tion of one's scholarly responsibilities.
... Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 141 n.380.
' CoTTRoL, OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 13.
Cottrol & Diamond, Fifth Auxiliary Right, supra note 13.
, Cottrol & Diamond, Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, supra note 13.
,s Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 143.
60 See supra Part I.A.
161 See COTrRoL, supra note 64, at 270-95; 2 id. at 1-44, 69-78, 253-58, 283-360.
"' Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 143 n.390 (referring to ROBERT J. COTTROL, GUN CONTROL AND THE
CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT (1994)).
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Gun Crazy asserts that Professors Cottrol and Diamond "rely on standard
gun-lobby materials."'63 As with Van Alstyne, no examples of this alleged
reliance are provided, and, insofar as this criticism is intelligible, it is false.
Cottrol and Diamond's historical exegeses have depended entirely on standard
historical evidence,' " not "standard gun-lobby materials"--an imprecation
Gun Crazy fails to reference in any way that would explain or define it.
To these charges, Gun Crazy adds an accusation that is particularly nox-
ious. It invokes the specter of racial paranoia (not to mention obsequious-
ness), when it asserts that "they elaborate the long-standing NRA theme that
'gun control is a white plot to disarm a feared minority population."" 65 Gun
Crazy is quoting here, not anything said or written by Cottrol and Diamond,
but a characterization borrowed with approval from Josh Sugarmann, whom
Gun Crazy fails to identify as former Communications Director of the Na-
tional Coalition to Ban Handguns, and the founder and present Executive
Director of an anti-gun organization called the Violence Policy Center. No
textual support for this demeaning characterization is provided."
The racial implications and intent of many gun control proposals are, how-
ever, no myth invented by the NRA. On the contrary, they were recognized
by historians and policy analysts, including at least one strong gun control
advocate, long before Cottrol and Diamond's admittedly much deeper explo-
ration of the issue.'67 And Herz himself concedes that "there is indeed some
historical merit to this argument."'68 What then is his complaint about
13 Id. at 142 (quoting Josh Sugarmann, a gun control activist). It is noteworthy that the only reference
usually provided when Gun Crazy ascribes actions and positions to pro-gun-rights groups is not some publi-
cation of theirs but an anti-gun publication attacking them.
'" See generally Cottrol & Diamond, Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, supra note 13; Robert J.
Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, "Never Intended to Be Applied to the White Population ": Firearms Regu-
lation and Racial Disparity-The Redeemed South's Legacy to a National Jurisprudence? 70 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1307 (1995).
6, Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 142.
16 Both Cottrol and Diamond are African-Americans.
67 Over 20 years ago, journalist and gun control advocate Robert Sherrill put the matter with charac-
teristic bluntness: "The Gun Control Act of 1968 was passed not to control guns, but to control blacks ......
ROBERT SHERRILL, THE SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL AND OTHER GUNS WITH WHICH AMERICANS WON THE
WEST, PROTECTED BOOTLEG FRANCHISES, SLEW WILDLIFE, ROBBED COUNTLESS BANKS, SHOT HUSBANDS
PURPOSELY AND BY MISTAKE AND KILLED PRESIDENTS-TOGETHER WITH THE DEBATE OVER CONTINUING
SAME 280, 289ff. (1975). See generally B. Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, PUB. INTEREST,
Fall 1976, at 50; Don B. Kates, Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United States, in RE-
STRICTING HANDGUNS (Don B. Kates ed., 1979); KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 96; Raymond G.
Kessler, Gun Control and Political Power, 5 LAW & POL'Y Q. 381, 391 ff. (1983).
'6 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 142.
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Cottrol and Diamond's scholarly thesis? That "the position makes little sense
today in light of the tremendous and disproportionate toll that gun violence
takes on the African-American community."' 69 In Part IV, we take up the
dubious criminological claims made by Herz, but suffice it to say that this
claim in no way supports his charge that Cottrol and Diamond subscribe to
some white conspiracy theory, nor that they are appropriately treated in a
section entitled, "Legal Scholars' Dereliction of Responsibility-Failure to
Speak the Truth."' °
3. Sanford Levinson
Gun Crazy reserves much of its vituperation for University of Texas law
professor Sanford Levinson. It charges him with "relying on the usual sec-
ondary materials that the NRA finds so appealing"'' and describes him as
an "ostensibly nonpartisan legal scholar[]"'" implying that he is not. Gun
Crazy asserts that:
Levinson provides a cursory overview of the Second Amendment text
and surrounding history, relying on the usual secondary materials that
the NRA finds so appealing, including The Federalist No. 46 and nine-
teenth-century constitutional commentary from Justice Joseph Story and
Thomas Cooley. Like the gun lobby, Levinson strips these materials of
important context, advancing the ball "by manipulating his supporting
material so as to exclude that which would cast doubt on the existence
of a broad individual right."' 73
It will be unnecessary to tediously discuss the details of the quotations
from The Federalist, Story, Cooley, and others that Levinson is accused of
bowdlerizing because Gun Crazy provide no details for its charge whatever.
Instead, like its reliance on Sugarmann's characterization of Diamond and
Cottrol's work, Gun Crazy once again incorporates by reference the claims of
an employee of an anti-gun group-this time an article by Dennis Henigan
(whom Herz once again fails to identify as the Chief Staff Lawyer for the
Legal Action Project of the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence).'
169 Id.
I' ld. at 139.
' Id. at 140.
I d. at 145 nA02
" Id. at 140 (citation to Levinson's article omitted). Gun Crazy is quoting here from Henigan, supra
note 12. Earlier in the article Gun Crazy makes the following charge, basing it also on Henigan: "Gun-rights
advocates manufacture many of the apparent endorsements of an expansive Second Amendment interpreta-
tion by stripping critical context from the original quotations." Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
"7 We continue to point out instances where Herz has violated the canon of scholarly ethics he seeks
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What the charges boil down to is that Gun Crazy and Henigan disagree
with Levinson (and Van Alstyne) as to the meaning of some quotations from
Joseph Story's Commentaries, James Madison in The Federalist, and, other
Founders. Levinson and Van Alstyne interpret these quotes as showing belief
in an individually armed citizenry, while Henigan claims that, in context, they
prove only belief in the militia as an antidote to a standing army.
It would perhaps suffice to point out that Gun Crazy and Henigan stand
alone in their interpretation of the quotations they claim have been "strip[ped]
of their important context" and "manipulated."'" We believe all the other
scholars who address these quotations have interpreted them as supporting the
individual right view. 76 Nevertheless, because the matter is important to es-
tablish that Gun Crazy has done Levinson a grave injustice by repeating
Henigan's accusations, we feel compelled to summarize the evidence that one
of us has elaborated elsewhere. This evidence shows it is Henigan and Herz
who take these quotes out of their context in the Founders' general thought
and philosophical background. It is clear that the quotations were available to
Herz because he criticizes the article in which they are related,'77 yet he ig-
nores them.
(1) James Madison, James Monroe, Fisher Ames, Albert Gallatin, and
others mentioned the right to arms in the same breath with freedom of
religion and press, and described them all and interchangeably as "human
rights," "private rights," "essential and sacred rights" which "each indi-
vidual reserves to himself."''17
(2) A Federalist commentary endorsed by James Madison, that was be-
fore Congress when it enacted the Bill of Rights and that described the
Amendment as confirming citizens "in their right to keep and bear their
private arms."'
179
to impose on those with whom he disagrees, because it demonstrates that he is projecting onto Second
Amendment scholars his own sins. We do not necessarily share his view that one need make explicit the
employment status of every author whose writings one cites. If any disclosure is appropriate, however, it
would surely be disclosure that an author is a full-time employee of a lobbying group.
" Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 140.
See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 13, at 461, 468, 469, 470; Shalhope, supra note 13, at 125, 131;
Cottrol & Diamond, Fifth Auxiliary Right, supra note 13, at 1001 n.24, 1005-06.
'" See Kates, supra note 96.
'I Id. at 223-24, 228; Shalhope, supra note 13, at 135.
"' Kates, supra note 96, at 224 (emphasis added).
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(3) Anti-Federalist editorials which hailed the Amendment as assuring
that "the said constitution be never construed" to infringe rights of free
expression or "to prevent the people of the United States who are peace-
able citizens, from keeping their own arms."' 0
(4) Thomas Jefferson's proposal in a model state constitution for a
guarantee that "No free man shall be debarred the use of arms within his
own lands or tenements."''
(5) Joseph Story's explanation of the Second Amendment in terms of
what was in his day regarded as a truism, an axiom of republican liberal-
ism: "One of the ordinary modes, by which tyrants accomplish their
purposes without resistance, is, by disarming the people, and making it
an offense to keep arms . ... ""'
These specific quotations lead us to the broader context in which Levinson
and Van Alstyne (and many other historians and scholars) understand the
quotations that Henigan and Gun Crazy question. That broader context is the
general attitude of the Founders toward the role of arms in society-an atti-
tude so reverential that one intellectual historian has described it as "almost
religious."'' 3
Neither Herz, Henigan, nor any other exponent of their position deals with
that attitude because it is so repugnant to their own. Nevertheless, the
Amendment can only be understood in light of that attitude, which involved a
set of related propositions that were deemed axiomatic truths in the allied
systems of natural rights and civic republicanism the Founders embraced:
(1) The right of personal self-defense is inalienable, being the cardinal
natural right;'
"~Id.
' See Shalhope, supra note 13, at 135 (emphasizing that, in contrast, Jefferson's draft had no mention
of a militia at all).
'" JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR ExPosmoN OF THE CONSTTIUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 264 (re-
published 1893) (1840).
' C. Asbury, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in America: The Origins and Application of the Sec-
ond Amendment to the Constitution (1974) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file
with the University of Michigan Graduate Library).
'" For example, Sam Adams listed among the "Natural Rights of the Colonists as Men," the rights to
life, liberty and property," "together with the right to support and defend these in the best manner they can."
(quoted in MALCOLM, ORIGINS, supra note 13, at 149). See also, 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*4 ("Self-defense therefore, as it is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in
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(2) A concomitantly inalienable element of the right of self-defense is the
right to possess personal arms for defense of self, home, and family; 5
(3) Derivative of the individual right of self-defense is the right of indi-
viduals to join together for collective defense;86
(4) The right of self-defense exists against murder, rape, robbery, and other
crimes, whether perpetrated by apolitical criminals or for political purposes
by a tyrant or his thugs ("a wicked Magistrate" and his crew of "lewd Vil-
lains");18 7
(5) The individual right of self-defense gives rise, in the ultimate extreme,
to the right to overthrow tyrants and return government to its proper
course;8t8
fact, taken away by the law of society.") (emphasis added); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 105, 110 (Collier
ed., 1962) (1651) (describing the right to self-defense as inalienable: "a covenant not to defend myself from
force, by force, is always void"); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW I (1827) (same); ST.
GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND
LAW OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 300 (1803) ("The right of self-defense is the first law of nature.").
' See. e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTI-
TUTIONAL RIGHT (1984), at 58 (quoting colonial newspapers justifying Sam Adams's recommendation that
individuals should arm themselves in response to British enforcement of the Stamp Tax on the ground that
"[i]t is a natural right [of the people] ... to keep ars for their own defence"); id. at 102-04 (quoting nine-
teenth century American legal treatises to the same effect). Quotation of such sentiments from eighteenth
and nineteenth century Americans, and the philosophers they revered, may be multiplied almost endlessly.
See id. at 17 n.76, 54 (noting the same view in William Eden's 1772 PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW and the
effect of Eden on Jefferson's views); David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurispru-
dence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 596 (1986) (quoting from a Nov. 5, 1776
editorial in the Pennsylvania Evening Post, describing the right to arms as "a natural right"); Don B. Kates,
Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 87, 90-104 (1992)
(quoting Montesquieu, Blackstone, Algernon Sydney, Cesare Beccaria, and Thomas Paine).
' See Kates, supra note 185, at 92-93 (quoting John Locke and Algernon Sydney, among others).
" Id. at 92-93, 103 (quoting Algernon Sydney). Rape, robbery, and murder by individual soldiers
(who were, in fact, largely criminals recruited by gaol-sweepings), particularly when billeted upon the king's
enemies, were an aspect of English and French history of which the Founders were all too well aware. And
it was an aspect of their own history as well. Because the Crown had attempted to enforce the Stamp Tax
and other exactions by soldiers, whose invasions of homes and businesses the Founders deemed criminal and
believed had been accompanied by robbery, assault, and rape, Sam Adams called upon the populace to arm
themselves individually for their own defense. Id. at 99-101.
'S Id. at 90 (citing Locke and Sydney). Compare Blackstone's equation of the "natural right of resis-
tance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the
violence of oppression" to "the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defense." I
BLACKSTONE, supra note 184, at *144. Note that Blackstone classified this right to arms as one of three
rights which were necessary to preserve liberty and free institutions, the other two being due process and
petition. Id.
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(6) The existence of an armed populace will generally avert the necessity
of actual resistance, much less revolution, by deterring government and rulers
from their inherent tendency to tyrannize and oppress;8 9
(7) Finally, the Founders believed "that the perpetuation of a republican
spirit and character within [a free] society depended upon the freeman's pos-
session of arms as well as his ability and willingness to defend both himself
and his society. '
C. Impugning the Integrity of Second Amendment Scholars
Gun Crazy has only one explanation for its charge that the scholarly con-
sensus that the Second Amendment protects a broad individual right is a
product of deception and a failure to speak the truth: Second Amendment
scholars who have ignored judicial opinions and distorted historical facts are
biased either because they are institutionally connected to pro-gun rights lob-
bying organizations or they are personally enamored with guns. In this sec-
tion, we examine the evidence that Gun Crazy advances for this most serious
accusation.
1. Are You Now, or Have You Ever Been, a Member of Academics
for the Second Amendment?
Earlier in this Article we described Gun Crazy's method as
McCarthyite.Y We now substantiate this characterization. Gun Crazy ex-
plicitly charges that Second Amendment scholars reach the conclusions they
do as a result of a nefarious conspiracy by the "gun lobby":
This Article contends that the prevailing Second Amendment deception
represents an especially severe threat to rational policyrnaking in a repre-
sentative democracy. An economically self-interested, single-issue pres-
sure group has effectively mobilized a rabidly vocal minority to drown
U9 See Kates, supra note 185, at 96-97 (quoting Thomas Paine, James Madison, John Trenchard and
Walter Moyle, Timothy Dwight, and Joel Barlow).
"' Shalhope, supra note 13, at 138. In the philosophy of civic republicanism to which the Founders
were heir, "the bearing of arms is the essential medium through which the individual asserts both his social
power and his participation in politics as a responsible moral being.... "J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVEL-
LIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 386 (1975).
See also the discussion of the "moral fibre" implications of citizens being armed and dedicated to the de-
fense of their families, homes, liberties, and polity in Kates, supra note 96, at 231-34; and Kates, supra note
185, at 94-97.
' See supra INTRODUCTION.
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out and shout down virtually all other voices in the constitutional con-
versation.'92
Not content to rely solely on its own lawyers and activists, the gun
lobby is also working hard to flood the law reviews with friendly
scholarship from sympathetic law professors [footnote 357] and prom-
ising law students.'93
Footnote 357 states: "'In 1993 the gun lobby organized a sympathetic
scholars' group, known as Academics for the Second Amendment."'" Later
Gun Crazy adds: "AFSA is headed by NRA Executive Board member Joseph
Olson, a professor at Hamline University School of Law. The group was
lauded in the December 1993 issue of the NRA's American Rifleman."'9 It
then connects this group with Second Amendment scholars: "Of the nine full-
time law professors who have offered endorsements of the broad-individual-
right position via law review articles, seven are members of the anti-gun-
control group Academics for the Second Amendment (AFSA)."'96 The sev-
en professors identified as "members of the anti-gun-control group" are law
professors Ahkil Amar, Charles Cantrell, Robert Cottrol, Raymond Diamond,
Nicholas Johnson, Sanford Levinson, Nelson Lund, and political scientist
James B. Whisker.
Gun Crazy's one, and only one, piece of evidence in support of this accu-
sation is the fact that these professors signed a single advertisement published
by Academics for the Second Amendment:
As of March 13, 1993, Professors Amar, Cantrell, Cottrol, Diamond,
Johnson, Levinson, and Lund were all AFSA members, as was political
science Professor Whisker. Academics for the Second Amendment, An
Open Letter on the Second Amendment, NAT'L REV., Mar. 15, 1993, at
23, 23. The group also published the Open Letter on the same date in
the New Republic and the National Law Journal.'97
This is one of the bases on which Herz accuses Sanford Levinson of lying
when he claims in his article to have previously supported bans on gun pos-
session.' "But Levinson's claim in this essay, that he supports 'prohibitory
192 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 61.
" Id. at 138.
' Id. at 138 n.357.
"' Id. at 144.
"I Id.
" Id. at 144 n.396.
" See Levinson, supra note 13, at 642 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added):
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[firearms] regulation' is hard to swallow. He is a member of the anti-gun-
control group, Academics for the Second Amendment....
Their alleged "gun-lobby group" membership also enables Gun Crazy to
ignore the articles by professors Amar, Cantrell, Johnson, Lund, and Whisker,
dismissing them all with one sentence parentheticals in a single footnote. For
example, Gun Crazy dispatches Yale Law School professor Akhil Amar's two
articles2° touching on the Amendment in the following parenthetical: "re-
jecting the 'states' rights' view of Second Amendment on originalist grounds,
with no discussion of contrary case law." ''
The group membership charge is entirely false. It rests solely on the fact
that professors Amar, Cantrell, Johnson, Levinson, Lund, and Whisker let
their names be included in an advertisement endorsed by seventy political
philosophers, political scientists, law professors, and historians that was spon-
sored by Academics for the Second Amendment (A2A). Moreover, Gun Cra-
zy offers no evidence to show that any of the articles it traduces was written
at the behest of the A2A group. Indeed, it is clear from the facts Gun Crazy
itself offers that its author must have been aware of the falsity of his charges.
All but one article he cites appeared before 1993, when Gun Crazy alleges
I cannot help but suspect that the best explanation for the absence of the Second Amendment
from the legal consciousness of the elite bar, including that component found in the legal acade-
my, is derived from a mixture of sheer opposition to the idea of private ownership of guns and
the perhaps subconscious fear that altogether plausible, perhaps even "winning," interpretations of
the Second Amendment would present real hurdles to those of us supporting prohibitory regula-
tion.
' Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 140-41. In light of this accusation the following statements also reek of
insinuation:
The NRA has enthusiastically quoted Sanford Levinson's similar defense of the Second
Amendment: "Il"]o take rights seriously ... [means] that one will honor them even when there is
significant social cost in doing so." Id. at 110 n.233 (alterations in original).
Sanford Levinson utterly ignores the vast case law arrayed against his favorable nod to the
gun lobby's reading of the "right to bear arms." Id. at 139.
Levinson provides a cursory overview of the Second Amendment text and surrounding
history, relying on the usual secondary materials that the NRA finds so appealing. Id. at 140.
Like the gun lobby, Levinson strips these materials of important context, advancing the
ball "by manipulating his supporting material so as to exclude that which would cast doubt on the
existence of a broad individual right." Id.
" Amar addresses the Second Amendment in two articles, Bill of Rights. supra note 13, at 1164; and
Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 13, at 1205-11, 1261-62. Gun Crazy cites only Bill of Rights. Gun Cra-
zy. supra note 7, at 62 n.12.
201 Gun Crazy supra note 7, at 143 n.391.
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A2A came into existence."n The articles Gun Crazy seeks to portray as
A2A-sponsored or promoted date back to 1975. Gun Crazy does not offer any
evidence or reference for its suggestion that Academics for the Second
Amendment has sponsored or-promoted any post-1993 law review article.
Gun Crazy's charges against distinguished scholars would be comic but for
its publication in a respectable law review. Akhil Amar and Sanford Levinson
are major figures in constitutional law whose character and opinions are wild-
ly at variance with claims that they are members of "the gun lobby" or con-
sciously deceitful propagandists for it or any other organization. 3 The na-
ture of these charges, their inconsistency with the known character and opin-
ion of the victims, and the emphasis Gun Crazy places on them, required its
author to have taken steps to positively verify them. Even a slight attempt to
do so would instead have discredited these charges.
Had Professors Levinson and Amar been contacted before Gun Crazy was
published, Herz would have been informed that both dislike guns, have never
owned one and have no desire to do so; neither has ever been even a member
of the NRA or A2A, much less a leader or paid employee thereof; neither has
ever litigated a gun case (for pay or pro bono), much less been "gun rights
litigators and activists." On the contrary, they are supporters of gun control,
although they were more supportive before they began researching the Second
Amendment than they are now."
Had Herz contacted Professor Amar, he would have been told that Amar
began work on his bicentennial article on the Bill of Rights with a precon-
ception of the Secoid Amendment as states' right rather than individual
right."' It is only because he found that the text and legislative history ad-
mit of no other view that Professor Amar was driven to conclude:
The ultimate right to keep and bear arms belongs to "the people," not
the "states." As the language of the Tenth Amendment shows, these two
are of course not identical and when the Constitution means "states," it
says so. Thus,... "the people" at the core of the Second Amendment
are the same "people" at the heart of the Preamble and the First Amend-
202 Id. at 138 n.357.
23 A law professor (who will remain nameless) commented to us facetiously that all one need do is
look at pictures of Levinson and Amar to know that neither is a closet gun lover or, indeed, would know
one end of a gun from the other.
24 Personal communication with Professor Levinson (June 21, 1995).
205 Personal communication with Professor Amar (June 21, 1995).
[Vol. 451182
UNDER FIRE
ment, namely Citizens.... Nowadays, it is quite common to speak
loosely of the National Guard as "the state militia," but... [i]n 1789,
when used without any qualifying adjective, "the militia" referred to all
Citizens capable of bearing arms .... [T]he "militia" is identical to "the
people" in the core sense described above."
Assuming Herz felt some reticence about checking his claims with Amar
and Levinson, the fact that they are not A2A members could have been ascer-
tained by asking A2A's president (correctly identified in Gun Crazy as
Hamline University law professor Joseph Olson) whether they were. It is
noteworthy that Herz did call Olson for information. But Herz failed to ask
him whether the professors who Gun Crazy falsely claims are A2A members
really do have that status. 7 Instead of asking them or Professor Olson, Gun
Crazy charged the law professors with A2A membership based solely on the
fact that they endorsed a statement summarizing their views on the Second
Amendment, which A2A published in 1993.
Then there is Gun Crazy's treatment of Professor Van Alstyne. Gun Crazy
discusses Van Alstyne in the same section that discusses Sanford Levinson,
Akhil Amar, et al., a section that is expressly devoted to law professors who
allegedly champion the Amendment mendaciously and in bad faith because
they are members of A2A. Unless readers attend to the footnotes with partic-
ular care, they will not catch the fact that Gun Crazy never actually claims
Van Alstyne is a member "of the anti-gun control group" as it does of
Levinson and Amar. It could not make such a claim because Van Alstyne's
name was not included in the A2A advertisement.
Creating this misimpression enables Gun Crazy to finesse the urgent need
to offer some plausible motive for someone of Van Alstyne's stature to falsi-
"' Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 13, at 1166 (footnotes omitted).
"' Personal communication with Professor Olson (June 19, 1995). In a letter dated July 23, 1993, and
sent to Don Kates (on file with Don Kates), Professor Olson further informed us:
Mr. Herz spoke to me once prior to writing his article, probably in late 1994. He had left me a
message that he was writing an article on the Second Amendment. We played telephone tag for a
while, then spoke for about two minutes. I told him that if he were serious about writing on the
right to keep and bear arms, he had to talk with you and Bob Cottrol and gave him both [your]
phone numbers and I said I would send him a copy of [William] Van Alstyne's article and the
Open Letter. I did so, including an information packet on A2A. He asked no questions and said
nothing beyond stating that he wanted to write a Second Amendment piece. I was led to the erro-
neous impression that he was a serious scholar... He never mentioned nor asked anything
about A2A. He never again called before publishing his article.
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fy quotations. To charge one of the major figures in constitutional law with
cribbing from NRA materials and trying to hoodwink other scholars into
accepting a pro-gun interpretation of the Second Amendment that he knows
to be deficient surely requires some plausible motive. It also avoids the need
to provide any evidence to support Gun Crazy's characterization of Van
Alstyne as a "pro-gun scholar"2 ° who "endors[es]... the gun lobby's Sec-
ond Amendment gospel."2"
If Herz means by this only that any scholar who comes to the individual
right conclusion is by definition "pro-gun," the characterization is completely
misleading, particularly in a section in which others are accused (falsely) of
organizational ties to the gun-rights lobby. Contrast this with its accusation
that Levinson has bowdlerized quotations, which Gun Crazy bolsters by ac-
cusing Levinson of being an A2A member. Gun Crazy's charge that Van
Alstyne also falsifies quotations is similarly bolstered by leaving readers un-
der the misimpression that Van Alstyne is an A2A member-though without
actually saying so.
Nevertheless, in Robert Cottrol, Gun Crazy can congratulate itself on hav-
ing at last actually identified a member, indeed a board member, of A2A: the
lone accurate charge of the eight it makes against scholars who have authored
law review articles endorsing a broad individual right interpretation of the
Amendment...0 Once again, A2A did not even exist when the Cottrol-Dia-
mond article Gun Crazy criticizes was published. So it is hard to see how it
could be part of a conspiracy by "the gun lobby... to flood the law reviews
with friendly scholarship from sympathetic law professors.'2
"I
But Gun Crazy's attack on Cottrol goes beyond its unelaborated innuendo
that his being an A2A member somehow discredits his (and Diamond's) pre-
A2A writings. Gun Crazy alleges that the whole body of Cottrol's work slav-
s On page 112 of Gun Crazy appears the following sentence: "[R]epealing the Second Amendment is
a red herring that pro-gun scholars have adopted." This is followed by a footnote which cites only Van
Alstyne. See Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 112 & n.242.
'" Id. at 142 n.384.
20 Gun Crazy charges A2A membership accurately as to Cottrol and inaccurately as to Professors
Amar, Cantrell, Diamond, Johnson, Levinson, Lund, and Whisker. See id. at 144 n.396.
21 Id. at 138. This passage is immediately followed by footnote 357 which reads: "In 1993 the gun
lobby organized a sympathetic scholars' group, known as Academics for the Second Amendment." Id. at 138
n.357. So the explicit claim being made is that A2A, formed years after Cottrol and Diamond published
their research, is the vehicle by which the gun lobby is attempting to "flood the law reviews" with "friendly
scholarship."
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ishly adheres to the "gun lobby gospel" ' and deceitfully omits "judicial or
scholarly views contrary to the gun lobby party line." '213 Far from being the
gun lobby stooge Gun Crazy depicts, however, Cottrol advocates the enact-
ment of gun control laws that pro-gun groups denounce as unconstitutional,
including the Brady Bill, plus more extensive controls that pro-gun groups
oppose even more bitterly.214
Perhaps Gun Crazy misrepresents Cottrol's position as one of pro-gun
irredentism to avoid dealing with Cottrol's criticism of the anti-gun irreden-
tism Gun Crazy represents. Cottrol and Diamond stress that the great majority
of the public, including most gun owners, accept the need for reasonable gun
controls. They argue that the NRA is only able to defeat such legislation
because gun owners are driven into its arms by the anti-gun extremism Gun
Crazy epitomizes.
Contrast Gun Crazy's misportrayal with what Cottrol and Diamond actually
write:
[Polls show o]verwhehning majorities of the American population sup-
port the right of individuals to own firearms [but they also want] ...
measures that would keep guns out of the hands of criminals, the men-
tally unbalanced, and others likely to abuse the right. And it is this pub-
lie consensus that should be the starting point of a new, more productive
debate over the Second Amendment....
... The debate should thus focus on ways of developing fair and
effective procedures for screening out those who should be prevented
from purchasing firearms and how to do so in ways that would not seri-
ously impair the rights the Second Amendment was designed to protect.
Whether such procedures should involve waiting periods, registration,
background checks, licensing procedures, or combinations of these possi-
bilities should be part of the debate....
Ironically, an acceptance of the individual rights component of the
Second Amendment may be necessaryfor effective gun control measures.
The political difficulty in securing effective national screening measures
is directly related to the fear on the part of many who value the right to
keep and bear arms that such measures are merely way stations on the
road to firearms prohibition. That fear has been fed by those who have
m Id. at 144.
1 Id. at 143.
" Robert J. Cottrol .... Here's a Better Idea, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATcH, April 9, 1989, at F-I. The
Brady Bill imposes a national background check only on handgun purchases. Cottrol's proposal, which was
made at the height of pro-gun groups' vociferous fight against Brady, favors a national background check
for purchasers of any kind of firearm.
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sought to read the Second Amendment's guarantee out of the Bill of
Rights. The recognition that the Constitution does indeed protect the
right to keep and bear arms may be the first step in the needed process
offashioning laws that both contribute to public safety and preserve a
right long valued in this society."1 5
Given the techniques used by Gun Crazy to discredit the scholars it dis-
cusses, it is interesting to note those Second Amendment scholars that Gun
Crazy chose not to discuss. In the previous section we quoted a passage from
intellectual historian Robert Shalhope that gives the quotations that Van
Alstyne and Levinson supposedly bowdlerized the same meaning they do.
Shalhope's seminal article on the Second Amendment and the place of an
armed citizenry in that philosophy appeared in the faculty-refereed Journal of
American History."6 This piece and a subsequent law review article should
have been prime targets for a scathing reply in Gun Crazy because Shalhope
too accepts the view Gun Crazy excoriates as a "Second Amendment decep-
tion." Shalhope writes:
When James Madison and his colleagues drafted the Bill of Rights,
they..: firmly believed in two distinct principles: (1) Individuals had
the right to possess arms to defend themselves and their property; and
(2) states retained the right to maintain militias composed of these indi-
vidually-armed citizens.... [In enacting the Bill of Rights]... con-
gressmen firmly believed in the right of individual citizens to possess
arms. 217
So it is surprising to find that Gun Crazy provides no discussion whatever
of Shalhope's body of uncongenial scholarship. One might dismiss this as an
oversight, except that Gun Crazy does cite Shalhope's Journal of American
History article at the end of a list of articles given in footnote 12.228 More-
over, although his article is reprinted in its entirety in the one-volume anthol-
ogy by Robert Cottrol that Herz claims to have examined, Gun Crazy reveals
nothing of Professor Shalhope's substantive analysis. Could this be because
2"2 Cottrol & Diamond, Public Safety, supra note 13, at 85-86 (emphasis added). While Herz may have
been unaware of this particular article, in denouncing Cottrol he cites a much shorter Cottrol article which is
devoted to the same point. Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 143 n.389 (citing Robert J. Cottrol, Want Gun Con-
trol? Enforce the Second Amendment!, AM. RIFLEMAN, Mar. 1990, at 21).
2"6 Robert Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599 (1982).
2"7 Shalhope, supra note 13, at 133, 137. We have added emphasis to highlight the Amendment's dual
effect: by guaranteeing individuals the right to arms it both preserved their right and precluded any attempt
to disarm a militia composed of its individually armed members.
28 Gun Crazy supra note 7, at 62 n.12.
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he is a non-gunowning intellectual historian who did not sign the A2A letter?
Indeed, Shalhope has evinced no interest in the modem gun control debate at
all. The subject of his research is the philosophy of the founding generation
and its relationship to the philosophy of civic republicanism.219
Another historian whose work should have attracted Gun Crazy's attention
is Joyce Lee Malcolm, whose specialty is the political and legal history of
early modem. England, colonial America, and the early Republic. Professor
Malcolm's recent book should have been well known to Gun Crazy's au-
thor,"0 especially because it received extensive publicitye ' and has been
hailed by scholarly reviewers as the definitive historical treatise on the right
to arms.' Furthermore, she had previously published articles in law re-
views and historical journals to the same effect.' Her findings should cer-
tainly have presented an important target for Gun Crazy, given her book's
pre-eminence and the support it lends to what Gun Crazy derides as "a con-
stitutional deception."
Summarizing those findings, Professor Malcolm writes:
The Second Amendment was meant to accomplish two distinct goals...
. First, it was meant to guarantee the individual's right to have arms for
self-defence and self-preservation.... These privately owned arms were
meant to serve a larger purpose as well . . . and it is the coupling of
these two objectives that has caused the most confusion. The customary
219 Personal communication with Professor Shalhope (1983).
o It is difficult to attribute Gun Crazy's failure to deal with Professor Malcolm's book, ORIGINS,
supra note 13, to ignorance of its existence. It was cited twice by William Van Alstyne, whose article Gun
Crazy reviews in as much detail as it gives any article that contradicts its views. See Van Alstyne, supra
note 13, at 1247 n.39 & 1249 n.45.
" Its publication by Harvard University Press in early 1994 was widely heralded, resulting in a
lengthy interview with Professor Malcolm in the National Law Journal. Interview with Professor Joyce Lee
Malcolm, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 3, 1994, at B14-16. Moreover, in addition to the reviews discussed infra note
222, the book was reviewed in the Washington Times. Richard Maxwell Brown, Analyzing the True Aim of
the Right to Bear Arms, WASH. TIMES, May 8, 1994, at B8.
2 The book has been reviewed by Vanderbilt Law School professor James Ely, Ely, supra note 13;
Canadian sociologist Allen D. Olmsted, 24 CoNrEmP. Soc. 58-59 (1995); Comell University political scien-
tist Jeremy Rabkin, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 231 (1995) (book review); University of Tennessee Law
School professor Glenn Reynolds, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 94-95; English historian Frederic Paul Smoler,
OBsutvER, Aug. 7, 1994, at 21 (book review); and English political scientist David Wootton, Wootton,
supra note 13.
2 See Malcolm, Common Law, supra note 13; Joyce Lee Malcolm, Charles H1 and the Reconstruction
of Royal Power, 35 HIST. J. (of Gr. Brit.) 307 (1992); Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Creation of a "True Ancient
and Indubitable" Right: The English Bill of Rights and the Right to Be Armed, 32 J. BRIT. STUD. 226
(1993); Malcolm, Review, supra note 13.
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American militia necessitated an armed public . . . the militia [being]..
• the body of the people. . . . The argument that today's National
Guardsmen, members of a select militia, would constitute the only per-
sons entitled to keep and bear arms has no historical foundation.224
However desirable it might have been to respond to this, doing so present-
ed a grave problem for Gun Crazy: Joyce Lee Malcolm was not an endorser
of the A2A statement; she has never belonged to a pro-gun group; and the
research underlying her book was sponsored not by any gun group but by the
American Bar Foundation, Harvard Law School, and the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities.' Moreover, she had been very critical of Stephen
Halbrook's book, which is the single most important influence and scholarly
source for pro-gun advocates (although she concurs in Halbrook's view of the
Amendment's purpose and meaning). 6
Bereft, therefore, of any ad homines to hurl at Professor Malcolm, Gun
Crazy simply ignores her. Malcolm's is yet another body of uncongenial
scholarship with which it fails to acquaint its readers.
2. Falsifying the Scholars' Actual Views
It is not true that the advertisement sponsored by Academics for the Second
Amendment and endorsed by over seventy scholars has "spread the gun
lobby's gospel" or has "provide[d] much-appreciated scholarly seals of ap-
proval for the NRA.'" We think that it is highly revealing, indeed decep-
tive, that Gun Crazy fails to reprint the text of the A2A-sponsored statement.
' MALCOLM, ORIGINS, supra note 13, at 162-63 (first emphasis added).
Personal communication with Professor Malcolm (June 22, 1995).
26 See, e.g., Malcolm, Review, supra note 13 (negatively reviewing HALBROOK's, THAT EVERY MAN
BE ARMED, supra note 185). Compare Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 138 & n.356, describing Halbrook as
among the "leading gun-rights litigators," a "warhorse" who has written nine articles on the Amendment.
"' According to Gun Crazy the A2A group
proclaims that it seeks to "foster intellectually honest discourse" on the Second Amendment, and
that its "primary goal is to give the 'right to keep and bear arms' enshrined in the Bill of Rights
its proper, prominent place in Constitutional discourse and analysis." But in the group's paid
political announcement and in the writings of its members, "intellectually honest discourse" in-
cludes steering a course far away from the judiciary's interpretation of the Second Amendment.
The group's members have spread the gun lobby's gospel effectively. Their academic endorse-
ments provide much-appreciated scholarly seals of approval for the NRA, and perpetuate the
popular false consciousness regarding the operative meaning, as rendered by the courts, of the
Second Amendment.
Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 144-45 (footnotes omitted).
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For, had Gun Crazy provided readers with its text, they would have found
that Gun Crazy wildly misrepresents the views of those who endorsed this
letter.
Contrast Gun Crazy's characterization with the actual words of the A2A
statement, particularly those we emphasize in its final paragraph:
The view that the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States guarantees only the states' right to maintain formal militias has
attained a surprising respectability. That may be more explicable as an
expression of the hostility many academicians feel towards guns and
their owners than as an unbiased constitutional interpretation. The Sec-
ond Amendment does not guarantee merely a "right of the states," but
rather a "right of the people," a term which, as used throughout the Bill
of Rights (e.g. the First and Fourth Amendments), is widely understood
to encompass a personal right of citizens.
Moreover, the Amendment refers to the "militia," a term which in the
18th Century meant not a formal military unit like the National Guard,
but a system under which every household and every man of military
age was required to own a gun in order to defend the community against
tyranny, foreign invasion, and crime. The leading interpretations before
Congress when it enacted the Bill of Rights affirmed that by the Second
Amendment "the people are confirmed in their right to keep and bear
their private arms".-"their own arms."
Furthermore, the "individual right" component of Second Amendment
thought became even more prominent in constitutional theory due to the
transformation wrought by and through the debates in the [post-Civil
War] Congress concerning the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship. Many Congressmen pointed out that blacks in the South
needed to be constitutionally protected in the citizen's individual, per-
sonal right to bear arms in self-defense.
Of course, the right to bear arms is no more "absolute" than is the
right to speak; to publish, or to assemble. Hence, there is room for dis-
agreement over the scope of Second Amendment rights, just as there
currently exists legitimate disagreement over the scope of First Amend-
ment rights of assembly and free speech. Nothing in this statement,
therefore, is intended to deny either the constitutionality of, or the need
for, sensible gun laws."
Nothing in this statement validates Gun Crazy's insinuation that the signato-
ries are promoters of gun lobby extremism.
Printed as An Open Letter on the Second Amendment, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 15, 1993, at 15 (em-
phasis added) (advertisement).
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In fact, Gun Crazy's misportrayal of the scholars it assaults is based on
systematic nondisclosure of the fact that some of them have actually con-
demned the NRA position.
Even if one accepts [the individual right view of the Second
Amendment], the overriding temptation is to say that times and circum-
stances have changed and that there is simply no reason to continue
enforcing an outmoded, and indeed dangerous, understanding of private
rights against public order....
I am not unsympathetic to such arguments. It is no purpose of this
essay to solicit membership for the National Rifle Association or to
express any sympathy for what even Don Kates, a strong critic of the
conventional dismissal of the Second Amendment, describes as "the gun
lobby's obnoxious habit of assailing all forms of regulation on 2nd
Amendment grounds. " 9
Anyone who diligently compares Gun Crazy to the articles it assails will
discover an odd coincidence. Criticisms Gun Crazy offers of the pro-gun-
rights position often coincide identically to such criticisms previously made
by Levinson, Van Alstyne, and others whom Gun Crazy depicts as minions or
fellow travelers of the gun lobby. Compare, for instance, the language itali-
cized in the quotation from Levinson just given to Gun Crazy's criticism:
"The gun lobby insists that the Second Amendment is an all-purpose barrier
to virtually all gun control proposals. ' o Or compare the analogy Gun Cra-
zy draws: "Viewing the Second Amendment as an absolute barrier to firearms
regulation is like the assertion that the First Amendment's Free Speech
Clause absolutely prohibits any speech regulations"23' to the following pas-
sage from the article by Van Alstyne that Gun Crazy severely criticizes: "The
freedoms of speech and of the press, it has been correctly said, are not abso-
lute. Neither is one's right to keep and bear arms absolute." 2
z Levinson, supra note 13, at 655-56. In the passage we have emphasized, Professor Levinson is
quoting from a then-unpublished manuscript that was subsequently published as Don B. Kates, Minimalist
Interpretation of the Second Amendment, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UN-
DERSTANDING 130 (E. Hickok, ed., 1991). Kates is, of course, one of the authors of this Article. Compare
the italicized passage with Gun Crazy's thrice-repeated description of Kates as "a gun rights litigator," Gun
Crazy, supra note 7, at 63, 69 & n.40, 109, a term which Gun Crazy defines as one who "share[s] the ex-
treme views of the NRA." Id. at 57 n.2.
Id. at 104. See also id. at 57 (In this article "[m]y focus is on the claim that every proposed reg-
ulation of firearms necessarily implicates the Second Amendment.") It is particularly incongruous that Gun
Crazy dispenses so much of its venom in falsifying the views of those whose scholarship has actually dis-
credited that claim.
n" Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 105.
van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 1254. The same analogy was made almost a decade earlier by one
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3. The Relevance of Guilt by Association
Gun Crazy's charges against Amar, Levinson, and other scholars raise
issues which Gun Crazy itself never directly addresses. Once again, all these
scholars actually did was sign a statement that summarized their previously
expressed views on the Amendment, a statement which Academics for the
Second Amendment then publicized in 1993. Gun Crazy uses this only as a
smear, an unelaborated innuendo. There is not even an attempt to explain
how conclusions Levinson and Amar reached in their respective 1989 and
1991 Yale Law Journal articles233 are impugned by the fact that years later
they endorsed a statement summarizing those same conclusions. Even assum-
ing that Gun Crazy were correct in charging Amar and Levinson with mem-
bership in A2A, a group that did not exist until late 1992" 4 (not 1993 as
alleged by Gun Crazy), 5 Gun Crazy does not attempt to explain how that
would impugn conclusions they independently reached years before.
This leads to some broader reflections on guilt by association as legal rea-
soning. Suppose that, when Levinson and Amar began their research, they
had both been members of the NRA (which did exist at that time). Is that a
basis for discounting their scholarship as Gun Crazy does? It is surprising---or
is it?-that Gun Crazy fails to make a charge that is logically indistinguish-
able and that has the added advantage of actually being true of Levinson and
Van Alstyne. They are both members of the ACLU, on whose national board
Van Alstyne served for many years. If their supposed A2A membership
would discredit their view of the Second Amendment, surely their ACLU
membership must equally do so (not to mention discrediting their views of
the rest of the Bill of Rights). Similarly, Professors Cottrol and Diamond are
members of the NAACP and other national groups opposing the death penal-
ty." 6 Does this association discredit Cottrol's adverse law review articles on
of the authors of this article. See Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 143, 145-46 (1986) ("[R]easonable gun controls are no more foreclosed by the second amendment
than is reasonable regulation of speech by the first amendment.").
r See Amar, Bill of Rights, supra note 13; Levinson, supra note 13.
"u Personal communication with Joseph Olson, A2A's President (June 19, 1995).
• Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 138 n.357.
.. In addition to the NAACP, Professor Cottrol is a member of Amnesty International and the Nation-
al Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty. Personal communication with Professor Cottrol (July 27, 1995).
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the death penalty? 7 Are Cottrol and Diamond now to be precluded from
writing on the death penalty or on legal issues involving race?"8
Presumably Herz would answer these questions in the negative. Yet what is
the likely effect of an attack like Gun Crazy's? Will it not be to deter addi-
tional scholars from publishing their agreement with the broad individual
right view of the Second Amendment? Will not others now think long and
hard before lending their name to an advertisement on an important legal
question with which they are in entire agreement, indeed an ad which en-
dorses and communicates the conclusions they reached during the course of
their scholarship? In sum, will not Gun Crazy contribute to the "ugly cross-
talk, [that] may simply be too off-putting for the taste of many in the legal
academy, quite a few of whom have intentionally eschewed the often con-
frontational stance of the practicing lawyer"?" That certainly appears to be
its intended effect.
II. FACTUAL ERRORS AND SLOPPINESS
In addition to the ad homines intended to malign both Second Amendment
scholarship and the scholars described in Part I, Gun Crazy is replete with
factual errors. Some of these errors concern its analysis of legal scholarship.
Others concern facts about the National Rifle Association and firearms. When
considered together, these errors suggest that Gun Crazy is more a polemic
than a serious contribution to legal scholarship.
A. Fudging the Count in Order to Minimize the Scholarly Consensus
Gun Crazy seeks energetically to dispel the overwhelmingly contrary schol-
arship by statistical legerdemain, but is hampered by its own slovenly re-
search and by the disability that doomed so many of us to law school: inabili-
ty to count. For reasons addressed below, Gun Crazy purports to limit the
scope of its count to full-time law professors listed in the 1993-94 AALS
"a' See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol, Static History and Brittle Jurisprudence: Raoul Berger and the Problem
of Constitutional Methodology, 20 B.C. L. REV. 353 (1985).
"3 See. e.g., Cottrol's argument for the constitutionality of and need for affirmative action, Robert J.
Cottrol, A Tale of Two Cultures: Or Making the Proper Connections Between Law, Social History and the
Political Economy of Despair, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 989 (1988); Raymond T. Diamond & Robert J.
Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana's Racial Classification Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 Loy.
L. REV. 255 (1983).
"2 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 139.
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Directory of Law Teachers24 as teaching constitutional law, who have pub-
lished articles focusing on the Second Amendment.24' Gun Crazy proceeds
to assert that "only nine [of these professors] have ever written a law review
article focusing on the Second Amendment,"242 to which it appends a foot-
note listing ten authors, not nine.243 Inexplicably, five of those listed do not
meet the specified criteria2" while four others who do meet the criteria are
omitted from the footnote.245 The criteria chosen exclude three other consti-
tutional law professors whose indicated support for the broad individual right
view appears very briefly in articles devoted to other topics.2"
Later in the same paragraph Gun Crazy asserts that "[flull-time law pro-
fessors [have] penned only ten articles focusing on the Second Amendment,"
of which it counts seven "on the broad individual right side" and three on the
24 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS (AALS), DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS, 1993-1994.
"' Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 137 ("At the beginning of the 1993-94 academic year, the AALS-mem-
her law schools employed 1368 self-described constitutional law professors.").
242 id.
1' Following is the text of footnote 353:
Bogus, supra note 11; Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Repub-
licanism: On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661
(1989); Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 12; Stephanie A. Levin, Grassroots Voices: Local Action
and National Military Policy, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 321 (1992); Levinson, supra note 12; McClurg,
supra note 108; Van Alstyne, supra note 12; David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second
Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 1007; Williams, supra note 48.
Id. at 137 n.353.
', Gun Crazy cites an article by Wendy Brown (a California professor of women's studies). Id. at 137
n.353. Reading Professor Brown's self-description at the bottom of the first page of her article would have
established that she is not a law professor. Reading the 1993-94 AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS that
Gun Crazy cites would have established that it does not list her. Neither does it list two others, Stephanie
Levin and Carl Bogus. The AALS Directory does list Andrew Jay McClurg and David Vandercoy as law
professors, but not as teachers of constitutional law.
24. It is particularly inexplicable that Gun Crazy omits from footnote 353 two such professors whom it
mentions elsewhere, Akhil Amar and Donald Beschle, not to mention George Anastaplo, whom it seems not
to have discovered, despite his having written one of the few articles by a law professor supportive of Gun
Crazy's position. See Anastaplo, supra note 14. Law professor Charles Cantrell (who is mentioned in foot-
notes 391 and 396 of Gun Crazy) may have been omitted because his article appeared in a bar publication
rather than a regular law review.
246 We do not suggest that it was in any way improper for Gun Crazy to exclude law professors who
have not devoted substantial space to addressing the Amendment. But because they are relevant to Gun
Crazy's claim about the silence of the academic community on this issue, we do note the affirmative refer-
ences to the individual right view by Gerard V. Bradley, James Gray Pope, and John Choon Yoo. See
Gerard V. Bradley, The Bill of Rights and Originalism, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 417, 434 (describing the mili-
tia clause as "mere exhortatory or precatory language"); James Gray Pope, supra note 13; John Choon Yoo,
supra note 13.
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other.247 But Herz misanalyzes the law professors' articles he cites and thus
overcounts the number of articles supporting his militia-centric view.
Far from supporting Gun Crazy's position, Professor Stephanie Levin takes
the position held by those whom Gun Crazy denounces. Indeed, she favorably
cites in support of her position a scholar Gun Crazy dismisses as a gun lobby
"warhorse" because he holds, as does Professor Levin, that the Second
Amendment embodies both collective and individual purposes. By guarantee-
ing individuals the right to have arms for self-defense it also protects the
collective arms of the militia, which consists of the military-age male citizen-
ry bearing their own arms. 48
Although it is true that Carl Bogus (who Gun Crazy neglects to mention
was a member of the Board of Directors of the Center to Prevent Handgun
Violence) feels a strong affinity for the narrowest possible view of the Sec-
ond Amendment, it is difficult to classify the article by Bogus that Gun Crazy
cites as squarely supporting its view of the Second Amendment. 49 Insofar
as Bogus discusses the matter, his article offers multiple conclusory denials
that the Amendment protects individual gun ownership. But the argument
made by Bogus in support of these denials undermines Gun Crazy's militia-
centric view of the Second Amendment. Bogus's thesis is that the
Amendment's real purpose was to guarantee the ability of white slaveholders
to keep control over their black slaves. Assuming that was one of the purpos-
es, it would seem to support, not contradict, the idea of the Amendment as a
broad-based right of individuals (that would now extend to blacks as well as
whites).
It is important to note two unannounced effects of Gun Crazy's exclusion
of all but "[f]ull-time law professors": First, that exclusion relieves Herz of
the need to mention, count, and respond to law review articles by professional
historians, all of them adverse to his position." A second advantage Gun
Crazy obtains from concentrating only on law professors is that it allows
247 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 138 & n.359.
2. Levin, supra note 13, at 346-47 n.105 (favorably citing David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment
and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1 (1987)). Compare Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at
138 & n.356 (listing Hardy among the "leading gun-rights litigators and lobbyists," a "band that essentially
knows just one tune").
"* Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1365 (1993).
2 0 See Fussner, supra note 13 (book review); Malcolm, Common Law, supra note 13; Malcolm, Re-
view, supra note 13; Shalhope, supra note 13; Shalhope, supra note 216.
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Herz to dismiss twenty-five law review articles whose authors Gun Crazy
categorizes as "leading gun-rights litigators and lobbyists"; s "[f]ive war-
horses [who] have pulled virtually all of the load"; 2 "a band that essential-
ly knows just one tune"; 3 "gun-rights advocates... [who] share the ex-
treme views of the NRA."'  This is highly misleading. One of the supposed
one-tune band members, Don Kates (one of the authors of the present Article)
devotes much of his scholarship to striking discordant notes: arguing for the
constitutionality of licensing, registration, and other controls that are anathe-
ma to the gun lobby;"s endorsing several such controls; 6 and severely re-
buking the gun lobby for myopic and constitutionally unwarranted opposition
to them. 7 Contrary to Gun Crazy's innuendos, this old warhorse has nei-
ther been urged nor paid by the gun lobby to write articles. In fact, his ar-
ticles have been denounced in the pages of the American Rifleman as "Or-
wellian Newspeak" ' by Stephen Halbrook, whom Gun Crazy also classi-
fies as a warhorse who, like Kates, supposedly belongs to a "band that es-
sentially knows just one tune." 9 Kates and Halbrook have publicly debated
each other as to the permissible scope of gun control under the Second
Amendment.2"
'1 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 138.
2" Id. at 138 n.356.
23 Id.
Id. at 57 n.2.
" Of the five articles by Don Kates that Gun Crazy mentions, the earliest devotes 11 pages to vali-
dating gun registration, licensing, and other controls, see Kates, supra note 96, at 257-67. The second is
devoted entirely to defending the validity of various gun controls, see Kates, supra note 229, as is a portion
of a third, see Don B. Kates, Gun Control: Separating Realityfrom Symbolism, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 353, 365
(1994) [hereinafter Gun Control].
X% See, e.g., DON B. KATES, GUNS, MURDER AND THE CONSTITUTION: A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF
GUN CONTROL 57-61 (1990) [hereinafter KATEs, GUNS, MURDER]; Don B. Kates, The Battle over Gun Con-
trol, 84 PUB. INTEREST 42, 42-43, 45-46 (1986); Don B. Kates, Conclusion, in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE
527-35 (Don B. Kates ed., 1984) [hereinafter KATES, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE]; Don B. Kates, Firearms
and Violence: Old Premises and Current Evidence in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 198, 207 (T. Gurr ed., 1989)
[hereinafter Kates, Current Evidence].
a' Kates, supra note 229, at 130-31 ("the gun lobby's obnoxious habit of assailing all forms of regula-
tion on Second Amendment grounds"); Kates, supra note 185, at 88 ("the gun lobby's obnoxious pretension
that the amendment bars any gun control it happens to oppose, however moderate or rational"); Kates, Gun
Control, supra note 255, at 365 ("the gun lobby position may be briefly dispatched by noting that the
Amendment does not read: 'Congress shall make no law of which the gun lobby disapproves"').
-"3 Stephen P. Halbrook, To Bear Arms for Self-Defense: Our Second Amendment Heritage, AM. RI-
FLEMAN, Nov. 1984, at 28 (criticizing Kates's arguments for the constitutionality of a wide variety of gun
controls under the Second Amendment).
n Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 138 & n.356.
2W See, e.g., Kates, supra note 232, at 143; Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Lin-
guistic Interpretation of the Second Amendment, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 153.
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B. Defaming the "Necromerchants"
Because our primary purpose here is to respond to the serious charges that
Gun Crazy makes about Second Amendment scholarship and scholars, we do
not address the pages of dubious allegations and invective Gun Crazy directs
against the NRA and the gun industry. Yet some of its claims are so patently
false, even absurd, that they evidence Gun Crazy's slipshod treatment of
facts.
One cannot always tell whether Gun Crazy's factual errors are deliberate or
merely the result of sloppiness or credulity. Sometimes they are offered to
buttress its arguments, but other times they are not. As an example of the
latter, Gun Crazy asserts, "[t]here are two types of handguns-revolvers and
pistols."'" It then offers the following definition of "pistols": "[P]istols, ac-
tually semiautomatic handguns, hold between 14 and 17 cartridges... ."262
Slight research would have informed Herz that there are other types of hand-
guns than revolvers and semiautomatics, and there is no significance whatever
to the figure of fourteen to seventeen rounds.263 Defining the category semi-
automatic pistol as holding "between fourteen and seventeen cartridges" is
comparable to defining the category "flower" as ranging in color from red to
pink.
Other false claims offered in support of its polemic against guns, gun man-
ufacturers, gun-rights activist groups, and Second Amendment scholars are
more disturbing. They are not only false, but so serious and demonstrably
false that they reveal Gun Crazy to be a work of propaganda.
' Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 59 n.5.
U2 Id.
-' In fact, most semiautomatic pistols hold no more than nine rounds, but there are semiautomatic pis-
tols holding 20, 30, 50, or even 100 round magazines. That some pistols hold 14-17 rounds is a happen-
stance that does not differentiate them in any meaningful way from those holding 5-13 and those holding
18-20 rounds.
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1. Marketing Candy-Colored Guns for Kids
Dubbing gun manufacturers "necromerchants, ' 6 Gun Crazy claims that
they "often target their products for use by children and criminals."265 To
support its claim with respect to children, Gun Crazy asserts that gun manu-
facturers "are turning out weapons in 'bright Crayola-crayon colors....
,,3266 Having never heard of such a thing, we checked with Eugene J.
Wolberg, the firearms examiner and Senior Criminalist for the San Diego,
California, Police Department. 267 After he finished laughing, Wolberg ex-
plained the matter: Only one of the "necromerchants," Eagle Arms, has ever
produced firearms in such colors. It did so as a gimmick on not-for-sale ad-
vertising models of target match rifles it displays at industry shows. A child
who attends gun industry shows and can afford the $2,000 price of an Eagle
target match rifle can buy such a rifle (in black steel only, not in the Crayola-
crayon colors).26s Of course, s/he must be willing to wait for the rifle to be
delivered after s/he reaches the age of majority. In addition, the Smith &
Wesson Company produces its "Ladysmith" pistols and revolvers in colored
versions; but these are subdued pastels and are marketed to women, not chil-
dren.
26
2. Marketing Fingerproof Guns to Criminals
Then there is Gun Crazy's claim that the "necromerchants" design guns for
sale to criminals. This is one of multiple falsehoods for which Gun Crazy
relies on citations to Josh Sugarmann.270 Quoting Sugarmann, Gun Crazy
26 Gun Crazy supra note 7, at 92. In a footnote, Gun Crazy offers the following definition:
necro-mer'chant (nek'rd-mfir'chant) n. [NLat. < Gk. nekros, corpse ME < Or. marcheant <
VLat. *mercantans < Lat. mercari, to trade] One whose occupation is the buying and selling of
the implements of death for personal profit.
Id. at 92 n.140. Presumably, Herz would continue to permit "necromerchants" to manufacture "implements
of death" so they might sell them to the police and armed forces "for personal profit."
m Id. at 92.
"6 1d. at 92 n.141. Gun Crazy obtains this misinformation from a magazine article. Diane Weathers,
Stop the Guns, ESSENCE, Dec. 1993, at 67, 134.
267 Personal communication with Senior Criminalist Eugene J. Wolberg (July 20, 1995).
26 The base price of the rifle is about $1,400, but that is without any kind of sighting mechanism.
With the normal target-quality telescopic sight. the price is about $2,000.
269 The only guns that remotely fit Gun Crazy's description are those with smaller proportions, which
are marketed to parents as "youth" models. Wolberg, supra note 267.
270 Once again, Herz fails to identify Sugarmann as the former Communications Director of the Na-
tional Coalition to Ban Handguns, and the founder and present Executive Director of an anti-gun organiza-
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asserts that one manufacturer advertises "a TEC-KOTE [finish that] provides
a natural lubricity... [that offers]... excellent resistance to finger-
prints .... ,27 Wolberg comments that this is "taken completely out of
context" in order to mislead people who have no knowledge of firearms."
What the advertisement is actually concerned with is not the issue of police
fingerprint detection, but the fact that fingers carry a natural acid that can
corrode and mar a firearm's finish unless it is carefully relubricated after each
time it is handled. What the advertisement conveys to those who are familiar
with firearms is that TEC-KOTEd firearms resist such corrosion. The TEC-
KOTE finish is irrelevant to police fingerprint detection techniques; police
laboratories have no more difficulty lifting prints from this firearm than from
any other.273
3. The NRA Helped Assassinate President Kennedy
Gun Crazy claims, referring to the rifle with which John F. Kennedy was
slain, that the NRA aided the assassination by "help[ing] develop the high-
powered ammunition that made this 'notoriously inaccurate' rifle more effec-
tive."274 Despite the absurdity of this, we checked with three experts.275
Each said that this claim is false in every particular.
First, the Manlicher-Carcano Italian army surplus rifle is not at all inac-
curate. Its bad reputation among American shooters is an artifact of their lack
of familiarity with Mannlicher-type actions (as opposed to the familiar
tion called the Violence Policy Center.
' Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 92 n.142 (alterations in original).
z" Wolberg, supra note 267.
273 Id.
27 Id. at 114 n.250 (citing JOSH SUGARMANN, NRA: MONEY, FIREPOWER AND FEAR 35 (1992)). It is
not entirely clear to us whether Gun Crazy means to imply that the NRA deliberately aided in the assassi-
nation of Kennedy (who was an NRA life member and a supporter of the gun industry, which is generally
centered in his native New England). But there would seem to be no point in mentioning the matter if it was
believed that all the NRA had done was develop more effective ammunition for a rifle without any fore-
knowledge or intent to help in its later use by Oswald. In that circumstance the NRA would be no more
blameworthy than the Texas School Book Depository, which without foreknowledge hired an assassin who
later misused its facility as a sniper's nest.
' Martin Fackler, M.D. (Col., U.S. Army, retired), founder and former director of the U.S. Army
Wound Ballistics Laboratory; William Wooton of Wooton Laboratory, the premier American authority on
the history of rifle ammunition; and Columbia Medical School Professor John K. Lattimer, author of innu-
merable medical studies of aspects of the JFK case. See JOHN K. LATrlMER, KENNEDY & LINCOLN: MEDI-
CAL AND BALLISTIC ASPECTS OF THEIR ASSASSINATIONS (1980).
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Mauser-type action). The Mannlicher-Carcano is a military-quality rifle cho-
sen as such for its accuracy against human targets. Indeed, the Italian Army
still uses the rifle for its precision shooting team. 76
Second, the ammunition Oswald used is "just normal [military surplus]
ammunition," commercially manufactured for sale based on the specifications
provided by the Italian Army. As to the NRA's having participated in the
assassination, the expert comments ranged from "absurd," "fantastic," and
"nonsense," to "preposterous." 77
4. The "Assault Weapon " Hoax"78
Gun Crazy's ignorance of firearms and factual sloppiness are evident in its
treatment of the "assault weapon" issue. Assault rifles are fully automatic
rifles developed for military service, for example, the Russian AK-47 and the
American M-16 .1 9 From the 1930s on, civilian possession of fully automat-
ic weapons has been outlawed by many states and highly restricted by federal
law. The 1986 Voelkmer-McClure Act flatly prohibited civilian ownership or
purchase of any fully automatic weapon manufactured after May 1986.5'
The term "assault weapon" (as opposed to "assault rifle") has no military
or other recognized or official meaning."' It is a term colloquially applied,
276 Fackler, supra note 275.
On reading Gun Crazy's source, SUGARMANN, supra note 274, it appears that Herz alone is respon-
sible for this innuendo. The facts which the source gives, but Herz omits, are that at the end of WWII the
NRA responded to a request for technical advice from the U.S. Army, which had captured large quantities
of the rifle during WWII. At that time Lee Harvey Oswald was not even ten years old and John F. Kennedy
was still serving his first term in the House of Representatives.
... In addition to the other sources cited herein, this section of the Article has been read and its accura-
cy confirmed by Eugene J. Wolberg, Senior Criminalist, City of San Diego and Chairman of the California
Attorney General's Assault Weapon Identification Committee. Personal communication (Aug. 25, 1995).
2' See GARY KLECK, PoINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 70 (1991) (citing U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) definitions). A fully automatic weapon continues to fire when the user continues to
press the trigger a semi-automatic weapon fires once each time the user pulls the trigger. The DOD defini-
tion is actually more restrictive than the one given in the text because it includes only those fully automatic
weapons that also have a semi-automatic mode of fire, that is "selective fire" weapons that allow the user to
select between semi- and fully automatic. The distinction is irrelevant to the issues we discuss because, since
the 1930s, laws regulating fully automatic arms have applied to any weapon capable of firing full-auto.
2a See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1988) (limiting civilian purchase of fully automatic weapons to those man-
ufactured prior to May 19, 1986, subject to registration requirements under 26 U.S.C. § 5812 (1988), and to
a $200 transaction fee under 26 U.S.C. § 5811 (1988)).
2"' Wolberg, supra note 278, comments that the experience of the California Attorney General's As-
sault Weapon Identification Committee is that the term "assault weapon" does not mean anything. It has
proven impossible for the Committee to identify an "assault weapon" by type after years of attempting to do
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largely as a scare tactic, to semi-automatic firearms that cosmetically resemble
real assault rifles, but fire no faster than a revolver or a pump-action shotgun
and that function mechanically no differently from many of the more innocu-
ous-looking rifles used for hunting.282
Contrary to the treatment in Gun Crazy, these weapons are far less deadly
than many conventional hunting weapons." 3 Like the military assault rifles
they imitate, the semi-automatic "assault weapons" are designed to use down-
powered ammunition, reflecting the fact that incapacitating an enemy soldier
requires far less power than killing a bear or moose with hunting weap-
ons.2 As David Kopel points out,
The great irony of the claim that the rifles labeled... "assault
weapons" are uniquely destructive is that they are the only rifles that
have ever been designed not to kill [human beings].... [This accords
both with the Hague Convention and with military theory which is that]
wounding an enemy soldier uses up more of his side's resources (to haul
him off the battlefield and then care for him) than does killing an ene-
my.2
85
According to the founder of the U.S. Army's Wound Ballistics Laboratory,
who is an experienced battle surgeon as well as a forensic analyst: "If [semi-
automatic 'assault weapon' makers] had advertised their effects as depicted
by the media, they would be liable to [civil] prosecution under truth-in-adver-
tising laws."2 6
so. The only definition which has proven workable is circular an "assault weapon" is one that is specifically
so identified by name and model on the California ban list. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12276 (West Supp. 1997).
Accordingly, when we use the term "assault weapon" it appears in quotes.
282 Wolberg, supra note 278.
' An assailant armed with an AR-15 (the civilian version of the M-16) would have to pull the trigger
27 times to fire as many similar-size projectiles as an ordinary 12-gauge hunting shotgun loaded with #4
buck dispenses with only one pull of the trigger. To equal the 162 projectiles dispersed by simply emptying
a 12-gauge shotgun of its six shots, an AR-15-armed assailant would have to empty and replace five and
one-half 30-shot detachable magazines. The AR-15's .223 bullets would travel at a substantially higher ve-
locity than the shotgun's .24 caliber pellets, but would also be substantially smaller. Wolberg, supra note
268; VINCENT Di MAIO, M.D., GUNSHOT WOUNDS: PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF FIREARMs, BALLISTICS AND
FORENSIC TECHNIQUES 146 (1985).
" See Edgar A. Suter, M.D., "Assault Weapons" Revisited, 83 J. MED. ASS'N GA. 281 (1994):
Typically assault weapons fire low or intermediate power cartridges (e.g., 9 mm Parabellum, 5.56
x 45 mm, 7.62 x 39 mm) with non-expanding bullets that have been designed to wound rather
than kill. Such cartridges are considerably less deadly than most high-power hunting cartridges
(e.g. .243 Winchester, 30-06, .300 Winchester Magnum) which, by definition, are designed to
kill, particularly when loaded with expanding bullets.
2'5 DAVID B. KOPEL, GUNS: WHO SHOULD HAVE THEm? 169 (1995) (emphasis added).
25 Id. at 170 (emphasis added). Kopel is here quoting Col. Martin L. Fackler, M.D.:
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Gun Crazy dwells emotionally on massacres like the Stockton, California
tragedy in which six of the thirty-five people Patrick Purdy shot with an "as-
sault weapon" died.287 Although it is grisly to make comparisons, Gun
Crazy's use of this example requires us to note that during a massacre at a
McDonald's in San Ysidro, California in 1984, James Huberty killed twenty-
one of the thirty-one people he shot (mostly children). He used several weap-
ons but primarily an ordinary hunting shotgun."' We realize, of course, that
Herz would ban all these weapons-indeed all firearms-so he would be
indifferent to the fact that "assault weapons" (and handguns) are less lethal
than common hunting weapons. But then gun-rights proponents are not wrong
when they claim that many gun regulations, including the ban on so-called
"assault weapons," are merely stepping stones along the route to complete
prohibition. 9
Also false is Gun Crazy's claim that "assault weapons" are frequently used
in crimes.' Contrast such a claim with the conclusion of the report to Con-
gress by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress: "The
only national statistics available on the makes and models of firearms that are
or might have been used by criminals ... indicate that criminals use the
semiautomatic firearms in question much less often than other makes or mod-
els of firearms."' The U.S. Department of Justice Survey of State Prison
Military bullets are designed to limit tissue disruption-to wound rather than kill. [Tactically,
this] ... is actually more effective for most warfare; it removes [both the enemy soldier] hit and
those needed to care for him.... If [semi-automatic "assault weapon" makers] had advertised
their effects as depicted by the media, they would be liable to prosecution under truth-in-adver-
tising laws.
Medical Examiner Vincent Di Maio notes that the lethality of the modem military .223 caliber rifle is
high only as compared to even less powerful modem military arms. Compared to even low-powered hunt-
ing rifles, .223 wounds "are, in fact, less severe than those produced by hunting ammunition such as the 30-
30." Di MAIO, supra note 283, at 146. Dr. Di Maio also notes the 30-30's relative weakness when compared
to standard hunting rifles. Id. at 161.
287 Gun Crazy does not mention incidents, such as occurred at a Shoney's Restaurant in Anniston,
Alabama, in which armed citizens prevented a massacre by successfully defending themselves against armed
assailants. Such incidents are not as well publicized as those in which defenseless, unarmed citizens are slain
by armed attackers. J. Neil Schulman, A Massacre We Didn't Hear About, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1992, at B5.
We discuss the efficacy of citizen self-defense infra Part IV.B.2.
" Personal communication (Aug. 25, 1995) from Eugene J. Wolberg, who was the senior criminalist
on the scene.
n" See our discussion of Gun Crazy's claim that gun rights proponents are paranoid, infra Part IV.C.
' Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 91-92 n.13 (assault weapons "make up 10% of all guns traced to
crime").
"I CoNGREssIoNAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, "ASSAULT WEAPONS": MILITARY-
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Inmates, 1991 suggests that less than one percent of inmates had been armed
with, although had not necessarily used, a "military-type weapon" (undefined)
while committing the offense for which they were incarcerated."
In their more candid moments, the advocates of banning such firearms
repudiate this falsehood. A Handgun Control, Inc., representative stated in
Congressional testimony: "[w]e agree with the National Rifle Association that
assault weapons right now play a small role in overall violent crime."293 As
to the supposed use of such weapons in attacking police, in 1992 more New
York City police officers were attacked "with roach spray, wood chisels, fire
extinguishers, radio amplifiers, or any other of a readily available array of
household objects than were attacked with assault weapons."294 Describing a
decade of.murders of California officers the California Journal of Law En-
forcement commented, "[it is interesting to note, in the current hysteria over
semi-automatic and military look-alike weapons, that the most common weap-
on used to murder peace officers [in the 1980s] was the .38 Special and the
.357 Magnum revolver."295 Nationally, of 1,534 police officers murdered in
the years 1975 to 1992, sixteen were killed with an "assault weapon."296
5. Race, Racism, Falsehood, and the NRA
Recall Gun Crazy's description of the idea "that 'gun control is a white
plot to disarm a feared minority population"' as a "long-standing NRA
STYLE SEMIAUTOMATIC FIREARMS FACTS AND ISSUES 5 (1992) [hereinafter FIREARMS FACTS] (emphasis
added). Eugene Wolberg comments that, of approximately 70 people murdered each year in San Diego with
a firearm, in no more than one or two cases has the weapon ever been a firearm listed as an "assault weap-
on" under the California "assault weapons" ban. This includes the years before the ban as well as those
following it. Personal communication (Aug. 25, 1995).
292 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE PRISON INMATES,
1991, at 19 (1993) [hereinafter SURVEY].
'" Quoted in FIREAR MS FACTS, supra note 291, at 6. To the same effect see Karl P. Adler et al., Fire-
arms Violence and Public Health: Limiting the Availability of Guns, 271 JAMA 1281 (1994) ("Although
these weapons account for only a small percentage of firearms deaths. . . "); Judith Cohen Dolins &
Katherine K. Christoffel, Reducing Violent Injuries, 94 PEDIATRICS 638, 646 ("These dangerous guns, which
fire a large number of bullets in seconds, still account for only a small percentage of all injuries and deaths
due to firearms .... ').
': Suter, supra note 284, at 285 (citing NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP'T, 1992 FIREARMS DISCHARGE
ASSAULT REP. 7 (1993)).
'295 George T. Williams & Charles B. Moorman, A Decade of Peace Officers Murdered in California:
The 1980s, 46 J. CAL. L. ENFORCEMENT 1, 6 (1991).
29 ALAN S. KRUG, THE "ASSAULT WEAPON" ISSUE 16-17 (1993) (using FBI, state, and local police
data). Although this is an NRA publication, generally confirming data are readily available from FIREARMS
FACTS, supra note 291 and from the Williams & Moorman study, supra note 294.
theme."297 On its face this is difficult to square with other elements of Gun
Crazy's portrayal of the NRA. Gun Crazy also denounces the NRA's "not-so-
subtle devaluation of the lives of poor persons of color" 'ri and depicts it as
an organization of white males (often associated with "white-supremacist
movements"2") for whom "[t]he pleasure of more efficient or pleasurable
hunting and target competition weapons... outweigh[s] the hundreds of
lives (mostly of persons of color in the inner city). ''3""
As discussed below,"' however, vast increases in gun (especially hand-
gun) ownership over the last two decades have been accompanied by a slight
decline in homicide. Since the early 1970s homicide has declined or remained
stable for every segment of American society except young inner city males.
Gun-rights proponents are forced to point this out to correct their opponents'
hyperbole about rising homicide. Yet Gun Crazy uses their response to mount
another accusation of racism. By correcting such criminological falsehoods
"the gun lobby" only proves its indifference to "non-white children and teen-
agers who die"'3"o and its "morally reprehensible""3 3 and "racist assump-
tions"3 that "we should discount [their deaths] because the lives of these
children of color are apparently worthless, or, at best, worth less [than the
lives of white children].""3 5
The works Herz cites contain nothing to justify these insinuations and he
has to suppress the fact that they expressly repudiate it. Compare, for exam-
ple, Gun Crazy's claims of an "insidious... lingering scent of racism in the
gun lobby's ranks,"3" its leadership's "indifference to the death and suffer-
ing of 'others' of color,"3 7 with the following passage by one of the two
"' Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 142 (citing and quoting SUGARMANN, supra note 275).
... Id. at 116 n.256.
' Id. at 84 n.110. Gun Crazy fails to mention, however, that Professor Robert Cottrol, who by virtue
of his membership in Academics for the Second Amendment is labeled by Gun Crazy as a member of a
anti-gun control group organized by the NRA, and his coauthor, Professor Raymond Diamond, are both
African-Americans. So is Professor Nicholas Johnson, who Gun Crazy falsely claims is an A2A member.
See supra note 196-97 and accompanying text.
Id. at 115.
"' See infra Part IV.BA.
'- Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 116.
30 Id.
3 id.
30s Id.
6 Id. at 115.
30 Id.
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"gun activists" Gun Crazy claims advocates the "devaluation of the lives of
poor persons of color."308
One of the central strategies of the gun prohibition advocates has been
to tell Americans that they are all in immediate peril of gun violence.
[Citing claims] that the recent rise in youth homicide puts all Americans
at imminent risk, for "this onslaught of childhood violence knows no
boundaries of race, geography, or class.. .. "
To the contrary, the problem of youth homicide is very heavily con-
centrated in Black males aged fifteen-nineteen .... That fact, of course,
is no reason to be less concerned about the youth homicide problem.
Since many problems, including violence, suffered by the urban Black
community are the long-term result of governmental and societal racism,
the moral obligation for all Americans to respond to the crisis is all the
greater.3
III. THE MILrrI-CENTRIc THEORY OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
We now turn to the substantive argument made by Gun Crazy about the
appropriate interpretation of the Second Amendment. Such as it is, the argu-
ment is largely if not entirely semantic.
A. A Makeweight Conception of the Second Amendment
Gun Crazy dubs its perspective the "narrow individual right"3 " view of
the Amendment, "a narrow focus on the militia in defining the right to bear
arms."'' It substitutes this terminology for the terms "collective right" or
"states' right" which commentators on both sides have used to describe the
same position on the Second Amendment, but to which Gun Crazy objects
303 Id. at 116 n.256 (citing Paul Blackman and David Kopel).
309 DAvID B. KoPEI, CHILDREN &GUNS: SENSIBLE SOLUTIONS 37 (1993) (emphasis added). Compare
Gun Crazy, supra note 7. at 116 n.256 (citing only a different, much shorter, work by Kopel). Kopel is,
incidentally, a Democrat, a member of Amnesty International and the ACLU, and the son of the Colorado
legislator who authored the state's fair housing act and other anti-discrimination measures. Personal commu-
nication from David B. Kopel (Aug. 24, 1995). Once again, we acknowledge that such facts should not be
appropriate for discussion in a scholarly article. Once again, we plead that, however inappropriate, they have
been made necessary by the argumentative techniques used by Gun Crazy.
310 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 61.
3 Id. at 66. The term "narrow" is used to describe the view espoused by Gun Crazy, e.g., "narrow
right," "narrow right view," "narrow individual right," "narrow individual right view," "narrow or limited
individual right," more than 30 times throughout the article.
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because, it claims, those terms fail to acknowledge the "narrow" position's
individual right component.3" Regrettably, this is, at best, misleading, like
so much else in Gun Crazy.
A crucial implication of describing a thing as an "individual right" rather
than a state prerogative is that the right protects choice by the individual or
individual liberty in some form. But individual liberty is missing entirely
from Gun Crazy's "narrow" individual right position. The militia system as it
existed in the American colonies required: (1) every household to have a gun
(even if its members were exempt from militia service); (2) all law-abiding,
respectable men (even those exempt from militia service) to carry a gun at
some or all times; and (3) many or most men to appear with their guns when
called out for militia service. 3
So what Gun Crazy apparently takes the Second Amendment to mean is
simply that if the state compels individuals to own or carry arms as part of a
militia system, the federal government cannot relieve them of that compul-
sion, confiscate their guns, or otherwise disable them from compliance with
the state militia laws. Gun Crazy's calling this an "individual right" is mere
lip service. The "right" Gun Crazy posits is actually the state's because it
applies only to individuals acting at the behest of the state and is limited to
the state's interest in preserving the group. To call this an individual right is
as misleading as it would be to call it "freedom of religion" if the First
Amendment meant no more than that Congress could not compel individuals
to be Protestants if their state compelled them to be Catholics.
We hasten to add that Gun Crazy does not actually say that its "narrow"
interpretation of the Second Amendment would preclude the federal govern-
ment from disarming state militia members. Indeed, it bears emphasizing that
i Id. at 69.
"' Under the colonial militia laws, every military-age male (excepting the insane, infirm, and crimi-
nals) was subject to the requirement to own arms for militia service and to bring them when called out for
drill, inspection, or actual military campaigning. Seamen, clergymen, and public officials were generally
exempt from the duty of responding to such callouts. Men over the upper military age (which varied from
45 to 60, depending on the colony) were also exempt. But the militia laws required every household to have
a gun, even if its occupants were all female, overage, seamen, clergymen, and/or public officials. Similarly,
all respectable men were required to carry arms at all times. In practice this was probably not enforced ex-
cept in times of danger and probably only applied when traveling or going outside the community. United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) (describing colonial practice of expecting all able men to supply
themselves with arms to support colonial militia); SENATE SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITrrION OF THE SEN-
ATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARms 3 (1982) [hereinafter
THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS].
1996] 1205
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Gun Crazy does not actually say anything about the Amendment's having any
application to anything. t4 Although we shall defer to Gun Crazy's objection
to its view being called the "states' right" or "collective right" view, we are
concerned to find terminology for it more accurate than "narrow individual
right view."
We shall therefore describe Gun Crazy's view as, in its own terms, the
"militia-centric""31 theory of the Amendment, though we might well have
called it the "makeweight" view. For "makeweight" accurately describes a
view under which the Amendment lacks any specific affirmative function or
substantive content. Gun Crazy's "narrow" view was invented to, and serves
only the negative purpose of, fronting for Gun Crazy's desired conclusion
that there is no constitutional barrier to gun control or prohibition.
The fact that the militia-centric "narrow right" is a mere makeweight is
evident from Gun Crazy's failure to ascribe to it any substantive content
whatever. Gun Crazy describes only what the "narrow right" does not do, but
nothing that it does. Under it, we are told, the state's power to restrict or ban
guns is "all-but-unlimited"3 6; and no ban on "any aspect of the private pur-
chase, use, or possession of firearms should see invalidation on Second
Amendment grounds."37 No explanation is given for how this accords with
the fact that "ordinarily when called for service these [militia] men were
expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves ...
As correctly described in Miller,a"9 the militia system the Founders knew
imposed an obligation on at least the entire suitable and fit military-age male
population to appear when called, bearing their own private arms. Logically,
therefore, a narrow militia-centric view of the Amendment would, at the very
least, protect ownership of military-style weapons including semiautomatic
rifles, if not machine guns,32 by the entire military-age male populace.
3" Gun Crazy's repeated use of the term "narrow" in such phrases as "narrow individual right" and
"narrow focus on the militia in defining the right to bear arms," see supra note 312, is as close as Gun Cra-
zy gets to explaining what Hez believes the Amendment to do. With no more basis than these statements we
extrapolate that Herz believes that, if Congress attempted to take away guns that the state had supplied to its
militia, the Amendment would preclude such an attempt. He does not actually say this.
"' Id. at 80 ("the Amendment had a narrow, militia-centric scope"); id. at 144 (referring to "a narrow
militia-centric view of the right to bear arms").
I16 d. at 148.
' d. at 82.
31 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
319 Id.
320 Some advocates of the individual right view of the Amendment, including one of the authors of this
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Yet Gun Crazy strongly affirms both the desirability and constitutionality
of prohibitions on such arms, without any attempt to reconcile such prohibi-
tions with its supposedly militia-centric view. Gun Crazy's assertion about the
"all-but-unlimited scope of [constitutionally] viable gun control"32' implies
that some gun control laws would violate the Amendment. But readers of
Gun Crazy will find no explanation or elaboration.
B. Problems with the Militia-Centric Theory
Gun Crazy's makeweight militia-centric view of the Second Amendment is
beset with substantial obstacles. They include the Amendment's text and
context in the Bill of Rights, its direct legislative history, the known attitudes
of the Framers on the subjects of the personal right to arms and the desirabil-
ity of an armed citizenry, and the congruent view of those matters taken by
the liberal political philosophers they revered.3" Finally, the implications of
the militia-centric theory of the Second Amendment (which its proponents
have not bothered to explore) lead to conclusions more frightening and gro-
tesque about limitations on federal power to enact gun laws than does the
individual right view. We discuss each of these issues in turn.
1. The Constitutional Text
Doubtless the strongest support for the individual right view and against
the makeweight militia-centric view derives from the text of the Amendment
itself. The Amendment uses the phrase, "right of the people," a term also
used in the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, and in the original
Constitution, and used to denote the rights of individuals. As William Van
Alstyne, Akhil Amar, and other neutral scholars have concluded, the constitu-
tional text unmistakably precludes minimizing the Amendment as a right
pertaining just to the states or to the state or federal militias as corporate
bodies, or to any group less comprehensive than the entire law-abiding, re-
sponsible, adult citizenry." In the context of the Bill of Rights taken as a
Article, have argued that the scope of the weaponry involved is actually much narrower than this militia-
centric conception, extending Second Amendment protection only to small arms. See the detailed discussion
of this point in Kates, supra note 96, at 258-61.
"' Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 148 (emphasis added).
312 See supra notes 178-90 and accompanying text.
32 See sources cited supra note 13.
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whole, the words of the Second Amendment admit only an individual right
interpretation. Clearly,
"the people" referred to in the Second Amendment are the same as "the
people" discussed in the First, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments. It
is hardly credible to assume that the Framers' reference to "the people"
indicated intent to protect the rights of private individuals to assemble
peaceably and petition the government in the First Amendment, but was
somehow transformed in the Second Amendment to refer to a right of
states to keep and bear arms, and then miraculously reverted to indicate
an individual right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and ef-
fects in the Fourth Amendment and an individual's residual rights and
powers in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.'
Characteristically, Gun Crazy simply assumes the phrase "well-regulated"
in the Second Amendment's introductory clause ("A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State") implies that government has
the power to forbid gun ownership. Someone less predisposed toward that
result might reflect that if this were so the Amendment would be meaningless
as a guarantee even of the "narrow" militia-centric right Gun Crazy concedes.
Had Herz made the attempt, he would have been unable to confmn his
assumption by research. For "[i]n eighteenth century military usage, 'well
regulated' meant 'properly disciplined,' not 'government controlled."' 3
The eighteenth century usage of "regulate" had the more specialized meaning
of "practiced in the use of arms, properly trained, and/or disciplined." '326
Thus we find Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 29 referring to "a
well-regulated militia" as one that has been sufficiently drilled.327
3 Cottrol & Diamond. Fifth Auxiliary Right. supra note 13, at 1002.
" Lund, supra note 13, at 107 n.8.
... Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65, 92 n.133 (1983) (quoting 7 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 380 (1933) and 3 id. at 416).
'" Hamilton assumes this meaning throughout Federalist 29, but it is made most explicit when he is
discussing his reasons why Congress will not undertake to discipline "all the militia of the United States,"
pursuant to its powers under Article I, § 8 ("to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia,
and for governing such parts of them as may be employed in the service of the United States"):
To oblige the great body of the yeomanry and of the other classes of citizens to be under arms
for the purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions as often as might be neces-
sary. to acquire the degree ofperfection which would entitle them to the character of a well reg-
ulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious public inconvenience and
loss.
THE FEDERALIST, No. 29, at 78 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis added). Notice also how Hamilton
assumes that the militia refers to the entire population.
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Even in more general usage, eighteenth and nineteenth century Americans
often used "regulate" not in the sense of regulation by law but rather in the
now-less-prominent uses given by Webster's:
2. to adjust to some standard or requirement, as amount, degree, etc.: to
regulate the temperature 3. to adjust so as to assure accuracy of opera-
tion: to regulate a watch 4. to put in good order, to regulate the diges-
tion.32
Consistent with this, President James Polk used "well-regulated" to mean
operating in good order, correctly or properly, referring to "well-regulated
self-government among men."
3 29
To construe "well-regulated" as authorizing regulation of arms makes the
clause in the Amendment ungrammatical-indeed syntactically senseless. In
contrast, when understood in eighteenth century usage, the clause tracks per-
fectly: "A well regulated [i.e., properly trained and disciplined] Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State ......
Like others who would dismiss the Second Amendment, Gun Crazy re-
sponds to the apparently plain meaning of the text with an historical claim
about original intent: that the Framers understood the second part of the
Amendment, which guarantees the people's right to keep and bear arms, to
have been somehow qualified by the first part, which asserts the importance
of a militia to a free society. Although a resort to legislative history is not
unreasonable in light of the sentence structure of the Second Amendment,
there is considerable hypocrisy in this standard response. Those who make it
would never subscribe to an "originalist" interpretation of any other textual
provision such as, for example, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Such arguments are clearly intended by Herz (and others30) as
328 WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1209 (1989).
'" James Polk, Inaugural Address (1845) in DAVIS N. Lorr, THE PRESIDENTS SPEAK: THE INAUGU-
RAL ADDRESSES OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTS 90 (1961).
.. See, e.g., Garry Wills, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV., Sept. 21, 1995, at 62.
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a sop for the benighted.33" ' Nevertheless, completeness compels us to exam-
ine these historical arguments.
2. The Founders' Understanding of the Amendment
Reasonable scholars may disagree about the role that the Framers' original
understanding of the Second Amendment should play in its interpretation by
courts. Indeed one of the authors of this article, Don Kates, takes an
originalist approach to interpretation, while the other, Randy Barnett, does
not.332 Nonetheless, we are both in complete agreement that the legislative
history of the Second Amendment is as clear as such matters ever get. Indeed
it is the overwhelming nature of the evidence that has led to the emergence of
a scholarly consensus among an otherwise very disparate group of schol-
ars.
3 3 3
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the founding generation's individual right
understanding of the Amendment is that the Founders themselves uniformly
described the Amendment as guaranteeing an inalienable individual right (and
so did courts and commentators for at least a century thereafter3 4). The
Founders seem not to have even understood the concept that the Second
Amendment was, or could be, something less or different. The very concept
of the Amendment as a collective right, a states' right, a right of the state
militia, or pertaining only to militiamen is an artifact of the twentieth century
gun control debate unknown to the Founders, courts, and commentators for
more than a century after their time.
"' See Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 66: "[W]e need not read the Second Amendment exclusively
through the eyes of a small group of white property-owning males who lived in a world utterly different
than our own. Ours is a Living Constitution, one that must be read against the backdrop of changing social
circumstances."
In a footnote to this passage, ld. at 66 n.29, Gun Crazy cites with approval Michael Perry's view that
he would "prefer to let the framers sleep. Just as the framers, in their day, judged by their lights, so must
we, in our day, judge by ours." MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTnILY'ON, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
75 (1982).
.3. See Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of Framers' Intent, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 403 (1996)
(distinguishing between interpretation based on a conception of the Framers as wardens and one that is based
on a conception of the Framers as designers, and favoring the latter).
... In this section, we unavoidably summarize in a highly abbreviated fashion an extensive body of evi-
dence that has been discussed with sensitivity and nuance by many others. See authorities cited supra note
13.
334 Our discussion of the courts appears supra Part I.A. For our discussion of how commentators inter-
preted the Amendment after it was ratified, see infra Part III.B.4.
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The evidence on this point is not solely that the Founders used the "right of
the people" phrase to mean individual rights in the First, Second, Fourth, etc.
Amendments. A review of other writings, both private and public, finds the
Founders consistently and routinely jumbling the Second Amendment togeth-
er with the freedoms of speech, press, and/or religion in the same sentence
and referring to them jointly as "human rights,"'335 "private rights,"' 336 "es-
sential and sacred rights,' 337 and rights that "respected personal liberty
[which] each individual reserves to himself.' 33 Remarkably, no instance
whatever has been found of the Founders referring to the right to arms as
being fundamentally different from the others guaranteed in the Bill of Rights
in that it was narrow or limited to the militia or to militiamen.339
Evidence surrounding the legislative history of the Second Amendment in
Congress also supports the individual right view. Madison initially proposed
that amendments be inserted into the particular parts of the original Constitu-
tion they affected or to which they related, not added at the end. Had Madi-
son held an exclusively militia-centric view of the Amendment, he would
have planned to place this provision into the Militia Clause of Article I, Sec-
tion 8. But he proposed to insert it, along with freedom of religion, the press,
and other personal rights, in Section 9, following the rights already in the
Constitution against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws"0 and immedi-
ately following his proposed rights of freedom of speech, press, and assem-
bly.'"
Moreover, the text of Madison's initial proposal lacks the awkward sen-
tence structure that has given rise to a militia-centric interpretation: "The
335 See Kates, supra note 96, at 228 (James Monroe included "the right to keep and bear arms" in a list
of basic "human rights" that he would propose be amended into the Constitution.).
33 See Madison's Notes, supra note 154, at 64 ("Read the amendments - They relate 1st to private
rights.").
3, Letter by Senator Gallatin of October 7, 1789, quoted in Steven Halbrook, To Keep and Bear Their
Private Arms: The Adoption of the Second Amendment, 1787-1797, 10 N. KY. L. REv. 13, 36 n.90 (1982)
(referring to "essential and sacred rights" which "each individual reserves to himself).
3m See 3 PATRICK HENRY 391 (1951) (letter from U.S. Senator William Gray to Patrick Henry stating
that Madison had introduced a "string of amendments" which "respected personal liberty.").
... Furthermore, as we discuss infra Part 111.B.4, "commentators in the antebellum years of the 19th
Century wrote of the Second Amendment as a right of individuals. To our knowledge, no commentator in
the antebellum era offered an interpretation of the Second Amendment that indicated that the right was only
a right of the states or was limited to those actively involved in militia service." Cottrol & Diamond, Fifth
Auxiliary Right, supra note 13, at 1001 n.24.
" Shalhope, supra note 13, at 135.
' See I ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 149, at 451 (statement of Rep. J. Madison).
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right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well regu-
lated militia being the best security of a free country: but no person religious-
ly scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in
person."' 2 Notice also that this entire provision concerns individual rights,
both the right of a person to keep and bear arms and the equally individual
right of a person to avoid being compelled to bear arms. Indeed, in his notes
for his speech to the House Madison refers to these rights as follows: "Read
the amendments-They relate 1st to private rights." 34
When Madison introduced his Bill of Rights into Congress his fellow Fed-
eralist, Trench Coxe, wrote an explanatory commentary and submitted it to
Madison for approval. Having received Madison's imprimatur, it was pub-
lished in Federalist newspapers all over the nation. It described the Second
Amendment as guaranteeing citizens against the confiscation of "their private
arms." Editorials in Anti-Federalist newspapers agreed, describing the
Amendment as a Madisonian plagiarism of the proposal by their champion,
Sam Adams, that "peaceable citizens" be guaranteed in the possession of
"their own arms."345
Gun Crazy neglects to address this and other evidence presented in the
authorities it attacks, choosing instead to borrow its arguments from previ-
ously published work by anti-gun activists.' " Like them, Gun Crazy argues
that, as an historical matter, the Second Amendment was "a compromise
between the Federalists' insistence on a strong federal government supported
by a large standing army, and the Anti-Federalists' demand that the states
maintain control over the existing state militias as a counterweight to the ex-
panding federal power."' 7 Far from "insisting" on a "large" standing army,
2 Id.
'3 Madison's Notes, supra note 154, at 64.
Trench Coxe, Remarks on the First Part of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, PHILA.
FED. GAZETrE, June 18, 1789, at 2 (emphasis added). Coxe's full comment on the Second Amendment was:
As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people duly before them, may attempt to tyrannize,
and as the military forees which must be occasionally raised to defend our country, might pervert
their power to the injury of their fellow citizens, the people are confirmed by the next article
[i.e.. amendment] in their right to keep and bear their private arms.
Id. (emphasis added).
-' Editorial, BOSTON INDEP. CHRON., Aug. 20, 1789, at 2. Adams's original proposal read: "the said
constitution be never construed ... to prevent the people of the United States who are peaceable citizens,
from keeping their own anns." 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMEbNTARY HISTORY
675 (1971) (emphasis added).
Compare sources cited supra note 12, with Gun Grazy, supra note 7.
"' Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 64. We have added emphasis to illustrate the ahistoricity of Gun
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however, Federalists repeatedly denied that they wanted a "large" standing
army,348 and there is no evidence supporting the idea that they did.
Gun Crazy then asserts that: (1) the Anti-Federalists were dissatisfied with
Madison's draft of the Second Amendment because it failed to mention self-
defense and hunting; and so, (2) the Anti-Federalists offered specific amend-
ments to guarantee a right to arms for self-defense and hunting, but these
amendments were rejected. 9 Gun Crazy understandably gives no support-
ig reference for either (1) or (2) because, together, they are fiction.
The Anti-Federalists' problem was precisely the opposite of Gun Crazy's
claim: Not that the Amendment failed to guarantee an individual right, but
that neither it nor the rest of the Bill of Rights addressed their opposition to
Article 1, Section 8's provisions for a standing army and substantial federal
control over what had heretofore been wholly state-run militias. They com-
plained that the Amendment did not deal with the militia issues, the very
issues Gun Crazy claims it addresses: "the absolute command vested by [Arti-
cle I, Section 8] in Congress over the militia, [is] not in the least abridged by
this amendment.""3 ' The constitutional amendments they unsuccessfully pro-
posed dealt not with the right to arms (which they fully endorsed), but rather
sought to abrogate elements of the standing army and militia provisions of
the original Constitution."'
Finally, unlike the individual right view, the militia-centric theory implies a
conflict between the Second Amendment and the original Constitution. The
militia-centric view posits that the Amendment embodies at least some of the
Anti-Federalist objections to the federal powers enunciated in Article I, Sec-
tion 8's military-militia provisions. Thus under the militia-centric view, the
Crazy's discussion even in its own terms.
-' See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison), supra note 143, at 310:
The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried
in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-
fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield in the United States
an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia
amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands....
" Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 66.
330 MALCOLM, ORIGINS, supra note 13, at 163 (quoting an Anti-Federalist discussion of the Bill of
Rights which stressed this point, without any reference to the complaint that Gun Crazy claims motivated the
Anti-Federalists, i.e. their supposed belief that the Amendment failed to guarantee the right to possess arms
for self-defense or hunting).
"'s Id. at 161. This is yet anotherpoint Gun Crazy, Henigan et al. fail to mention.
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Amendment must be seen as cutting back on those provisions, (though neither
Herz nor other partisans of that view have attempted to define what was cut
back and how 5 ). In contrast, in the individual right view, the Amendment
merely affirms the Federalists' insistence during the ratification debate that
the Constitution give the federal government no power to disarm individuals.
Only this interpretation renders the Bill of Rights consistent with Federalist
arguments that a bill of rights was unnecessary. 53
The individual right theory also reconciles the goals of two groups: those
who wanted an effective militia for national security purposes and to serve as
a counterweight to a standing army, and those who wanted to possess and use
their own arms for self-protection or hunting. An individual right to keep and
bear arms effectively accomplishes both purposes, satisfying both groups,
provided it is not limited to the militia or "common defense" context."5
In sum, Gun Crazy to the contrary notwithstanding, the text of the
Amendment broadly encompasses not just arms possession for militia pur-
poses but also the customary American common law right to possess arms for
self-defense and hunting. Gun Crazy to the contrary notwithstanding, not a
single legislator (Federalist or Anti-Federalist) rose to argue otherwise. And
Gun Crazy to the contrary notwithstanding, the Anti-Federalists voted for the
Amendment without seeking to amend or expand its "right of the people"
language in any respect.
3. "Firearms Fundamentalists ": The Founders' Beliefs About Guns
If any group of persons deserves the label "pro-gun," it is not Akhil Amar,
Sanford Levinson, or William Van Alstyne, but the Founders themselves.
They were not ignorant of the enormous harms that can result from the mis-
use of weapons, particularly firearms. Nor were they unaware of the argu-
ments for banning them from the general populace. Such arguments dated
back to at least the sixteenth century absolutist Jean Bodin, who denounced
the possession of arms as "the cause of an infinite number of murders, he
3.2 Henigan, supra note 12, at 116, admits that the Amendment does cut back on the Art. 1, § 8 pow-
ers. But he makes no attempt to explore the matter.
... See Lawson & Granger, supra note 150, at 315-26 (discussing the relationship between the Fed-
eralist argument that a bill of rights was unnecessary and interpretation of federal powers as limited by the
rights retained by the people).
' We thank Professor Joseph Olson for this insight.
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which weareth a sword, a dagger, or a pistol." '355 But such arguments, and
the French absolutism of which they reeked, were anathema to the Founders.
Cesare Beccaria's comment on the futility and injustice of banning arms so
impressed Thomas Jefferson that he translated it from the Italian and labori-
ously copied it in longhand in his own book of great quotations. This com-
ment by the Italian thinker and founder of modem criminology is nothing
more than a flowery eighteenth century rendition of "when guns are out-
lawed, only outlaws will have guns":
False is the idea of utility that sacrifices a thousand real advantages for
one imaginary or trifling inconvenience; that would take fire from men
because it bums, and water because one may drown in it; that has no
remedy for evils, except destruction. The laws that forbid the carrying of
arms are laws of such a nature. They disarm those only who are neither
inclined nor determined to commit crimes. Can it be supposed that those
who have the courage to violate the most sacred laws of humanity, the
most important of the code, will respect the less important and arbitrary
ones, which can be violated with ease and impunity, and which, if strict-
ly obeyed, would put an end to personal liberty-so dear to men, so
dear to the enlightened legislator-and subject innocent persons to all
the vexations that the quality alone ought to suffer? Such laws make
things worse for the assaulted and better for the assailants; they serve
rather to encourage than to prevent homicides, for an unarmed man may
be attacked with greater confidence than an armed man. They ought to
be designated as laws not preventive but fearful of crimes, produced by
the tumultuous impression of a few isolated facts, and not by thoughtful
consideration of the inconveniences and advantages of a universal de-
cree.
356
"' To his criminological arguments Bodin joined political ones reflecting his absolutism: "we may not
think ever to keep that people in subjection which hath always lived in liberty, if they be not disarmed." The
"most usual way to prevent seditions is to take away the subjects' arms"; otherwise they will presume to
exercise "the immoderate liberty of speech given orators" in free societies. In nations where the populace is
armed and enjoys free speech, that has "translated the sovereignty from the nobility into the people, and
changed the Aristocracy into a Democratic or Popular estate." JEAN BODN, THE SIX BOOKS OF
COMMONVEALE 106, 389, 542-44, 599, 610-11, 614 (R. Knolles, trans., London, 1606).
'- THE COMMONPLACE BOOK OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 314 (G. Chinard ed., 1926) (quoting CESARE
BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 87-8 (1764)). Thomas Paine made a similar observa-
tion:
The supposed quietude of a good man allures the ruffian; while on the other hand, arms like laws
discourage and keep the invader and the plunderer in awe, and preserve order in the world as
well as property. The balance of power is the scale of peace. The same balance would be pre-
served were all the world destitute of arms, for all would be alike; but since some will not, others
dare not lay them aside.... Horrid mischief would ensue were one half the world deprived of
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The Founders' attitude towards firearms and the desirability of an armed
citizenry would put even the most ardent modem gun extremist to shame.
Gun Crazy takes ten journal pages to argue that there exists today among gun
enthusiasts a form of "firearms fundamentalism." '357 But if this characteriza-
tion is apt, it is as old as this country. Nor is the idea original to Gun Crazy.
As was noted above, the Founders' views "about the relationship between
men and arms" has been described as having an "almost religious quali-
ty.,,358
"[O]ne loves to possess arms" wrote Thomas Jefferson to George Wash-
ington on June 19, 1796."' He and Washington maintained sizeable person-
al armories in their homes. A model bill of rights proposed by Jefferson
would have guaranteed that "[n]o freeman shall be debarred the use of arms
within his own lands."3' A letter of advice written to a nephew by Jeffer-
son embraces the view-typical in his day, but the epitome of what Gun
Crazy would deem "extremist"--that firearm ownership and proficiency
builds the bold, confident, upright, independent character necessary to a re-
publican citizenry:
A strong body makes the mind strong. As to the species of exercise, I
advise the gun. While this gives a moderate exercise to the body, it
gives boldness, enterprise, and independence to the mind. Games played
with the ball, and others of that nature, are too violent for the body, and
stamp no character on the mind. Let your gun, therefore, be the constant
companion of your walks." ''
Though claiming to expound a militia-centric view, Gun Crazy is silent on
the vital issue of character, which reinforced the founding generation's attrac-
tion to a militia consisting of "all males physically capable of acting in con-
cert for the common defense." '362 Many of the Founders believed that the
very survival of republican government depended on the "civic virtue... of
the armed freeholder: upstanding, courageous, self-reliant, individually able to
the use of them; ... the weak will become a prey to the strong.
I WRITMNGS OF THOMAS PAINE 56 (Conway ed., 1894).
's Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 93.
... Asbury, supra note 183.
... 9 WRMrNs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 341 (A.A. Lipseomb ed., 1903). Jefferson added the caveat that
he hoped never to have to use arms.
"0 THE JEFFERSON CYCLOPEDIA 51 (Foley ed., reissued 1967).
"' Id. at 318.
' United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
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repulse outlaws and oppressive officials, and collectively able to overthrow
domestic tyrants and defeat foreign invaders."3" To the Founders and their
intellectual progenitors, it was not only the individual's inalienable right to
defend home and family, but a crucial element in his moral character that he
should both desire and be able independently to do so. In so doing he was
also contributing to the defense of the entire community. Likewise, it was a
crucial element in his moral character that he join with his fellows in defend-
ing their community, both by hunting criminals down when the hue and cry
went up, and in more formal posse and militia patrol duties, under the control
of public officials."
Once again, Gun Crazy's silence on the issue of character cannot represent
mere ignorance, for that issue is strongly emphasized in articles Gun Crazy
cites, one of which it discusses in great detail.365 Rather it reflects the fact
that its author, like other anti-gun activists, simply cannot cope with the atti-
tudes that motivated the adoption of the Amendment, attitudes that still flour-
ish among a large segment of the public whom Gun Crazy disparagingly de-
scribes as "firearms fundamentalists."3
Gun Crazy may have been disingenuous when it presented at length367 its
claim that pro-gun beliefs have a "religious '3TM dimension that merits the
label "firearms fundamentalism,"'36 but it is on to something nonetheless.
Indeed, the beliefs of anti-gun enthusiasts are no less religious or "fundamen-
talist" than those of gun aficionados.7
3 Shalhope, supra note 13, at 128.
See Kates, supra note 185, at 89, 94 (citing Thomas Jefferson, Timothy Dwight, Joel Barlow, and
Francis Place); POCOCK, supra note 190, at 386 (For the civic republican, "the bearing of arms is the essen-
tial medium through which the individual asserts both his social power and his participation in politics as a
responsible moral being."); Shalhope, supra note 216, at 603 ("Civic virtue came to be defined as the free-
holder bearing arms in defense of his property and of his state.").
- See, e.g., Kates, supra note 96, at 232 ("Mhe ideal of republican virtue was the armed freeholder,
upstanding, scrupulously honest, self-reliant and independent-defender of his family, home and property,
and joined with his fellow citizens in the militia for the defense of their polity.:).
3' Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 93. See also notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
.. Herz devotes ten pages to his thesis that firearms proponents constitute a religious system. See id. at
93-103.
' See. e.g., id. at 93 (where Gun Crazy asserts that "[t]he gun lobby's cavalier treatment of the consti-
tutional text, and of the judicial consensus rejecting the broad view of the Second Amendment, must be
understood as a quasi-religious movement.... ").
... More likely, however, Herz is merely using "fundamentalist" as a pejorative term intended to di-
minish the legitimacy of claims made by pro-gun groups.
"' See infra notes 525-31 and accompanying text.
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Gun Crazy fails, however, to consider the ominous implication of this
claim. For the only solution that has ever worked when two religious move-
ments clash (or when a majority persecutes a dissenting religious minority), is
toleration,371' not persecution. Indeed, if Gun Crazy is right then we would
be better focusing, not on the Second Amendment, but on the First
Amendment's protections of the right of free exercise and its prohibition on
the establishment of a religion. For the rationales of those provisions apply
here as well.
We offer this argument in all seriousness. Anti-gun activists' radical dis-
connection from, lack of empathy for, and willingness to use legal coercion
and incarceration to suppress the culture that produced and that still supports
the Second Amendment are potentially disastrous for a pluralistic society. As
observed prophetically twenty years ago by B. Bruce-Briggs:
[U]nderlying the gun control struggle is a fundamental division in our
nation. The intensity of passion on this issue suggests to me that we are
experiencing a sort of low grade war going on between two alternative
views of what America is and ought to be. On the one side are those
who take bourgeois Europe as a model of civilized society: a society
just, equitable, and democratic; but well ordered, with the lines of re-
sponsibility and authority clearly drawn, and with decisions made ratio-
nally and correctly by intelligent men for the entire nation. To such peo-
ple, hunting is atavistic, personal violence is shameful, and uncontrolled
gun ownership is a blot on civilization.
On the other side is a group of people who do not tend to be espe-
cially articulate or literate, and whose world view is rarely expressed in
print. Their model is that of the independent frontiersman who takes
care of himself and his family with no interference from the state. They
are "conservative" in the sense that they cling to America's unique pre-
modem tradition-a non-feudal society with a sort of medieval liberty
writ large for everyman."
Briggs then adds, presciently in light of the growth of the so-called patriot
and militia movements and of recent tragedies:
From the point of view of a right-wing threat to internal security, these
are perhaps the people who should be disarmed first, but in practice they
will be the last.... They ask, because they do not understand the other
side, "Why do these people want to disarm us?" They consider them-
3 See, e.g., John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), reprinted in 35 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD, 1-24 (Hutchins ed., 1952).
312 B. Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, 45 PUB. INTEREsT 37, 61 (1976).
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selves no threat to anyone; they are not criminals, not revolutionaries.
But slowly, as they become politicized, they find an analysis that fits the
phenomenon they experience: Someone fears their having guns, someone
is afraid of their defending their families, property, and liberty. Nasty
things may begin to happen if these people begin to feel that they are
cornered.373
One persecutes "fundamentalists" at one's peril.
4. Subsequent Commentary on the Constitution
As indicated in our earlier discussion of certain nineteenth century Supreme
Court opinions and commentators, the very concept that the Amendment
guaranteed only a right of the states or related to their militias appears to
have been completely unknown before the twentieth century. 74 That the in-
dividual right interpretation was the common understanding is shown by the
earliest American legal commentary on the Second Amendment. That com-
mentary was written by a distinguished early law professor, and a colleague
and correspondent of Jefferson and Madison, St. George Tucker, "one of the
leading jurists of the day."375 Tucker's American edition of Blackstone was
annotated with his own notes on American constitutional law.
To Blackstone's comments on the limited (but absolute and clearly indi-
vidual) right to arms in the English Bill of Rights,376 Tucker added a note
on the Second Amendment headed with the same partial quotation that Gun
Crazy castigates the NRA for using:377 "The right of the people to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed. 3 78 Omitting all reference to the militia,
Tucker added that in their federal constitution, Americans are guaranteed this
right "without any qualifications as to their condition and degree as in Eng-
land."379
.. Id. (emphasis added). See also Randy E. Barnett, Foreward: Guns. Militias, and Oklahoma City, 62
TENN. L. REv. 443 (1995).
"' See supra notes 71-77, 82-87 and accompanying text.
..' Shalhope, supra note 13, at 137 n.81.
376 The primary purpose of the English right to arms, which was specified as applicable only to Protes-
tants, was self-defense of individuals, albeit it also facilitated their service in the militia. See MALCOLM,
ORIGINS, supra note 13, at 113-34.
'" See Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 103-04 ("Official NRA products, from belt buckles to beer mugs,
eliminate that troublesome introductory clause.").
., TUCKER, supra note 184, at 144.
37 Id.
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Tucker's Appendix contained a more extensive discussion of the Bill of
Rights. The section on the right to arms both quoted the whole Amendment
and noted the militia purpose. But the militia is only the second of three pur-
poses mentioned for the right to arms. The first is self-defense and the third
is hunting. Moreover, Tucker denounces attempts (like those in Gun Crazy)
"to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible"; for the right to
arms is "the true palladium of liberty" and where it "is, under any color or
pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the
brink of destruction." 380
Finally, when discussing the need for judicial review of Congress's power
to pass laws under the Necessary and Proper Clause he gave a revealing ex-
ample:
If, for example, congress were to pass a law prohibiting any person from
bearing arms, as a means of preventing insurrections, the judicial courts,
under the construction of the words necessary and proper, here contend-
ed for, would be able to pronounce decidedly upon the constitutionality
of these means. But if congress may use any means, which they choose
to adopt, the provision in the constitution which secures to the people
the right of bearing arms under such an act, might be without relief;
because in that case, no court could have any power to pronounce on the
necessity or propriety of the means adopted by congress to carry any
specified power into complete effect."'
According to Tucker, then, Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to violate the retained right of the people to keep and bear arms which
was enumerated in the Second Amendment was limited and any such law was
subject to judicial review.3"2 Moreover, in asserting the legitimacy of judi-
cial review of such legislation, Tucker once again made no mention of any
militia-centric limitation in construing this right.
Bear in mind that, when Tucker's comments were published, the majority
of those who had served in the Congress and state legislatures that enacted
the Second Amendment, including Madison himself, were still alive. If these
comments were magnifying or misreading the Amendment, surely Madison or
one or more other former legislators would have remonstrated with the author
"I Id. at 300.
31 Id. at 289.
" See Lawson & Granger, supra note 150, at 303 (arguing that one plausible interpretation of this
passage is "that laws that violate individual rights are not 'proper,' regardless of whether they are 'neces-
sary."). See also Barnett, supra note 150 (discussing natural rights and the Necessary and Proper Clause).
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or publisher and, if correction was not forthcoming, publicly clarified the
record. But none did.
After Tucker's commentary in 1803, the next interpretation came in the
1825 constitutional commentary authored by William Rawle 3 He too dis-
tinguished the unqualified American right from the limited English one and
flatly and repeatedly denied that Congress has any authority to legislate on
the subject of personal firearms ownership. He did give first and most em-
phatic mention to the militia as a reason for the guarantee, but also mentioned
self-defense and hunting."4
Justice Story's 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution described the Sec-
ond Amendment as a "right of the citizens" and portrayed it as a deterrent to
oppression rather than a mechanism for serving government. Because Gun
Crazy avers that Levinson falsifies Story,3"5 we quote the full passage:
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been consid-
ered as the palladium of the liberties of a republic, since it offers a
strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers;
and will generally, even if these are successful in the first instance, en-
able the people to resist and triumph over them.a 6
Further context is provided by another of Story's comments about the
Amendment, with which Gun Crazy fails to acquaint readers: "One of the
ordinary modes, by which tyrants accomplish their purposes without resis-
tance, is, by disarming the people, and making it an offense to keep
,,387arnms ....
The authors of the Fourteenth Amendment were equally unaware of any
concept confining the right to arms to militia members or requiring that it be
construed more narrowly than other rights of the people. A recent history of
the Fourteenth Amendment concludes that "among the rights that Republicans
in the Thirty-ninth Congress relied on as absolute rights of the citizens of the
United States were the right[s] to freedom of speech•., due process ... and
. . . to bear arms." ' Significantly, all these references stressed the need to
3 VILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 122 (2d ed.
1825). A distinguished lawyer, Rawle was prominent enough in the late eighteenth century to have several
times been asked by George Washington to serve as Attorney General.
Mu id.
" Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 140.
SS JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 746 (1833) (emphasis added).
317 STORY, supra note 182, at 264.
'' CuRTIs, supra note 13, at 104 (footnote omitted). For statements surrounding the origins and ratifi-
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guarantee that freedmen and white southern Unionists could have arms for
personal defense against the KKK and similar attackers.
As Akhil Amar has noted ironically,389 the authors of the Fourteenth
Amendment could not have understood the right they were hailing as being
limited to militia service or having the sole purpose of countervailing federal
standing armies. After all, they were maintaining a standing army as the gov-
erning body in the South and one of its duties was to suppress southern
militias, both official and private.
In sum, although there are innumerable examples of the broad individual
right understanding of the Amendment by eighteenth, nineteenth, and early
twentieth century commentators and courts, there is no evidence that they
even comprehended the concept of a right to arms that pertained only to the
state or its militia?" That concept appears to be an artifact of the twentieth
century gun debate, a concept of which prior generations had no inkling.
5. Congressional Construction of the Second Amendment
During the period 1866-1986, Congress enacted three statutes expressly
recognizing the Amendment as an individual right.39 Gun Crazy mentions
only the third of these enactments and a congressional report reaching the
same conclusion, which Gun Crazy dismisses with factual selectivity.392 As
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment that extol the right to arms or equate it to free expression, religious
liberty, due process, jury trial, and against unreasonable search, etc., see id. at 52, 53, 56, 72, 88, 140-81,
164. Gun Crazy does not discuss or cite Curtis's work.
"' Amar, Bill of Rights. supra note 13, at 1162-73.
"9 For other nineteenth and early twentieth century commentaries to the same effect see SPOONER,
supra note 87, at 98; TIFFANY, supra note 87, at 99; Aynes, supra note 13, at 84 (quoting TIMOTHY
FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1867)); Kates, supra note 185, at 87 n.l;
HENRY C. BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 543 (3d ed. 1910) (citing JOHN N.
POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 152-53 (1868)); AL-
BERT H. PUTNEY, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW 363 (1908); JAMES SCHOULER,
CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES: STATE AND FEDERAL (1897); THEODORE SHROEDER, FREE SPEECH FOR RAD-
ICALS 104 (reprint ed. 1969); JOHN RANDOLPH TUCKER, 2 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 671
(Henry Tucker ed., 1899); HERMANN E. VON HOLsT, 5 THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 307 (John J. Lalor trans., Callaghan & Co. 1885); Levinson, supra note 13, at 649-50
(citing THOMAS COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 298 (3d ed. 1898)).
' See discussion and citations given in Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second
Amendment: Declarations by Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L.
REv. 597 (1995).
3'2 See Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 72 n.50 (citing THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, supra note
[Vol. 451222
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Gun Crazy presents the matter, congressional interpretation officially accept-
ing the individual right to arms is nothing more than "Political Leaders' Der-
eliction of Dialogic Responsibility": that is, their failure to accept Gun
Crazy's view of the Second Amendment as demonstrated by their
"perpetuat[ing] the constitutional false consciousness... [and] the empty
refrain about the 'right to bear arms... . ?393
Ironically, judicial opinions, which Andrew Herz repeatedly states deci-
sively bind all writers who offer an interpretation of the Constitution,394
suggest that congressional interpretations are entitled to more weight than
lower federal court opinions. Although the congressional interpretation of a
constitutional provision does not bind the Supreme Court (this is especially
true of narrow interpretations of the Bill of Rights395), they are entitled to
cognizance and "to great consideration .... ,396 Thus, according to Gun
Crazy's standards of "dialogical responsibility," Herz was bound to reveal and
"acknowledge fully" the fact that Congress has thrice rejected his militia-cen-
tric conception of the Second Amendment.
313, at 68). Gun Crazy characterizes this as "a one-sided, misleading document" which "has the feel of hav-
ing been written by the gun lobby... because it effectively was: The authors included two prominent gun-
rights advocates-Stephen Halbrook and David Hardy." Id. at 122. Apparently Gun Crazy's definition of a
one-sided and misleading document is one in which two of the exhibits consist in articles written by
Halbrook and Hardy respectively. They appear in an appendix to the Report entitled "Other views of the
second amendment" which (though Gun Crazy neglects to mention it) also includes anti-gun submissions by:
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York; David J. Steinberg, Executive Director, National Coun-
cil for a Responsible Firearms Policy; Michael K. Beard and Samuel S. Fields of the National Coalition to
Ban Handguns; and two anti-gun law review articles. There is also an official submission by three lawyers
who work for the NRA.
In other words, having reviewed materials from each side, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcom-
mittee on the Constitution accepted the "broad individual right" position in its Report and attached the views
of each side for readers to make up their minds. We are informed by Stephen Halbrook that he had no part
in writing the Report (it simply printed his submission in its Appendix). Personal communication (Aug. 16,
1995). But Herz's claim about authorship is, in any event, irrelevant. Hard though Gun Crazy may try to
evade the fact and its implications: it is inescapable that a report accepting the individual right view issued
not from Stephen Halbrook, but from the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution.
"I Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 121. "Political Leaders' Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility" is the
title of the section in which these statements appear.
3' A canon of interpretation that we reject.
~' See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276-77 (1855).
11 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533, 544 (1869). See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703
(1974) ("great respect"); Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952). See also Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S.
788, 803-04 (1992) ("persuasive") and authority there cited.
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C. Does the Initial Purpose of a Right Limit its Scope?
Unable to controvert the textual and historical analysis, Gun Crazy claims
to view the Amendment as an individual right, but only a "narrow right" to
have arms for the purpose of militia service. Assuming arguendo this inter-
pretation were accurate, Gun Crazy makes no attempt to explore or define
what it might entail.
That failure is understandable, because exploring Gun Crazy's thesis neces-
sarily entails rejecting its claim that gun "controls" can be extended to the
prohibition of handguns, "assault weapons," or firearms generally.397 Even
if the Amendment's sole purpose were to preserve an armed citizenry so that
government could call armed citizens to militia service when necessary, the
constitutional command would still bar laws designed to disarm that citizen-
ry?" The permissible scope of gun control laws opened up by that view of
the Amendment would be limited to weaponry not clearly of the kind useful
for military purposes.3
Gun Crazy and proponents of other makeweight militia-centric conceptions
do not realize this, of course. Perhaps this is due to an unstated and unexam-
ined assumption that the Amendment is somehow less binding if based not on
a belief that individuals have a right to arms, but on a belief that society
benefits by allowing arms.
... Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 148 (referring to "the all-but-unlimited scope of viable gun control
measures").
"' The current descendant of the First Militia Act is 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1994), which provides that the
entire male citizenry at least 17 and less than 45 years of age is liable for call-up to service in time of emer-
gency. But that definition does not so limit the scope of the militia whose anns the Amendment protects. In
an extreme emergency the federal government might have to extend the ages covered by the law to 60 as
did the German government when it organized a militia at the end of the Second World War and as did
various colonial militia laws. See MALCOLM, ORIGINS, supra note 13, at 139 ("All men between sixteen and
sixty were liable for militia service. .. ."). This is somewhat misleading because it lumps together different
statutes from different times in different colonies or states. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILL OF RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES (1989) at, inter
alia, 32 (1787 North Carolina statute with militia age range of 15-50); 46 (late eighteenth century Massa-
chusetts statutes with militia age range of 18-45); 74 (1786 New Hampshire statute with militia age range of
16-40); 83 (1786 New York statute with militia age range of 16-44). Generally, earlier colonial statutes
would have tended to encompass a greater age range than later colonial and early state statutes.
'" See Kates, supra note 96, at 260-61 (arguing that the Amendment allows the banning of brass
knuckles, blackjacks, switchblade knives, "Saturday Night Specials" (defined as low caliber handguns of
substandard manufacture), but not of military quality handguns and other firearms, especially "assault weap.
ons," many of which are directly related to current military issue arms).
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Compare Article I, Section 2, Clause 2, which establishes twenty-five as
the minimum age for members of the House of Representatives. Clearly, this
is not a matter of individual right, but only of the Founders' belief that the
age limit benefits society by assuring mature and competent legislators. Yet,
just as clearly, regardless of what underlies the constitutional command, Con-
gress cannot flout it with a statute permitting anyone over the age of eighteen
to serve in the House, or, for that matter, by substituting thirty-five as the
minimum age and excluding a duly elected member because she is only thir-
ty-three. 4°
It bears emphasis that other rights can be characterized as having been
motivated by a concern for social benefit rather than the guarantee of an indi-
vidual right, the most prominent example being free expression. The earliest
and still the most universally accepted theories posit that the Founders
deemed free expression vital to a free and republican governmental structure
and/or that they embraced the free market in ideas as the optimum means for
society to make public policy determinations. Yet, even if those theories of
social benefit were the sole basis for the First Amendment, it would not fol-
low that its commands may be ignored by a Congress or a state legislature
which rejects those theories. The fact that most constitutional rights were en-
acted-or can be perceived as having been enacted-for reasons that involve
social benefit, at least partially, in no way negates their status as constitution-
al imperatives that are binding upon governmental action.
D. Evading the Text by Claiming the Amendment Is an Anachronism
1. Suppose the Amendment Is an Anachronism
Gun Crazy argues that the Amendment has become an anachronism be-
cause the militia has been succeeded by the National Guard, a select militia
that is armed by the federal government."' But even if the Amendment's
only purpose were preserving the militia, and even if the militia were an
anachronism, that point offers no constitutional basis for legislation in dero-
gation of the Amendment.
o See, e.g.. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 541-47 (1969).
41 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 66-67. Herz is apparently unaware of the continued existence of state
militias and the fact that they have generally been composed partially or entirely of citizens having their own
weapons. See Reynolds & Kates, supra note 13, at 1752, 1760.
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Asserting that "[o]urs is a 'Living Constitution,' one that must be read
against the backdrop of changing social circumstances, '4 2 Gun Crazy in-
vokes what Herz apparently believes are the views of Justice Brennan. 3
But although Brennan, among others, has offered that perspective in favor of
expanding constitutional protections when necessary to apply the protections
of the Bill of Rights to circumstances that have arisen since its enactment,
neither he nor any other Justice has ever suggested that such changes allow
the courts to contract or to set a constitutional right (or other provision)
aside. On the contrary, innumerable opinions affirm that courts have no pow-
er to rewrite the Constitution and that, however obsolete, its provisions re-
main binding until repealed.'
For instance, conditions have obviously changed greatly since the enact-
ment of the Seventh Amendment requirement of jury trial in all civil cases
where $20 or more is in controversy. Moreover, critics, including Supreme
Court Justices, suggest that jury trial is anachronistic, at least as to complex
antitrust and other industrial or economic disputes.4 5 Yet, far from setting
the Seventh Amendment aside, or even confining it to cases that would have
been tried to juries in the eighteenth century, the Supreme Court has consis-
tently expanded it, while still using the $20 standard. A jury trial is required
in modem fact-intensive claims that did not exist in the eighteenth century or
that were exclusively or primarily equitable, including stockholders' deriva-
tive, antitrust, and other complex economic issue cases. 4e In applying the
Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 66.
'3 The ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time. For the
genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that
is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current prob-
lems and current needs.
Id. at 67 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
27 S. TEX. L. REv. 433, 438 (1986)).
' See, e.g., Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 n.3 (1956) (endorsing speech by Senator
Alfred J. Beveridge appealing "to the whole Constitution, not to a mutilating selection of those parts only
which for the moment find favor."); Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 676 (1976); Curry v.
McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 373-74 (1939) and eases cited therein. See also Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelso
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 264 n.4 (1989) ("We look to the origins of the Clause and the purposes which
directed its framers."); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 n.14 (1977) (same); Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 439-40 (1974) (same).
41 See Georgiana G. Rodiger, Has the Right to Jury Trial as Guaranteed Under the Seventh Amend-
ment Become Outdated in Complex Civil Litigation?, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 189, 190 (1980) (quoting Jus-
tices Burger and Stevens). For similar statements, and even suggestions that civil jury trial be abandoned
altogether, see id. at 214-16 (citing, inter alia, Judge Jerome Frank and Deans Griswold and Prosser).
41 See Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) (action by bankruptcy trustee against
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spirit of the right to civil jury trial expansively, the Court has rejected eigh-
teenth century precedent limiting the right of jury trial as irrelevant in light of
modem procedures; 7 applied the jury trial requirement to new causes of
action based on analogy to common law claims that would have been cov-
ered;403 disregarded the fact that a remedy has traditionally been deemed eq-
uitable, holding that the decisive issue is whether "it is legal or equitable in
nature"4 9; rejected the "equitable clean-up" doctrine under which primarily
equitable claims would be tried to the court even though incidental damage
issues were also involved;40 held that the post-eighteenth century merger of
law and equity reduces the inadequacy of legal remedies and therefore ex-
pands the scope of the civil jury requirement;41' held that the fact that a
pleading seeks purely equitable relief is not dispositive if legal relief may be
involved or if it provides an adequate remedy in lieu of purely equitable
relief;4" and rejected "purely semantic" eighteenth century distinctions be-
tween law and equity.413
When the First Amendment was adopted, anyone with a little capital could
start up a newspaper, but establishing a newspaper today is impossible for all
but the very wealthy. That change of conditions was adduced in 1974 in the
state's brief supporting a law requiring newspapers to accord persons they
attack a right of reply. But the Court dismissed the argument because it con-
flicted with "the express provisions of the First Amendment" and judicial
interpretation thereof "over the years."
414
defendant who had not made a claim in bankruptcy to recover fraudulent conveyance); Tull v. United States,
481 U.S. 412 (1987) (suit by federal government under Clean Water Act: right to jury determination of civil
liability, but not civil penalty); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974) (landlord's specially created
statutory action for summary eviction analogized to common law action for recovery of possession of real-
ty); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) (action for violation of Fair Housing Act); Ross v. Bernhard,
396 U.S. 531 (1970) (stockholders' derivative action); Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959)
(antitrust).
401 Whether a remedy at law is adequate, so that a case should be determined by jury trial rather than
in an equitable proceeding must be determined "not by precedents decided under discarded procedures, but
in light of the remedies now made available . . . ." Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 507.
4' See Tull, 481 U.S. at 417.
41 Id. at 417-18. See also Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42.
"' See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
4 See id. at 478.
4,2 See id. at 477-78.
411 See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 49 n.7.
4" Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248-54 (1974).
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2. The Amendment Is Not an Anachronism
As will be discussed below,"5 anti-gun advocates oppose the right to
arms. because they feel that armed self-defense is immoral and/or not cost-
effective. But supposing this to be true, that would not render the right an
anachronism, even if one. also allowed that Gun Crazy was correct in its un-
defended assumption that anachronistic provisions of the Bill of Rights can be
ignored.
As Gun Crazy itself portrays the matter, it does not meet the definition of
anachronism that a constitutional provision is, or has become, controversial or
partially outmoded. To be an anachronism, we maintain, a constitutional
provision must have unquestionably and unequivocally lost all utility in mod-
em conditions. Clearly, if the Second Amendment's purposes are deemed to
include possession of arms for self-defense, as we contend, the Amendment is
not an anachronism. The criminological evidence reviewed below4"' shows:
(a) that victims who use firearms in self-defense are much less likely to be
injured--or to be robbed, raped, or assaulted-than are victims who comply
or who resist with other weapons; (b) that handguns are used by good citizens
in self-defense at least hundreds of thousands of times annually; and (c) that
felons fear and take steps to avoid armed victims. In short, if the Amendment
is viewed as a guarantee of a right to possess arms for self-defense, it is
clearly not something which has, beyond any question, lost all utility through
the passage of time.
But Gun Crazy conceives of the Amendment as something that relates only
to preserving the state's capacity to mobilize armed citizen militias. From that
premise, Gun Crazy asserts that the Amendment is obsolete because the mili-
tia has fallen into desuetude and whatever utility it had in the eighteenth
century is now served by the National Guard." 7 Even were the Amendment
limited to this purpose, however, the claim that it has lost its utility is untrue.
In rural areas of the nation where law enforcement agencies with a few
dozen personnel have hundreds of square miles to patrol, armed civilian vol-
unteers are often formally enrolled into an institution called something like
"the sheriff's posse," which is used sometimes for auxiliary patrol, and par-
" See infra Part iv.C.
416 See infra Part W.B.3.
4" Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 65-67.
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ticularly for massive search and rescue operations.4"' Additionally, it is not
uncommon for rural officers to exercise their legal power in an emergency to
call civilians to their assistance; and, as a practical matter, those called are
generally those who the officers know have ready access to arms.4"9 These
phenomena exist less often in urban areas, but many urban police departments
still maintain police auxiliary units composed of armed civilians.42°
In broader compass, personally armed citizens are the state's ultimate re-
source, for instance in disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and
riots. This is particularly true if an emergency overwhelms police resources at
a time when the Armed Forces and National Guard are overseas (as they were
during the Persian Gulf war and World Wars I and II), or when disruption of
transportation precludes their deployment. In such situations a call-up of the
armed citizenry provides the only backup available. Citizens armed with their
own weapons were called up and deployed to defend beach areas as recently
as Pearl Harbor, and served in sentry police and other volunteer defense du-
ties throughout World Wars I and II.42
Gun Crazy notes none of these facts, though once again most were avail-
able to Herz when he wrote, as they appear in an article he mined for all the
points he wished to make.4" Gun Crazy does note that federal law continues
to make most of the adult male citizenry liable to be called for militia duty in
emergencies. It does not note that state laws also provide both for an ongoing
state militia system and for calling ordinary citizens to militia duty in emer-
4. Personal communication from Professor Preston Covey (Nov. 16, 1996). Professor Covey, who is
Director of the Center for Advancement of Applied Ethics at Carnegie-Mellon University, is also, by avo-
cation a Special Deputy Sheriff (a fully sworn officer performing training duties) with the Allegheny County
Sheriff's Reserve, (Pittsburgh, PA); a member of the American Society of Law Enforcement Trainers, who
serves on its ethics committee; and one of five members of the International Association of Law Enforce-
ment Firearms Instructors who have been honored by election by its board as "life members" of the orga-
nization.
419 id.
40 Professor Covey informs us that reservists with the Allegheny County Sheriff's Reserve are espe-
cially used in crowd control and riot control work. Reservists also have both a river patrol (boat) unit and a
motorcycle patrol unit. Id.
"' See Cole, State Defense Force, 39 MIL. COLL & His. 152 (1987) [hereinafter State Defense] (war-
time experiences of Maryland armed volunteer force in disorder suppression and general guard duties);
Treacy, Maryland Minute Men, 6 GLADES STAR 214 (1988) (same); Cole, United States Guards, 40 MIL.
COLL & His. 2 (1988) (armed volunteer force in both disorder suppression and general guard duties nation-
ally under joint federal-state control during World War I); OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DE-
FENSE, U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, U.S. HOME DEFENSE FORCES STUDY, 32-34 (1981) (describing use of indi-
vidual citizens as substitute for national guard).
41 See Kates, supra note 96, at 271-72.
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gencies. 4  More importantly, Gun Crazy fails to note that when
emergencies requiring call-ups actually occur, the citizens mustered are large-
ly limited to those possessing their own firearms. The authorities generally
have no firearms to issue to unarmed citizens nor any time to train them in
the safe and effective use of arms with which the citizens are not familiar.
Gun Crazy's most important omission on this issue, however, is the fact
that the role of federal and state militias and the personally armed citizenry is
growing rather than receding due to modem military policy. Since the 1980s,
military doctrine has posited "the National Guard's growing involvement in
the 'Total Force' concept of national defense. This doctrine assigns many
National Guard units to virtual front-line combat status in the opening stages
of future wars." Thus, the progressive downsizing of the Armed Forces
since the 1980s has greatly increased the likelihood of a deployment of Na-
tional Guard units overseas in the event of any major overseas crisis. In such
a scenario the backup role of an armed citizenry is ever more important.
This last point illustrates another significant weakness of Herz's and other
anti-gun advocates' implicit claim that constitutional commands become
nonbinding by reason of their supposed anachronism. This claim rests on yet
another unexamined assumption: That anachronism occurs by unidirectional
progression, so if that which was viable in 1789 has become anachronistic in
the years since, it will never again be useful. Anachronism is not, however, a
matter of unidirectional progression. As illustrated by the now-growing utility
of the armed citizenry as a backup to the police, a 1789 concept may become
more, as well as less, relevant with the passage of time.
In any event, the Second Amendment is not based just on the utility of an
armed citizenry to the state, but on its value in preserving liberty and its
status as an individual right. As Joseph Story's words illustrate, late eigh-
teenth century Americans, being classically educated, took as gospel
Aristotle's lessons that basic to tyrants is "mistrust of the people; hence they
43 See. e.g., CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE §§ 121, 122 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-8-107, 28-3-
102, -103(6), -103(8), -104 (1989) (classifying the male population aged 18 to 45 of California and Colora-
do, respectively, as the unorganized militia, subject to call at the command of designated public officers).
24 Cole, State Defense, supra note 421, at 154.
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deprive them of arms, 4 25 and that confiscation of the Athenians' personal
arms had been instrumental to the tyrannies of Pisistratus and the Thirty.4
26
Far from being an anachronism, possession of arms served importantly and
recently to protect political speech and action even in our own nation, as
veterans of the civil rights struggle in the South have attested.427 Based on
actual experience in the South, it has been observed that armed self-defense
brings police intervention and martyrdom does not. Public authorities and
influential elites may be content to see unarmed victims injured or slain, if
the violence can be so confined. But when victims can arm themselves, au-
thorities feel compelled to take action, lest incidents lead to widespread
bloodshed and disorder.
428
Indeed, it has been argued that the personal right to defensive arms is par-
ticularly relevant in a century which has seen almost 160 million unarmed
civilians murdered by governments or by private groups or militias acting
with government acquiescence or encouragement.4 29 Noting that "the right
4,- ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 218 (Thomas A. Sinclair trans., Penguin Books 1962). Cf. STORY, supra
note 182, at 264 ("One of the ordinary modes, by which tyrants accomplish their purpose without resistance
is, by disarming the people and making it an offense to keep arms."). See also supra text accompanying note
384.
411 ARISTOTLE, THE ATHENIAN CONSTnTUON 47, 105 (H. Rackham trans., 1935).
41, John R. Salter, Jr. & Don B. Kates, Jr., The Necessity of Access to Firearms by Dissenters and
Minorities whom Government Is Unwilling or Unable to Protect, in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS, supra note
167, at 186-91; John R. Salter, Jr., Civil Rights and SefDefense, AGAINST THE CURRENT, July-Aug. 1988,
at 23, 23-25; John R. Salter, Jr., Guns Kept Klan Enemies at Bay in the Deep South, GRAND FORKS (N.D.)
HERALD, Oct. 9, 1994.
The necessity of dissenters' and racial minorities' having access to arms for their own protection is
also suggested by the history of the second Ku Klux Klan of the 1910s and 1920s, which was a major or
even controlling force in many northern states. See DAVID M. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM 66, 67,
179, 239, 248, 249, 273, 338, 348 (1965) (citing incidents of armed resistance by individuals or groups, and
of bearing arms for protection against potential KKK attack); NANCY MACLEAN, BEHIND THE MASK OF
CHIVALRY: THE MAKING OF THE SECOND KU KLUx KLAN 13-14 (1994). See generally, Cottrol & Diamond,
supra note 164.
... Don B. Kates, Jr. & Daniel D. Polsby, Of Genocide and Disarmament, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 297 (1995) (reviewing JAY SIMICIN Er AL., LETHAL LAWS (1995)); Salter & Kates, supra note 427,
at 186. Cf. Chalmers, supra note 427, at 228 (Florida's "Gov. Martin spoke out forcefully. Such a situation
in which 'mobs formed at night to terrorize the community and citizens had to carry concealed weapons'
[for their own protection] could not continue.") See also id. at 59-65 (describing the defeat of the KKK in
Louisiana).
4' The 1945-47 India-Pakistan Partition riots involved upwards of a million deaths perpetrated by pri-
vate groups or individuals largely without firearms. The same is true of the 1960s murders of 500,000 to I
million ethnic Chinese and other suspected Communists in Indonesia, and of the more recent genocides in
Cambodia, Rwanda, and Burundi. However, the "auto-genocide" of 2-3 million Cambodians was perpetrated
by soldiers who had guns, but largely starved, clubbed, and bayoneted their victims to death to save bullets.
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to arms is essentially a question of the balance of power between a people
and the state that governs them," Cottrol and Diamond urge that "that ques-
tion is far more important today than when it was first formalized .... 430
Nor is it clearly, absolutely, unquestionably the case that, because civilians
cannot resist the massive power of the modem state, the Amendment is today
an anachronism. Sanford Levinson comments:
It is simply silly to respond [to the value of an armed citizenry] that
small arms are irrelevant against nuclear-armed states: Witness contem-
porary Northern Ireland and the territories occupied by Israel, where the
sophisticated weaponry of Great Britain and Israel have proved almost
totally beside the point. The fact that these may not be pleasant exam-
ples does not affect the principal point, that a state facing a totally dis-
armed population is in a far better position, for good or ill, to suppress
popular demonstrations and uprisings than one that must calculate the
possibilities of its soldiers and officials being injured or killed.43
As Justice Black expressed in his Adamson dissent: "[lt is true that [the
provisions of the Bill of Rights] were designed to meet ancient evils. But
they are the same kind of human evils that have emerged from century to
century whenever excessive power is sought by the few at the expense of the
many.
432
E. The "Insurrectionary" Implications of the Second Amendment
We conclude our discussion of Gun Crazy's treatment of the Second
Amendment by responding to what is, in the wake of the tragic Oklahoma
City bombing, a particularly malicious straw man argument. Gun Crazy labels
the individual right position an "insurrectionary" view based on "the idea of a
right to bear arms [which allows private groups] to organize independent
armies or to prepare for insurrection against a potentially despotic govern-
ment."433 While we do not deny that a right to keep and bear arms makes
"insurrection against a potentially despotic government" more feasible, we do
deny that the Second Amendment protects a right of insurrection or a right to
organize independent armies.434 Herz offers no reference to show that such
See Kates & Polsby, supra note 428, at 247-56.
430 Cottrol & Diamond, Fifih Auxiliary Right, supra note 13, at 1025-26 (emphasis added).
431 Levinson, supra note 13, at 657.
432 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
4" Gun Crazy. supra note 7, at 70 (emphasis added).
"34 Some organizational activity, however, may well be protected by the First Amendment right of
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an argument has been made by the scholars it traduces, or anyone else for
that matter.
Moreover, this argument by Gun Crazy reveals, once again, that Herz,
Henigan, et al. have never examined the implications of their militia-centric
theory, and that their theory is intended solely as a makeweight. They portray
the Amendment as embodying the Anti-Federalists' objections to the military-
militia provisions of Article I, Section 8 and their "demand that the states [be
allowed to] maintain control over the existing state militias as a counter-
weight to the expanding federal power.""43 In other words, their militia-cen-
tric view is fully as "insurrectionary"436 as the individual right view. The
only difference is that the former envisions state militias as the revolutionary
actors where the latter envisions "the people."
Anti-gun advocates share at least as much blame for the rise of the "pri-
vate" militia movement as do the gun-rights groups. True, the so-called pri-
vate militias vehemently oppose new anti-gun laws and the anti-gun groups'
prohibitionist agenda, and many of them despise those who enforce existing
laws. But the inspiration for "private" militias comes from taking seriously
the anti-gun refrain that the right to arms is only a collective right, a position
that pro-gun advocates and groups have consistently rejected.437 We place
quotation marks around "private" to emphasize an important and potentially
disquieting aspect of this development. The militia movement is not necessar-
ily or always private at all. In Arizona and Idaho it has substantial approval
from state-level officials, and in those states and areas like the Florida pan-
handle and far northern California it tends to have the explicit approval or
sanction of local government.438
association as well as by the Ninth Amendment. This issue is, however, beyond the scope of our present
inquiry, which concerns the meaning of the Second Amendment. Although it serves a number of purposes,
the Second Amendment does so by protecting only an individual right to keep and bear arms.
... Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 64 (citing Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 12, at 21) (emphasis added).
436 By this we mean it makes insurrection easier, not that it creates a constitutional right to insurrection.
.., Anti-gun advocates will doubtless protest that the militias interpret "collective right" far differently
than do they, but that is as misleading as it is true. What the militias actually do is take seriously a slogan
which anti-gun advocates never interpreted, but only used as a makeweight against the individual right po-
sition. The purpose of their collective right view was to render the Amendment an oxymoron, a non-right, as
it has no effect and can never be invoked by anyone against any gun law. Like such left-wing extremists as
the Symbionese Liberation Army, who kidnapped Patricia Hearst in 1974, the right-wing extremists of the
militia movement associate themselves with "the people," and, as "the people," they deem themselves to
have the collective right to arms guaranteed by the Amendment.
"' Several Florida counties have gone so far as to declare that their entire populations constitute their
militias, and thus are exempt from the federal "assault weapon" ban. See Larry Dougherty, Militia Groups
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Anti-gun fundamentalists posing as constitutional theorists should be care-
ful what they wish for. Someone might take them seriously.
IV. GuNs AND PUBLIC SAFETY
Gun Crazy only poses *as a serious analysis of the proper interpretation of
the Second Amendment. Ultimately, Herz's real concern is that adherence to
the Second Amendment is just bad policy. Herz is horrified at gun violence,
which he blames on the guns rather than on the violent. In this he resembles
many Americans who are less concerned with what the Founders thought
about banning guns than with the criminological wisdom of such a ban. As
Dan Polsby observes, many Americans would not care whether the Constitu-
tion guarantees individuals a right to possess arms if they believed the right
was "very dangerous to public safety.... That would be a case for repealing
the Second Amendment, not respecting it."439 Does respecting the Second
Amendment lead to disastrous consequences? We conclude our reply to Gun
Crazy by examining the criminological evidence that addresses this question.
A. Vilifying One's Opponents
Herz demonizes gun owners and gun groups, claiming ihat they do
"evil." 4 He bases this on three disputable assumptions, which we address
individually. Gun owners and gun groups do evil, says Gun Crazy, by their:
[(I)] insistence on virtually unrestricted access to all manner of firearms
[(2), which insistence is only] in order to satisfy personal desires, when
[(3)] that unrestricted access [is a, if not the, major cause of the gun vio-
lence which] imposes on the rest of society an extraordinary toll in hu-
man suffering and health-care costs." *
... the gun lobby has played an important role in blocking potential
gun control legislation, and [thereby] in perpetuating our extraordinary
level of gun violence."
Item (1) is demonstrably untrue. While the criminological value of the
well-known pro-gun proposals for "gun control" is certainly debatable, the
Attract Hundreds of Floridians, ST. PETMSBURG TIMES, Apr. 30, 1995, at IA. See also Reynolds & Kates,
supra note 13, at 1755-56 n.55.
... Daniel D. Polsby, The False Promise of Gun Control, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 1994, at 59.
44 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 113 (section entitled "The Evil That Gun Men Do").
I ld. at 58. See also id. at 84-97, 148-53.
442 Id. at 62.
claim that gun groups seek "virtually unrestricted access to all manners of
firearms" is not just hyperbolic but patently false. Herz must necessarily be
aware that for seventy-five years gun groups have insisted on, supported, and
actually drafted laws against handgun possession by felons, "use-a-gun, go-to-
jail" laws, ever-harsher penalties for gun possession by felons, gun misuse,
and "three strike" laws, etc."3 Had Gun Crazy sought to accurately identify
the difference between its position and that of the gun owners, the paragraph
we have quoted would have had to read something like this:
Gun owners and the gun lobby do evil by their insistence on limiting
gun laws to proposals I believe are ineffective in stemming our ex-
traordinary level of gun violence, and their blocking of potential gun
control legislation which they believe is ineffective, counter-productive,
and unconstitutional, but which I believe would alleviate the extraordi-
nary toll in human suffering and health-care costs associated with gun
violence.
Item (3) of Gun Crazy's indictment is as hyperbolic as then-Attorney Gen-
eral Meese's claim that the ACLU promotes crime by "irresponsibly" chal-
lenging police practices.4" Herz and Meese each assume their own premise
(that the activities of gun groups and the ACLU, respectively, promote crime)
and then foist that premise on to their opponents, who reject it. Now bur-
"' See KENNET & ANDERSON, supra note 96, at 192-95; LA PIERRE, supra note 97, at 223-24 (NRA
Executive Vice President describing NRA policies and goals). Gun Crazy refers in its footnotes to the sec-
ond of these references. Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 138 n.354.
Whether "use-a-gun, go-to-jail," "three strikes," and similar proposals offer real benefits is unclear.
Criminologists have been skeptical of these pro-gun answers to gun violence, as has one of the authors of
this article. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Conclusion, in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE, supra note 256, at 527 n.8;
Alan Lizotte & Marjorie S. Zatz, The Use and Abuse of Sentence Enhancement for Firearms Offenses in
California, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 (1986); Colin Loftin et al., Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms
Violence: Evaluating an Alternative to Gun Control, 17 L. & Soc'Y REV. 287 (1983); Don B. Kates &
Nicholas Johnson, Three Strikes and You're Out Is a Fraud, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 12, 1994, at A23. But
cf Daniel Fife & William R. Abrams, Firearms' Decreased Role in New Jersey Homicides After a Mandato-
ry Sentencing Law, 29 J. TRAUMA 1548 (1989) (suggesting that laws mandating prison for felons who mis-
use a gun may reduce homicide); David McDowall et al., Criminology: A Comparative Study of the Preven-
tive Effects of Mandatory Sentencing Laws for Gun Crimes, 83 Nw. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 378
(1992) (same).
In contrast to "use-a-gun, go-to-jail," most "three strikes" proposals are arguably counterproductive.
The evidence is clear that violent crime is a young man's game. As violent felons grow older, they are pro-
gressively disillusioned about the viability of a life of violent crime, and tend to limit themselves to less
dangerous offenses. A life sentence for a 37 year-old felon who is convicted of a third felony, which may be
far less serious than his first two, expends scarce prison resources on a felon who is less dangerous than
other potential candidates for the same cell.
' Charges by 2 Associates of Reagan Challenged by Civil Liberties Union, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
1981.
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dened with beliefs they do not hold, gun groups and the ACLU can be de-
nounced for irresponsibly opposing things which they believe worthless for
combating crime, but which Herz and Meese, respectively, think will be ef-
fective.
Indeed, Gun Crazy's indictment is even more unfair than Meese's because
of item (2)'s falsity. Gun groups do not defend gun ownership only "in order
to satisfy personal desires." Unlike those who defend the interests of smokers
or drinkers on purely "freedom of choice" grounds, gun owners truly believe
widespread gun ownership is an affirmative social good that deters tyranny
and both deters and thwarts criminal attack. As will be seen in the next sec-
tion, there is considerable criminological support for the latter conclusion
(and, as we have seen, the Founders strongly endorsed both). But, regardless
of whether gun owners are correct in their faith, Gun Crazy's lengthy and
vicious vilification of those citizens who may simply be mistaken about a
matter of public policy is--dare we say it?-a Dereliction of Dialogical Re-
sponsibility.
B. The Criminology of Guns and Violence
Readers may have less interest in the-degree of Gun Crazy's dialogical
responsibility than in the truth or falsity of item (3) in its indictment: Her's
assumption that widespread gun ownership is a cause of crime rather than just
a reaction to it." As we show, this assumption cannot be validated by crim-
inological evidence and Gun Crazy's recital of the evidence supposedly sup-
porting item (3) is highly misleading.
1. Foreign Comparisons
Gun Crazy begins with international statistics-after they have been care-
fully selected and truncated.' Gun Crazy avoids highlighting the
,u The assumption that gun availability is a cause of violence rather than an effect thereof is enunci-
ated in the article's very first footnote and often repeated throughout. See, e.g., Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at
57 n. (No kids "should have to grow up in the dark shadow of so many guns."); id. at 55 n.2
("[U]nrestricted access [to guns] imposes on the rest of society an extraordinary toll in human suffering and
health-care costs."); id. at 113 ("The gun lobby has perpetuated societal conditions that have seen more
Americans die during the past twenty-five years in gun-related murders than were killed in the Vietnam
War, the Korean War, and World War I combined.").
44' See Gun Crazy, s-upra note 7, at 59 n.5 (comparing handgun murders in the U.S. and in selected
foreign nations).
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sociocultural factors that actually cause differences in international homicide
rates by citing only statistics of the comparative use of handguns in murders
in various nations. Handgun murders turn out to be far more frequent in the
U.S. than in various other industrialized Western nations having much smaller
populations."7 But to dispel Gun Crazy's assumption that more handguns
explain why the U.S. has higher murder rates, just add back in the statistics
Herz has omitted: the statistics for murders committed with knives, blunt
instruments, etc. Doing so shows that the U.S. has not only more handgun
murders but also more non-gun murders than other industrialized Western
nations; indeed, the non-gun U.S. murder rate exceeds those nations' total
murder rates (i.e., their combined total for murders with handguns, long guns,
knives, blunt instruments, and all other weapons). Obviously, gun ownership
cannot be the reason why America has so many more non-gun murders than
other societies. The inevitable conclusion when all methods of murder are
considered is that something beyond guns must explain the differentials be-
tween the U.S. and other nations."8
International comparisons lend themselves to making all sorts of spurious
points if one ignores sociocultural and economic differences and focuses
instead on particular public policies as single-cause explanations. For in-
stance, then-Attorney General Meese could have buttressed his assault on the
ACLU with the same kind of spurious correlation: Our civil liberties re-
straints on the police far exceed those in other industrialized Western nations,
and, thus, we have far higher rates of murder and other violence." 9
"' Id. To exaggerate the matter Gun Crazy presents the comparison in terms of total murders rather
than in the rate per populace. The standard criminological comparison is murders per 100,000 population.
"' For a fill and accurate comparison of international murder and suicide statistics, see Don B. Kates,
et al., Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Violence or Pandemic of Propaganda?, 62 TENN. L. REV. 513,
563, tbl. 1 (1995). It also shows a fact routinely undisclosed by anti-gun advocates when they claim that
both American homicide and American suicide are caused by the availability of guns, and (as does Herz)
give gun death figures in which homicide and suicide are combined. Because homicide and suicide are both
the results of sociocultural and economic factors, rather than the mere availability of particular means of
death, it turns out that, while the U.S. does have a much higher murder rate than Western European coun-
tries, it has a much lower suicide rate. Id. This comparison holds whether the comparison is to nations like
Denmark where handguns are strictly forbidden or to nations like Switzerland and Austria where it is as easy
to own a handgun as in most American jurisdictions. Id.
When evaluating gun deaths in the U.S., anti-gun activists have taken to combining homicide and
suicide rates to inflate the numbers of "gun-related" deaths. However, if homicide and suicide are combined
for international comparisons, which anti-gun advocates do not do, it turns out that the U.S. falls below the
median in international comparisons. The lowest combined homicide-suicide rate, incidentally, is for Israel,
a nation in which guns are far more available than in the U.S. Id.
" This correlation is actually slightly less misleading than Gun Crazy's handgun murder correlation
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The definitive study of American and foreign gun policies and violence
rates appeared in 1992 and received the American Society of Criminology's
Comparative Criminology Award for that year.450 Briefly summarized, the
evidence shows:
(a) Laws against gun ownership cannot have caused low Western European
murder rates, since those low rates long preceded the gun laws. Violence was
low, and falling, in Western Europe from at least the mid-nineteenth century,
but anti-gun policies only appeared after World War I, aimed not at crime but
at the political turmoil of that tumultuous era. Nevertheless, Western Europe
has suffered far more political gun violence than the U.S., with its generally
less restrictive gun policies.45" '
(b) Other nations with strict anti-gun policies have not achieved compara-
bly satisfactory results. Although Gun Crazy cites the low number of handgun
murders in Canada, whose strict gun laws have been praised by American
anti-gun advocates, Canada-wide studies conclude that any differences in
homicide rates relate to socioeconomic and cultural differences, and that Ca-
nadian gun laws have no more effect than the less restrictive American
laws.452 By the same token, if anti-gun laws explain low Japanese homicide
rates, why does Taiwan (where gun possession is a capital offense) have a
since it requires only genuine murder and violent crime statistics. Meese would not have to truncate the
statistics as Gun Crazy does to exclude data that undercut its argument.
4"s DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBOY: SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE
GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? (1992). Kopel's work provided in-depth comparisons and cover-
age of Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Jamaica, Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland. The observations
made in the subparagraphs numbered (a)-(c) which follow are based on the corresponding chapters in the
Kopel book as well as on the specific references given.
"' See generally id. at 59-136; COLIN GREENWOOD, FIREARMS CONTROL: A STUDY OF ARMED CRIME
AND FIREARMS CONTROL IN ENGLAND AND WALES 1-58 (1972); Ted Robert Gurr, Historical Trends In
Violent Crimes: A Critical Review of the Evidence, in 3 CRIME & JUST.: ANN. REV. RES. 295 (Michael
Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1981); Frank Mom, Firearms Use and the Police: A Historic Evolution of
American Values, in KATES, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE, supra note 256, at 496-500; Eric H. Monkkonen,
Diverging Homicide Rates: England and the United States, 1850-1875, in I VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 80 (Ted
Robert Gurr ed., 1989).
..2 See Brandon S. Centerwall, Homicide and the Prevalence ofHandguns: Canada and the United
States, 1976 to 1980, 134 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1245 (1991); David B. Kopel, Canadian Gun Control:
Should the United States Look North for a Solution to Its Firearms Problem?, 5 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
1 (1991); Gary A. Mauser & Richard A. Holmes, An Evaluation of the 1977 Canadian Firearms Legisla-
tion: An Econometric Approach, 16 EVALUATION RES. 603 (1992); Robert Mundt, Gun Control and Rates
ofFirearms Violence in Canada and the United States, 32 CANADIAN J. CRIM. 137 (1990). But see also
KOPEL, supra note 450, at 13-19 (discussing contrary findings of earlier, less complete studies).
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higher murder rate than the U.S?453 Why does Russia also have much higher
homicide rates,4M  despite a longtime, highly stringent gun control policy455
and the adoption by the Soviet Army of different caliber weapons than any
Western nation, a measure which hampered soldiers returning with souvenirs
from World War II and later wars from obtaining ammunition?
46
(c) Austria, Israel, and Switzerland, which have gun possession rates
equaling or exceeding those in the U.S., have homicide rates fully as low or
lower than the highly gun-restrictive nations of Western Europe.457 An Is-
raeli criminologist notes that Israel's murder "rates are ... much lower than
in the United States ... despite the greater availability of guns to law-abid-
ing [Israeli] civilians. 458
Indeed, American gun owners might cite the Israeli experience as proof of
the value of making guns available to potential victims. Though Israeli law
requires a license to own a gun, licensure is routine for every law-abiding,
responsible, trained Israeli who wishes to buy a handgun. Alternatively, those
Israelis who want a pistol or submachine gun for temporary use just draw it
out of the local police armory, unlike in the U.S., where fully automatic
weapons have been illegal or severely controlled since the 1930s, and the
importation and manufacture of even semiautomatic Uzis are now prohibit-
ed.459 Unlike the United States, where carrying a concealed handgun has,
until recently, been almost universally illegal, in Israel if you legally possess
a firearm (by loan or licensure), you
are allowed to carry it on your person (concealed or unconcealed). The
police even recommend you carry it [concealed] because then the gun is
protected from thieves or children. The result is that in any big crowd of
411 See Kates, Current Evidence, supra note 256, at 200-01.
"' The Russian homicide rate for 1992 was 15.5 murders per 100,000 people. Russia's Mafia: More
Crime than Punishment, ECONOMIST, July 9, 1994, at 19, 20. The American rate for the same year was 8.5
per 100,000. See infra note 494 and accompanying text.
' Raymond G. Kessler, The Political Functions of Gun Control, in KATEs, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE,
supra note 256, at 457, 472.
4" See entries for various nations' military arms and the calibers thereof in EDWARD CLINTON EZELL,
SMALL ARMS OF THE WORLD: A BASIC MANUAL OF SMALL ARMS (1 th rev. ed. 1977).
'" See Kates, Current Evidence, su1pra note 256, at 200. Switzerland is yet another nation Gun Crazy
cites as having a very low handgun homicide rate. Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 153.
.. See Abraham N. Tennenbaum, Israel Has a Successful Gun Control Policy in GUN CONTROL: CUR-
RENT CONTRovEsms 250 (Bruno Leone et al. eds., 1992) (emphasis added). Professor Tennenbaum teaches
in the Department of Criminology at Bar lan University in Israel.
439 Id.
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citizens, there are some people with their personal handguns on them
(usually concealed).'
American massacres, in which dozens of unarmed victims are mowed down
before police can arrive, astound Israelis," who note
what occurred at a Jerusalem [crowd spot] some weeks before the Cali-
fornia McDonald's massacre: three terrorists who attempted to machine-
gun the throng managed to kill only one victim before being shot down
by handgun-carrying Israelis. Presented to the press the next day, the
surviving terrorist complained that his group had not realized that Israeli
civilians were armed. The terrorists had planned to machine-gun a suc-
cession of crowd spots, thinking that they would be able to escape be-
fore the police or army could arrive to deal with them.462
The experience of England, the nation generally cited as the prime exem-
plar of the value of strict firearms prohibitions, in fact demonstrates their
irrelevancy. By the middle of the nineteenth century, England had moved
from its eighteenth century status as one of the world's most violent nations
to its present peaceful state. This shift is attributable to vast socioeconomic
changes in this period. Certainly it cannot be attributed to gun laws-for mid-
nineteenth century England had none, beyond a policy that police would not
carry firearms. Severe English gun restrictions, like those on the Continent,
' Id. at 248 (emphasis added). At around the time Professor Tennenbaum's paper was written (it was
read at the 1991 annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology) a host of American states were
changing their laws to mandate issuance of licenses to carry concealed firearms to law-abiding, responsible
adult applicants with suitable training. Currently 31 states comprising about 55% of the American population
have mandatory issuance laws. See Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, "Shall Issue": The New Wave of
Concealed Cany Handgun Permit Laws. 62 TENN. L. REv. 679 (1995) (detailing and evaluating concealed
carry permit laws); John R. Lott & David D. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Cany Concealed
Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1997).
4" See Abraham Tennenbaum, Editorial, Handguns Could Help, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 26, 1991, at
9A.
4I Kates, Current Evidence, supra at 256, at 209 (footnote omitted). Such events are not uncommon in
Israel. The following example is from the Baltimore Sun:
JERUSALEM-A Palestinian opened fire with a submachine gun at a bus stop near the port of
Ashdod today, killing one Israeli and wounding four before being shot to death by bystanders,
officials said.
National police spokesman Eric Bar-Chen said today's attacker, who was armed with an
Uzi submachine gun, was shot and killed by a civilian and a soldier who were at the bus stop and
hitchhiking post used by soldiers.
Mr. Bar-Chen identified the gunman as a Palestinian from the Shati refugee camp in the
Gaza Strip. Six ammunition clips and a knife were found on his body, he added.
Palestinian Kills Israelis. Is Slain, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 7, 1994, at IA.
did not appear until after World War I; and their purpose was not to restrain
ordinary crime (of which England had far less then than now), but to disarm
the politically unreliable."3
In the nineteenth century, as today, American reformers were appalled at
rising U.S. homicide rates and sought answers by comparing our institutions
unfavorably to those of peaceful England. But gun control could not be
among those answers because England had far less gun control in the nine-
teenth century than did the U.S. The lesson that contemporary reformers prin-
cipally drew was that capital punishment was useless, and perhaps even coun-
ter-productive, because the U.S. executed many more people than did Eng-
land and yet had a large and rising murder rate, while England's was low and
falling.'
England's leading analyst of gun control is Colin Greenwood, a now-re-
tired chief superintendent of police. His thesis on English gun control, which
was done at Cambridge University's Institute of Criminology," also goes
unmentioned in Gun Crazy. Greenwood comments that there was much less
gun violence in England "when there were no controls of any sort and when
anyone, convicted criminal or lunatic, could buy any type of firearm without
restriction." 4 That remains true whether one is comparing England to the
U.S. at that time, or to England in the 1960s when Greenwood was writing,
much less to the England or the U.S. of today. Of course, Greenwood is not
endorsing the idea that there should be no controls, or that felons, lunatics,
and children should be allowed to own guns. Rather, his point is that the inci-
dence of violence and homicide in a society is really determined by socio-
economic and cultural factors. Policies regarding the mere ownership of par-
ticular weaponry can have marginal effects at most.
It is worth noting that every Western society has experienced a vast in-
crease in crime since the end of World War II, particularly since the
1960s.' 7 In many of these nations, the rate of increase is several times
higher than the rate at which U.S. crime increased during the same peri-
od.4" They compare so favorably to U.S. homicide and other crime rates
4" KOPEL, supra note 450.
4 See DAVID BRION DAVIS, HOMICIDE IN AMERICAN FICTION, 1798-1860: A STUDY IN SOCIAL VAL-
UES, 239-65 (1957) (citing nineteenth century American tracts).
I" Published as GREENWOOD, supra note 451.
41 Id. at 243.
467 See KOPEL, supra note 450; Gurr, supra note 451, at 295, 321, 324.
' Gurr, supra note 451 (noting that in 1974 the American murder rate was 40 times higher than the
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only because the base from which they started is so much lower, a base es-
tablished at a time when they had few or no controls over firearms owner-
ship.
2. Defensive Gun Use in the United States
The most recent and exhaustive data analysis concludes that handguns are
used by victims to defend themselves about three times more often than they
are misused by criminals in violent crime. 9 This conclusion rests on con-
sistent results in tell different surveys yielding estimates of the numerical fre-
quency of defensive gun use. Particularly impressive support for this conclu-
sion has been supplied through its endorsement by an eminent criminologist
who is deeply opposed to gun ownership,47 and by the premier study of the
effect of laws allowing law-abiding, responsible adults to obtain licenses to
carry concealed handguns.4 '
The precise incidence of defensive gun use is still open to question, but
there is no doubt that it is very large. The victim survey evidence showing
large amounts of defensive gun use is confirmed by an independent body of
data from the other parties involved, for example, surveys taken among in-
mates of various federal and state prisons over the past two decades. Some of
these surveys are methodologically crude and/or involve inadequate samples.
Because the results of all these surveys are mutually consistent and support-
ive, it will suffice to refer to the latest and most recent, which was conducted
under the auspices of the National Institute of Justice in state prisons across
the country.
472
While most of the study's questions on arms possession by victims focused
on the deterrent effect, several did address self-defense. Responding thereto,
34% of the convicts "said they had been scared off, shot at, wounded or
English, but 15 years later it was only 10 times higher). This does reflect about a 10% decline in American
murder rates but, obviously, it is far more attributable to the steep rise in English homicide.
" See Gary Kleck & Mare Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-
Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150 (1995); see also GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS:
FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL ch. 5 (forthcoming 1997), for a comprehensive discussion of the subject, in-
cluding several additional supporting surveys.
4. Marvin E. Wolfgang, A Tribute to a View I Have Opposed, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 188
(1995).
"' Lott & Mustard, supra note 460.
42 See JAMES WRIGHT & PETER Rossi, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS
AND THEIR FIREARMS (1986).
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captured by an armed victim, [quoting the actual question asked] and about
two-thirds (69%) had at least one acquaintance who had this experience."'473
Also suggestive of the frequency of defensive gun use were the responses on
two other points: 34% of the felons said that in contemplating a crime they
either "often" or "regularly" worried that they "[m]ight get shot at by the
victim"; and 57% agreed that "[m]ost criminals are more worried about meet-
ing an armed victim than they are about running into the police." 74
As to the comparative value of gun bans versus gun possession in reducing
violence, two further findings dovetail dramatically: on the one hand, the
felons most frightened "about confronting an armed victim" were those "from
states with the greatest relative number of privately owned firearms";475
while, on the other hand, the highest robbery rates are in the jurisdictions
which are most restrictive of gun ownership.
476
Finally, recent data establish that Handgun Control, Inc. is wrong in ad-
vising submission as invariably the best strategy for victims of rape or rob-
bery: "the best defense against injury is to put up no defense-give them
what they want or run." 7 Analysis of nationwide victimization data gath-
ered for the U.S. Department of Justice shows that, far from defensive gun
use endangering gun-armed victims, those who resist with guns are injured
far less often than either those who submit or those who resist with other
weapons.47 Of course, gun-armed resisters are also much less likely to be
"' Id. at 154.
4,, Id. at 145 & tbl. 7.2.
411 Id. at 151.
411 Philip J. Cook, The Effect of Gun Availability on Robbery and Robbey-Murder: A Cross Section
Study of 50 Cities. 3 POL. STUD. REV. ANN. 743, 776-78 (1979). An unpublished aspect of a more recent
study is the finding that the few major cities with handgun bans have higher gun-robbery rates than cities
that allow handgun ownership. These results were not published because the author does not consider them
strong enough, given the very limited number ofjurisdictions involved. Personal communication from Gary
Kleck (July 4, 1995) (regarding unpublished data run for Gary Kleck & E. Britt Patterson, The Impact of
Gun Control and Gun Ownership Levels on Violence Rates, 9 1. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 249-87
(1993)).
'7 NELSON "PETE" SHIELDS, GUNS DON'T DIE, PEOPLE Do 124-25 (1981) (by then-Chairman of
Handgun Control, Inc.) (emphasis added). Submission, running away, or screaming is also the advice offered
by M. Yeager and the Handgun Control Staff of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, MATTHEW E. YEAGER, Er
AL, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, How WVELL DOES THE HANDGUN PROTECT YOU AND YOUR FAMILY?
(1976). In fact, however, running away or screaming is far more dangerous and far less effective than resist-
ing with a gun. Sarah E. Ullman & Raymond A. Knight, Fighting Back. Women's Resistance to Rape, 7 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 31 (1992); Sarah E. Ullman & Raymond A. Knight, Sequential Analysis of Sex-
ual Assaults, Paper presented at annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology (Oct. 29, 1993).
4. See Don B. Kates, The Value of Civilian Arms Possession as Deterrent to Crime or Defense Against
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robbed, raped, or otherwise harmed.
3. The Ordinary Gun Owner and the Aberrant Murderer
American anti-gun advocates manifest an elitist contempt for ordinary citi-
zens by their portrayal of the common person as a potential murderer. This
myth asserts that most murders are committed, not by criminals, but by ordi-
nary people; therefore, if guns were banned most potential murderers would
docilely comply with the ban, and most disputes would end in fistfights at
worst.479
Crime, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 113, 147-50 (1991). Gary Kleck's analysis of 1979-85 national data in Point
Blank shows the following comparative rates of injury: only 12.1-17.4% of gun-armed victims resisting
robbery or assault were injured; 24.7-27.3% of victims who submitted were nevertheless injured; 40.1-48.9%
of those who screamed were injured, as were 24.7-30.7% of those who tried to reason with or threaten the
attacker, and 25.5-34.9% of those who resisted passively or sought to evade; 29.5-40.3% of those resisting
with a knife were injured; 22-25.1% of those using some other kind of weapon were injured; 50.8-52.1% of
those resisting bare-handed were injured). See id. at 166 (table summarizing findings in KLECK, supra note
279, at 123-36).
Data from subsequent years have yielded confirming results. "A fifth of the victims defending
themselves with a firearm suffered an injury, compared to almost half of those who defended themselves
with weapons other than a firearm or who used no weapon." BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, CRIME DATA BRIEF: "GUNS AND CRIME" 2; 1987-91 data summarized in BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SELECTED FINDINGS FROM NAT'L STATISTICAL SERIES: "FIREARMS
AND CRIMES OF VIOLENCE" 8 (1994) (emphasis added):
in nearly 400,000 incidents of violence, the victim had a firearm for self-protection (and] [i]n
35% of these incidents, the offender was also armed with a firearm. About a fifth (i.e. 20%] of
the victims using a gun for self-defense were injured. [But] [a]mong victims defending them-
selves with a weapon other than a firearm or having no weapon, about half [i.e., 50%] sustained
an injury.
" See, e.g., Katherine Kaufer Christoffel, Toward Reducing Pediatric Injuries from Firearms:
Charting a Legislative and Regulatory Course, 88 PEDIATRICS 294, 300 (1991) (article by a doctor who
founded and heads her ovn medical gun prohibition group, stating that "most shootings are not committed
by felons or mentally ill people, but are acts of passion that are committed using a handgun that is owned
for home protection"); Daniel W. Webster et al., Reducing Firearms Injuries, 7 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 73
(1991) (article by officer of the Maryland affiliate of Handgun Control, Inc. stating that "most (murderers]
would be considered law-abiding citizens prior to their pulling the trigger"). See also, MAYOR JOHN
LINDSAY, THE CASE FOR FEDERAL FIREARMS CONTROL 22 (1973) (pamphlet published by N.Y. City)
(claiming that the overwhelming majority of convicted murderers are "previously law abiding citizens com-
mitting impulsive gun-murders while engaged in arguments with family members or acquaintances"); NA-
TIONAL COALITION TO BAN HANDGUNS, A SHOOTING GALLERY CALLED AMERICA (asserting that "each
year" thousands of "gun murders [are] done by law-abiding citizens who might have stayed law-abiding if
they had not possessed firearms" and "that most murders are committed by previously law abiding citizens
where the killer and the victim are related or acquainted.'); David Kairys, A Carnage in the Name of Free-
dom, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 12, 1988, at A15 ("That gun in the closet to protect against burglars will most
likely be used to shoot a spouse in a moment of rage .... The problem is you and me-law-abiding
folks . . ").
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But homicide studies discredit this, showing instead that murderers are
highly aberrant. They tend to have lifelong histories of felony, extreme vio-
lence, and other hazardous behaviors (toward themselves as well as those
around them), including car and gun accidents, substance abuse, and psycho-
pathology. 8° The homicide data collected over the past thirty-five years
have consistently shown that 70-80% of those charged with murder had prior
adult records, with an average adult criminal career of six or more years, in-
cluding four major adult felony arrests.48' Indeed, over 10% of accused
murderers were actually out on pretrial release, that is, they were awaiting
trial on some other offense when the murder was committed. Nor should it be
thought that the 20-30% of accused murderers who do not have prior crime
records are ordinary citizens; 14.1% are juveniles and so cannot have an adult
criminal record. 82 Upon investigation however, it turns out that "many have
histories of committing personal violence in childhood, against other children,
siblings, and small animals. '483 A four-year sample of Boston youth mur-
ders analyzed by the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
describes the arrested youth as "a relatively small number of very scary
kids." '4 Overall, during their years as minors these 125 arrestees ran up re-
, See Kates et al., supra note 448, at 480, 579 (reviewing in detail the criminological findings).
'' Compare an FBI data run of murder arrestees nationally over a four-year period in the 1960s which
found 74.7% to have had prior arrest(s) for violent felony or burglary, D. MULVIHILL ET AL, CRIMES OF
VIOLENCE: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF VIOLENCE 532 (1969), with late 1980s
samplings by the Bureau of Criminal Statistics finding that, nationally, 76.7% of murder arrestees had crimi-
nal histories, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE SPECIAL REPORT, "MURDER IN FAMI-
LIES" 5, tbl. 7 (1994); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MURDER IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1988 (1993)
(78% of murder defendants being prosecuted in state courts had criminal histories); FED. BUREAU OF INVES-
TIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 3 (1971) (one year FBI data run in 1970s
showing that 77.9% of arrestees had prior arests).
Local U.S. figures are similar. The annual Chicago Police Department bulletin, Murder Analysis,
shows the following figures for the percentage of convicted murderers who had prior crime records: 1991:
77.15%; 1990: 74.63; 1989: 74.22; 1988: 73.59; 1987: 73.81 (The five-year average for 1987-91 is
74.68%.). CHICAGO POLICE DEP'T, MURDER ANALYSIS (1987-91).
By way of comparison Canadian murder statistics show that, out of the "582 (murders] in which an
accused was identified in 1991," 249 had previous records of violent offenses: 103 for property offenses and
10 for drug offenses. CANADIAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE STATISTICS, MINISTER OF INDUS., SCI. & TECH.,
JURISTAT. SERV. BULLEIN (1992).
... For this 1991 figure see Heide, Weapons Used by Juveniles and Adults to Kill Parents, I I BEHAV.
SCi. & L. 397, 398 (1993). Juvenile criminal records are generally not available. The one study of which we
are aware that was able to check at least the prior juvenile arrests in the locality in question found that 75%
of juveniles who shot another had local criminal records. M. Denise Dowd et al., Pediatric Firearm Injuries,
Kansas City, 1992: A Population-Based Study, 94 PEDIATRICS 867, 871 (1994).
4 3 R. HOLMES & S. HOLMES, MURDER IN AMERICA 8-9 (1994).
'" Interview with David M. Kennedy, Professor at the Kennedy School of Government of Harvard
University in Boston Massachusetts (Oct. 15, 1996) (study results to be published in an as-yet-untitled article
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cords which averaged 9.7 prior offenses per person. Adding their records to-
gether, these 125 arrestees had been charged with 3 murders; 160 armed vio-
lent crimes; 151 unarmed violent crimes; 71 firearms offenses; and 8 offenses
involving other weapons; plus vast numbers of property and drug offenses. It
is noteworthy that their victims had substantially similar records."' Nor are
adults convicted of murder, who have no prior arrest record, likely to be ordi-
nary citizens. Rather, they are likely to be involved in domestic and intra-
family murders, and have long histories of violence that have not resulted in
arrest because the violence was directed against domestic partners or other
family members. 86
The term "acquaintance homicide" misleads anti-gun advocates to conjure
up images of law-abiding citizens killing each other in domestic quarrels and
neighborhood arguments. The reality is that, almost invariably, statistics of
"acquaintance homicide" involve a far different milieu and very aberrant peo-
ple. "These are not previously law-abiding people killing each other, but
abusive men killing women [and/or children] they have savaged on many
prior occasions or gang members and drug dealers killing each other-or
being killed in 'ripoffs' by addicts or other robbers."7
These facts, gleaned from studies of the perpetrators, are fully confirmed
by studies of the victims. For instance, the District of Columbia "Police De-
partment classifies most homicides by motive: the fraction classified as drug-
related increased from 21% to 80% between 1985 and 1988.""'8 Likewise, a
Philadelphia study showed that "84% of [murder] victims in 1990 had ante-
mortem drug use or criminal history";4 9 71% of children and adolescents
injured in Los Angeles drive-by shootings "were documented members of
violent street gangs";4  in Harlem, "the great majority of both perpetrators
and victims of assaults and murders had previous arrests, probably over
eighty percent or more";491 from a study of all gunshot wounds reported to
by David M. Kennedy, Anne M. Piehl, and Anthony A. Bragg, in L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming).
I" d.
"' See Kates et al., supra note 448, at 583-84 (surveying studies to this effect).
... Id. at 583.
4, Philip J. Cook, The Technology of Personal Violence, in 14 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL RE-
VIEW OF RESEARCH I (M. Tonry ed., 1991).
41, Michael D. McGonigal et al., Urban Firearm Deaths: A Five-Year Perspective, 35 J. TRAUMA 532-
34 (1995).
" H. Range Hutson et al., Adolescents and Children Injured or Killed in Drive-By Shootings In Los
Angeles, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 324, 325 (1994).
"I A. SWERSEY & E. ENLOE, HOMICIDE IN HARLEM 17 (1975). See also studies in three major trauma
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Charlotte, North Carolina police during the period July 1, 1992, to June 30,
1993, 71% of the 545 adult victims had known criminal records.492
4. The "More Guns = More Murders'" Shibboleth
It is already against the law for people with felony records, or histories of
violence, substance abuse, dangerous accidents, or insanity to possess fire-
arms."9 Should we be optimistic that such people will comply with gun
laws? Obviously not, for they are already refusing to comply with existing
federal and state gun laws. However, to anti-gun advocates the problem is not
criminal gun ownership, but widespread gun ownership by the citizenry in
general. They believe that independent of any other factor, "more guns =
more murder," a premise adopted without serious examination, simply as a
matter of faith, and despite the contrary empirical evidence. In Gun Crazy
that premise is assumed in the very first footnote and reiterated throughout
the article without once being examined.
Until about 1980 anti-gun advocates did actually attempt to prove their
faith. They routinely cited statistics to show that from the early 1960s
through the early 1970s crime and gun ownership both steadily increased.4"
But this only assumed that the increased number of guns was causing crime,
without examining the equally plausible alternative that increased crime was
causing frightened noncriminals to buy more guns.
The statistics from 1960s and early 1970s showing both rising crime and a
rising gun ownership simply did not permit an inference of a causal relation-
ship or, if so, what that relationship might be. But in recent years these two
care centers finding urban knife and bullet wounds to be "a chronic recurrent disease peculiar to unem-
ployed, uninsured law breakers." R. Stephen Smith et al., Recidivism in an Urban Trauma Center, 127 AR-
CHIVES OF SURGERY 668, 670 (1992) (describing the conclusions in D.W. Sims et al., Urban Trauma: A
Chronic, Recurrent Disease, 29 J. TRAUMA 940 (1989); T.B. Morrisey et al., The Incidence of Recurrent
Penetrating Wound Trauma in an Urban Trauma Center, 31 J. TRAUMA 1536 (1991)).
... For a discussion of this preliminary data run by University of North Carolina professors Richard C.
Lumb and Paul C. Friday, see Kates et al., supra note 448, at 587 n.325.
... Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) with the fairly comprehensive California system of state laws: CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 12021ff, 12072, 12076, 12100-01, 12551-52 (West Supp. 1997); and CAL. WELt'. & INST.
CODE §§ 8100-8105 (West Supp. 1997). It might reasonably be suggested that a person who has rehabilitat-
ed herself ought not to be barred from gun ownership for life because of a 20 year-old felony conviction or
mental commitment, particularly if it did not involve a violent crime. Perhaps, therefore, a better policy
would be to bar felons, etc., from firearms ownership, subject to a licensing procedure administered by the
local police or courts.
"' See, e.g., Sam Fields, Handgun Prohibition and Social Necessity, 23 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 35 (1979).
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figures have diverged, thus undermining empirically the anti-gun belief that
"more guns = more crime. ' '495 Consider the following table:4 96
TABLE: GUNSTOCK INCREASES OVER 20-YEAR PERIOD
1973
Total Gun Stock
Handguns
36,910,819
All Guns
122,304,980
Handguns
175.9
Homicide rate: 9.4 per 100,000 population
1992
Total Gun Stock
Handguns
77,144,448
Guns per 1,000 pop.
All Guns
221,967,343
Homicide rate: 8.5 per 100,000 population
" The implication of these recent statistics may explain the absence from Gun Crazy and other anti-
gun works of data attempting to correlate homicide with gun ownership trends after the early 1970s.
" The information regarding firearms ownership in this table was graciously supplied to us by Pro-
fessor Gary Kleck of the School of Criminology at Florida State University. It will appear in Table 3.1 of
his forthcoming book, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL, supra note 469. Homicide rates
are taken from BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE STATISTICS-1993, 365. tbl. 3.111 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 SOURCEBOOK]; and BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICs--1989, 365, tbl. 3.118
(1989) [hereinafter 1989 SOURCEBOOK].
Guns per 1,000 pop.
All Guns
610.3
Handguns
302.5
All. Guns
870.4
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If the "more guns = more murder" shibboleth were true, massive increases
in guns should translate into massive increases in murders.497 There might
not be a perfect correlation. The 81.5% increase in gun ownership generally
and the 100% increase in handgun ownership would not necessarily have
resulted in identical percentage increases in murder in the twenty year period
1973-1992. But if guns really were the "primary cause" of murder, or just
"one of the main causes," as anti-gun advocates have asserted, gunstock in-
creases of 80-100% should have been accompanied by a consistent, marked
increase in murders over those decades, as predicted by anti-gun advocates
who bewailed those gun increases as they occurred.498
At the very least, murder should have increased somewhat. But there was
no consistent and marked increase in murder. In 1973, the American firearm
stock totaled 122 million, the handgun stock was 36.9 million, and the ho-
micide rate was 9.4 per 100,000 population. At the end of 1992, twenty years
later, the firearm stock had risen to 221.9 million, the handgun stock had
risen to 77.1 million, but the homicide rate was 8.5, that is, almost ten per-
cent lower than it had been in 1973. 499 Nor had the percentage of murders
committed with firearms increased either. In 1973, 68.5% of murders were
committed with guns." At the end of 1992, twenty years later, the firearm
stock had risen to almost 222 million, the handgun stock had risen to 77.1
million, but 68.2% of homicides were committed with guns.
We are not contending here that increased gun ownership reduced the rates
of homicide or other violence, although as we have seen there is reason to
think that criminals will understandably tend to avoid attacking persons who
they think are armed.5"' We are simply disputing the unexamined article of
faith among anti-gun advocates such as Andrew Herz: that guns are the pri-
mary cause of murder and that more guns, particularly more handguns, equals
more murder. The data examined so far do not bear this out.
In presenting the 1973-92 data we are not suggesting that homicide rates
'" The argument in this and the next four paragraphs has been taken from Kates et al., supra note 448,
at 572.
... See, eg., JOSEPH D. ALVIANI & VILLIAM R. DRAKE, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, HANDGUN
CONTROL: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 42-43 (1975); RAMSEY CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA ch. 7 (1970).
' 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 496, at 365, tbl. 3.111.
KLECK, supra note 279, at 262, tbl. 6.5.
'o, See data discussed supra Part IV.B.2. There is also reason to think that the gun-ridden West was
peaceful by inner-city standards. See BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW 312-15 (1990) (summa-
rizing the "growing literature that concludes that the West was not very violent.").
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steadily declined during that period. In the five-year period 1973-77, the
homicide rate first rose to 9.8% (1974) and then dropped to 8.8% (1977).
Then it rose steeply to its highest point ever, 10.2% (1980). Five years later,
in 1984, it had dropped 22.5% to 7.9%. Then in 1986 it began rising again,
with some fluctuations, to its 1992 level of 9.3%. As for homicides commit-
ted with guns, over the 20-year period they fell to as low as 58.7% (1985),
but then rose back to 68.2% by 1992.502
In sum, over a twenty-year period of radically increasing gun purchases,
homicide rates were erratic and unpatterned. This is completely inconsistent
with the shibboleth that doubling the number of guns, especially handguns,
would increase homicide rates. Geographic and demographic studies of homi-
cide are equally inconsistent with this claim. For instance, studies trying to
link gun ownership to violence rates find either no correlation or a negative
one, that is, that cities and counties with high rates of gun ownership suffer
less homicide and other violence than demographically comparable areas with
a lower rate of gun ownership. 3
No less telling are the experiences in Florida, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
other states whose laws have been amended to mandate licensure for any law-
abiding, responsible applicant seeking a license to carry a concealed handgun
(CCW license). If more access to guns necessarily produced more murder, the
issuance of hundreds of thousands of CCW licenses in these states since the
mid-1980s should generally have produced an increase in homicide. Instead,
however, the homicide trends in each state have been generally lower."'
'0' BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FIREARMS AND CRIMES OF VIOLENCE:
SELECTED FINDINGS FROM NATIONAL STATISTICAL SERIES 13, tbl. 2 (1994).
" See. e.g., David J. Bordua, Firearms Ownership and Violent Crime: A Comparison ofiliinois Coun-
ties, in THE SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF CRIME 156 (James M. Byme & Robert J. Sampson eds., 1986); David J.
Bordua & Alan L. Lizotte, Patterns of Legal Firearms Ownership: A Situational and Cultural Analysis of
Illinois Counties, 2 L. & POL'Y Q. 147 (1979); Chris W. Eskridge, Zero-Order Inverse Correlations Be-
tween Crimes of Violence and Hunting Licenses in the United States, 71 SOC. & SOC. RES. 55 (1986); Gary
Kleck, The Relationship Between Gun Ownership Levels and Rates of Violence in the United States, in FIRE-
ARMS AND VIOLENCE, supra note 256; Kleck & .Patterson, supra note 476, at 249-87; Alan J. Lizotte &
David J. Bordua, Firearms Ownership for Sport and Protection: Two Divergent Models, 45 AM. SOC. REV.
229 (1980); David McDowall, Gun Availability and Robbery Rates: A Panel Study of Large U.S. Cities,
1974-1978, 8 L. & POL'Y Q. 135 (1986); Douglas Murray, Handguns. Gun Control Laws and Firearm Vio-
lence, 23 SOC. PROBS. 81 (1975).
' Lott & Mustard, supra note 460; Cramer & Kopel, supra note 460. we note that another study
documented an increase in homicide in three Florida cities during the same period. See David McDowall et
al., Easing Concealed Firearm Laws: Effects on Homicide in Three States, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
193 (1995). This does not seem to be a matter of any significance given that homicide, overall, declined
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What about the possibility that, although the granting of large numbers of
CCW licenses in the states increased the incidence of murder, the trend was
concealed because sociocultural, economic, and other factors that are more
important determinants of homicide caused an overall decline in the murder
rate? This theory is undermined by the statistics from Florida where the li-
censing agency meticulously tracks the licensing process and its results. If the
"more guns = more murder" axiom were correct, issuing licenses which have
allowed approximately 186,000 Florida residents to carry a concealed hand-
gun wherever they go should have resulted in an increase in homicide by
them, even though other, more important, factors might have caused a decline
in the overall murder rate. But the Florida data for the five years since the
liberal licensure law passed show not one unlawful killing by any of the re-
sponsible, law-abiding persons to whom licenses have been issued.s' Again,
this suggests that gun ownership by the law-abiding general citizenry is sim-
ply not a risk factor for criminal homicide.
5. The Tragedy of Homicide Among Young African-American Urban
Males
Despite Americans arming themselves at an unprecedented rate, the murder
rate has held stable or decreased for every segment of American society save
one: murders committed by young African-American males in the inner cities
have greatly increased since the mid-1980s.5° While the rate of murders by
non-Hispanic whites in the "gun-ridden" U.S. is no greater than in many gun-
banning European nations, this trend has been offset and concealed by the
across the state. In addition, the authors were unable to connect the increased homicide in the three cities to
the issuance of gun carry licenses there. See Daniel D. Polsby, Firearms Costs, Firearms Benefits and the
Limits of Knowledge, 86 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 207 (1995). In any event McDowall's results from a
five-city sample are refuted by the contrary results from Lott & Mustard's sample of over 3,000 counties (all
in the United States).
" We are informed by David B. Kopel that a homicide outside the state was committed by a homeless
person who had a fraudulently obtained Florida carry license. One homicide among 180,000 people over a
six-year period works out to approximately .10 homicides per 100,000 people annually. That is approximate-
ly one-eightieth the annual homicide rate of the nation at large during each of those years. Personal commu-
nication with David B. Kopel (Aug. 24, 1995).
's See Lois A. Fingerhut et al., Firearm Homicide Among Black Teenage Males in Metropolitan Coun-
ties: Comparison of Death Rates in Two Periods. 1983 Through 1985 and 1987 Through 1989, 267 JAMA
3054 (1992); Lois A. Fingerhut et al., Firearm and Nonfirearm Homicide Among Persons 15 Through 19
Years of Age: Differences by Level of Urbanization, United States. 1979 Through 1989, 267 JAMA 3048
(1992) [hereinafter Fingerhut et al., Urbanization]; Lois A. Fingerhut & Joel C. Kleinman, International and
Interstate Comparisons of Homicides Among Young Males, 263 JAMA 3292, 3295 (1990); Polsby, supra
note 504.
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enormously increasing murder rate among young African-American urban
males.
Of particular relevance here is the fact that this tragic increase in homicides
committed by young African-American urban males contradicts the faith that
"more guns = more homicide" in two respects. First, guns are far more avail-
able to rural blacks than to urban blacks,' 7-- yet the homicide rate among
young urban black men is almost 900% greater than among their rural coun-
terparts. 5 8 Second, the rise in the rate of murders by young African-Ameri-
,can males corresponding to a decline in murders by whites is inversely corre-
lated to the pattern of American gun ownership. As criminologist Gary Kleck
notes, "[w]hites are much more likely to own guns or handguns than
blacks... ."" Observing this non-correlation, two other criminologists
comment that, even though violence is primarily a male phenomenon,
rates of male firearms ownership tend to be inversely correlated with
violent crime rates, a curious fact if firearms stimulate aggression. It is
hard to explain that where firearms are most dense, violent crime rates
are lowest, and where guns are least dense violent crime rates are high-
est.... [Moreover data show that] when used for protection firearms
can seriously inhibit aggression and can provide a psychological buffer
against the fear of crime. Furthermore, the fact that national patterns
show little violent crime where guns are most dense implies that guns do
not elicit aggression in. any meaningful way. Quite the contrary, these
findings suggest that high saturations of guns in places, or something
correlated with that condition, inhibit illegal aggression."'0
Thus, the catastrophic increase in young urban African-American male
homicide correlates not to any radical increase in gun availability, but to
other developments in ghetto areas. Many now believe that the relative ab-
sence of natural fathers, abetted in ghetto households by welfare policy, has a
pernicious effect on male children."' The War on Drugs has also perversely
exacerbated violence among black males in at least four ways: (a) the
' " KLECK, supra note 279, at 23 (indicating that rural black homes have guns at roughly the rate of
rural white homes. This is higher than the rate of urban white homes and vastly higher than the rate of ur-
ban black homes).
s See Lois A. Fingerhut et al., Urbanization, supra note 506, at 3049, tbl. 1.
so9 KLECK, supra note 279, at 22.
sb Hans Toch & Alan J. Lizotte, Research and Policy: The Case of Gun Control, in PsYCHOL. & Soc.
POL'Y (Peter Sutfeld & Philip Tetlock eds., 1992) (emphasis added).
"' See, e.g., James A. Mercy & Mark Rosenberg et al., Public Health Policy for Preventing Violence,
12 HEALTH AFF. 7, 19-21 (1993) (suggesting that neglectful, unstable, abusive, violent family environments
are "pivotal influence[s]" in turning children into violent adolescents and adults).
"' See generally, Stephen B. Duke & Albert C. Gross, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR
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black market uses violence to enforce agreements and fight over turf;5 3 (b)
turf fights are exacerbated by imprisoning established sellers; and (c) black
market sellers are routinely murdered for their money or their drugs. Finally,
and generally overlooked, (d) by imprisoning massive numbers of African-
American males, the War on Drugs has taken untold thousands of fathers
away from their male children, thereby perpetuating the climate of violence
among inner-city youth.
While we do not pretend to know all the reasons why homicide among
inner-city African-American males is so common, we do know this: a pre-
occupation with guns has distracted many from addressing the real problems.
The problem of violence among young urban black males
will not yield to simplistic, unicausal solutions. In this connection, it is
useful to point out that everything that leads to gun-related violence
among youths is already against the law. What is needed are not new
and more stringent gun laws but rather a concerted effort to rebuild the
social structure of inner cities.514
In sum, anti-gun advocacy is not just irrelevant to solving these problems, it
is counterproductive.
In this connection it is useful to contrast the data Gun Crazy offers to that
which we have supplied. The only data Gun Crazy provides goes to the tru-
ism that guns can be dangerous, that is, statistics on their use in murder and
other crime. From this Gun Crazy leaps to the assumptions: (1) that the
perpetrator's having a gun caused him to commit the crime; and (2) that if
guns were outlawed for the law-abiding, criminals would also be dis-
armed." 5 Gun Crazy makes no attempt to show even a correlation between
gun availability and the rise of homicide among young African-American
TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993); DEALING WrrH DRUGS: CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT CON-
TROL (Ronald Hamowy, ed. 1987); Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of
Public Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2593 (1994) (book review).
"' A "study of 218 homicides in New York City classified as drug-related found that twenty-one were
caused by the pharmacological effect of alcohol and five by the effect of crack; the rest resulted f6om the
turf wars, robberies, and other violence engendered by drug prohibition, just as alcohol prohibition caused
violence in a previous era." KOPEL, supra note 285, at 347 (citing Paul J. Goldstein et al., Drug-Related
Homicide in New York: 1984 and 1988, 38 CRIME & DELINQ. 459 (1992); Paul J. Goldstein, Crack and
Homicide in New York City, 1988: A Conceptually Based Event Analysis, 16 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 651
(1989)).
'14 Joseph F. Sheley et al., Gun-Related Violence in and Around Inner-City Schools, 146 AM. J. DIS-
EASES CHILDREN 677, 682 (1992).
"' See supra notes 444, 445, 449 and accompanying text.
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urban males. Gun Crazy just assumes that premise and proceeds to heap epi-
thets and vituperation upon gun owners, gun-rights groups, and manufacturers
("necromerchants"). No attention is paid to the crucial question: If the law
cannot prevent drug dealers and their runners from continuously obtaining
and selling supplies of illegal drugs, how could it prevent them from making
a single purchase of a gun and a few hundred rounds of ammunition?
C. The Prohibitionist Goal of the Gun Control Movement
Gun Crazy denounces the gun lobby for "conjuring up [false] visions of
powerful gun-grabbing Washington confiscators knocking down the doors of
law-abiding citizens," ' and capitalizing on paranoid gun owners' "fear of
Big Brother's storm troopers confiscating their weapons,"5 7 while, so Gun
Crazy asserts, "[v]irtually no one in the gun control movement calls for con-
fiscation." ' 8 Who's kidding whom? This is a denial which no one familiar
with the gun control movement could honestly make. Indeed, Gun Crazy's
disclaimers are undermined by the very sources it cites.
For example, Gun Crazy cites an article by gun control advocate Andrew
Jay McClurg"9 who candidly admits, based on analyses carried out by two
major national gun control groups, that wholesale confiscation first of hand-
guns and then of all guns, is indeed their goal: "the extreme views of many
gun control supporters make the slippery slope argument understandable.""52
McClurg criticizes the slippery slope argument not because it misstates what
gun control groups desire, but because their goals are too unrealistic for gun
owners to reasonably fear. "Despite the yearnings of many champions of gun
sl' Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 95.
"' Id. at 89.
.. Id. at 89 n.126. See also id. at 142 n.384 (deriding "The gun lobby bogeyman of disarmament and
confiscation").
"I Id. at 83 n.108 & 137 n.353 (citing Andrew Jay McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U.
L. REV. 53 (1992)).
" McClurg, supra note 519, at 89. On the preceding page McClurg distinguishes such arguments
against anti-gun laws from slippery slope arguments in the First Amendment context that would be plainly
silly:
Many Brady Bill supporters [do] want to prohibit private possession altogether. This is what
differentiates the Second Amendment slippery slope argument from most other arguments [e.g.,
that accepting the law of libel imperils the First Amendment]. Persons who believe in a civil
remedy for libel are not ultimately looking to abolish newspapers.
Id. at 88.
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control, guns are so deeply entrenched in this country's history and culture
that there is virtually no chance that they ever will be banned."
' 2
'
Another anti-gun activist whom Gun Crazy repeatedly citessn is Kather-
ine Christoffel, M.D., who asserts:
Guns are a virus that must be eradicated.... They are causing an epi-
demic of death by gunshot, which should be treated like any epidem-
ic-you get rid of the virus.... Get rid of the guns, get rid of the bul-
lets, and you get rid of the deaths."2
The article in which Christoffel's views are quoted notes that her views are
widely approved by other anti-gun medical professionals and that Dr.
Christoffel has founded her own national group of such gun ban advo-
cates. 24
Although not calling for complete prohibition, Deborah Prothrow-Stith,
Dean of the Harvard School of Public Health, does call for widespread con-
fiscation: "My own view on gun control is simple. I hate guns and I cannot
imagine why anyone would want to own one. If I had my way, guns for sport
would be registered, and all other guns," that is, guns for self-defense,
"would be banned.""s Her prejudice against civilian self-defense represents
a perspective widely shared among anti-gun advocates.
Not all anti-gun activists share Betty Friedan's belief "that lethal violence
even in self-defense only engenders more lethal violence and that gun control
should override any personal need for safety."'526 But there can be no doubt
that a crucial tenet of anti-gun advocacy over the past three decades is epit-
omized by the words of Gary Wills:
521 Id.
", Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 83 n.107, 152 n.424 (citing a medical news article profiling and quot-
ing Christoffel as an anti-gun medical activist).
" Quoted in Janice Somerville, Gun Control as Immunization, AM. MED. NEws, Jan. 3, 1994, at 9.
However, as Daniel Polsby has observed: "[c]learly, firearms have at least one characteristic that distinguish-
es them from smallpox viruses: nobody wants to keep smallpox viruses in the nightstand drawer." Polsby,
supra note 439, at 64.
524 Somerville, supra note 523.
"2 DEBORAH PROTHROW-STITH, DEADLY CONSEQUENCES 198 (1991) (emphasis added). Note that by
"banned" Prothrow-Stith means confiscated, as distinguished from other guns which could be kept if they
were registered.
" Ann Japenga, Would I Be Safer with a Gun?, HEALTH, Mar. 1994, at 52-54 (interview with Betty
Friedan) (emphasis added to highlight that Ms. Friedan's concern is based on a moral belief at least as much
as, or instead of, criminological beliet). In the same interview she denounces "the trend of women buying
guns [as] 'a horrifying, obscene perversion of feminism."' Id.
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Mutual protection should be the aim of citizens, not individual self-pro-
tection. Until we are willing to outlaw the very existence or manufacture
of civilian handguns we have no right to call ourselves citizens or con-
sider our behavior even minimally civil. 27
In this view the individual who defends herself, or owns a firearm for de-
fense, is seen as arrogating to herself, and encroaching on, prerogatives re-
served to the state alone. In the words of Handgun Control, Inc. chairperson
Sarah Brady, "[T]he only reason for guns in civilian hands is for sporting
purposes." '28 According to the Washington Post, "[t]he need that some
homeowners and shopkeepers believe they have for weapons to defend them-
selves [represents] the worst instincts in the human character. '529
Representatives of the Presbyterian Church USA affirmed before Congress
the Church's view that armed self-defense is morally equivalent to murder,
and indistinguishable therefrom, as well as the Church's support for a federal
527 Garry Wills, John Lennon's War, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 12, 1980, at 56 (emphasis added). Wills
has also written: "Every civilized society must disarm its citizens against each other. Those who do not trust
their own people become predators upon their own people. The sick thing is that haters of fellow Americans
often think of themselves as patriots." Garry Wills .... Or Worldwide Gun Control?, PHILA. INQUIRER, May
17, 1981, at 8E. We were disappointed to see that Wills's opinions on guns have apparently led him to write
a one-sided and derisive critique of Second Amendment scholarship. See Wills, supra note 330. But see
also. To Keep and Bear Arms: An Exchange, N.Y. REV., Nov. 16, 1995, at 61 (responses to Wills by San-
ford Levinson, David Williams, Glenn Harlan Reynolds, and John Lattimer).
"' Jackson, Keeping the Battle Alive, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 21, 1993 (interview with Sarah Brady). Com-
pare this with the following statements: "The only legitimate use of a handgun that I can understand is for
target shooting .... " Oversight of the 1968 Gun Control Act: Hearings on Handgun Crime Control Before
the Subcomm. on Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong. 1974 (1975) (testimony
of Professor Robert Replogle, M.D., organizer of a local Chicago gun control group); "For target shooting,
that's ok. Get a license and go to the range. For defense of the home-that's why we have police de-
partments." In Step With: James Brady, PARADE June 26, 1994, at 18 (quoting James Brady in response to
the question whether gun ownership can be legitimate). See also Ramsey Clark, CRIME IN AMERICA 107
(1970) (denouncing defensive gun ownership as "anarchy, not order under law-a jungle where each relies
on himself for survival," and an insult to govemment, for "[a] state in which a citizen needs a gun to protect
himself from crime has failed to perform its first purpose").
"' Editorial, Guns and the Civilizing Process, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1972, at A16. Compare this with
the confiscatory advocacy of the N.Y. TIMES: "[O]ne way to discourage the gun culture is to remove the
guns from the hands and shoulders of people who are not in the law enforcement business." The Gun Cul-
ture, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1975 (editorial). See also Taming the Gun Monster: How Far to Go, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1993 (editorial) (recommending that federal law limit ordinary citizens to "ownership (only]
of sporting and hunting weapons,"); Taming the Monster: The Guns Among Us, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1993
(editorial) ("Under our plan individuals could own sporting weapons only if they had submitted to a back-
ground check and passed a firearms safety course. Other special, closely monitored exceptions could be
made, such as for serious collectors.").
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law to ban and confiscate all handguns. "The General Assembly [of the Pres-
byterian Church USA] has declared in the context of handgun control and in
many other contexts, that it is opposed to 'the killing of anyone, anywhere,
for any reason."'530
The Presbyterian Church USA is a member of the premier anti-gun group,
the National Coalition to Ban Handguns (NCBH), which was founded, and is
still sponsored by, the Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist
Church. That sponsorship reflects the Methodist Board's view that a woman's
Christian duty is to submit to rape rather than do anything that might imperil
her rapist's life. "Is the Robber My Brother?" is the question rhetorically
posed in the title of an article published by the Methodist Board and written
by the editor of its official publication. And the answer to that is "yes," for,
though the burglary victim
or the woman accosted in the park by a rapist is [not] likely to consider
the violator to be a neighbor whose safety is of immediate concern....
Criminals are members of the larger community no less than are others.
As such they are our neighbors or, as Jesus put it, our brothers. ... 131
NCBH itself calls its position "very clear"; it seeks legislation to ban the
manufacture, sale, and possession of all handguns, except by police, the mili-
tary, licensed security guards, and pistol clubs. 32 NCBH has now been re-
named the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence to reflect its present advocacy of
banning many long guns as well as handguns.533 Handgun Control, Inc.'s
"a 1985-86 Hearings on Legislation to Modify the 1968 Gun Control Act, House Judiciary Comm.,
Subcomm. on Crime, Part I at 128 (emphasis added). Like many of the secular opponents of handgun own-
ership we have cited, the Presbyterian Church emphasizes that there is no objection to long (i.e., hunting)
guns because they are owned for "sports." Handguns---"weapons of death"--are what the Church condemns,
making no distinction between their use by criminals and their use by victims in lawful self-defense. Their
reason is that, "[tlo be opposed to killing is to be opposed to the instruments that make killing possible, that
are designed solely for the purposes of killing" and that, "[t]here is no other reason to own a handgun (that
we have envisioned, at least) than to kill someone with it." Id. at 127, 128. For the similar views of the
Union of American Hebrew Congregations and the General Board of Church and Society of the Methodist
Church (condemning handgun ownership for self-defense as "vigilantism"), see id. at 121-23.
... Rev. Allen Brockway, But the Bible Doesn't Mention Pistols, ENGAGE-SOCIAL ACTION FORUM,
May 1977, at 39-40. The language quoted from this issue has been published as a separate pamphlet by the
METHODIST BD. OF CHURCH & Soc., HANDGUNS IN THE UNITED STATES. See Don B. Kates, Jr., Gun Con-
trol: Separating Reality from Symbolism, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 353, 357 n.l I (1994).
"' Testimony of NCBH head Michael K. Beard in Support of 8-132 before the Committee on the
Judiciary, March 22, 1989 (emphasis added).
. Deane Calhoun, From Controversy to Prevention: Building Effective Firearm Policies, INI. PRE-
VENTION NETWORK NEWSL., Winter 1989-90, at 17 (hailing the name change as indicative of NCBH's view
"that guns are not just an inanimate object, but in fact are a social ill.").
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(HC) ultimate goal is more sweeping, though perhaps less confiscatory (and
would presumably enjoy NCBH's support as an addition to its program, but
not as a substitute). HCI's goal is a federal licensing requirement to own any
gun, with licensure being available only to people desiring firearms for sport;
self-defense would not be an allowable ground for gun ownership. 34 In the
interim HCI seeks legislation similar to the legislation that it and NCBH
successfully lobbied for in Washington, D.C., which precludes self-defense by
requiring householders who own guns of any type to keep them unloaded and
disassembled.
Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), author of the recent ban on "assault
weapon" sales, recently admitted that the only reason she does not seek the
banning and confiscation of all guns is because that is not politically feasible
at this time: "If it were up to me, I would tell Mr. and Mrs. America to turn
them in-turn them all in," she told Lesley Stahl in an interview CBS's 60
Minutes aired on February 24, 1995."35
Finally, on the same page on which Gun Crazy complains that "[g]un lob-
by leaders" have often "misrepresented the provisions of pending legisla-
tion," '36 Gun Crazy asserts that although "Senator John H. Chafee (R-RI)
has called for a ban on handguns, [his bill] does not contemplate confisca-
tion." '37 Gun Crazy assigns this denial to a footnote without explaining what
the Chafee bill actually requires: that the handgun owner either surrender the
gun or keep it locked in a licensed handgun club or a facility under police
supervision. 38 In other words, while the Chafee bill does not propose to
confiscate the property itself, it would preclude the sole or primary use the
property owner has for it to defend self, family, and home.
" Erik Eckholm, A Little Gun Control, A Lot of Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1993, at 4-1 (quoting
Sarah Brady). For similar proposals from the L.A. TIMES, see supra note 529.
".. Don Feder, Gun Control Delusions, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1994 (quoting Senator Feinstein).
"4 Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 89 ("Gun-lobby leaders and their supporters have frequently misrepre-
sented the provisions of pending legislation.").
". Id. at 89 n.126 ("Although one proposal, that of Senator John H. Chafee (R-R.I.), has called for a
ban on handguns, it does not contemplate confiscation.").
"4 See S. 892, 103d Cong., §§ 942, 943 (1993) (making it "unlawful for a person to manufacture,
import, export, sell, buy, transfer, receive, own, possess, transport, or use a handgun or handgun ammuni-
tion" except for those persons in the military, law enforcement, who work as security guards, or who are
members of a licensed handgun club that must "maintain possession and control of the handguns used by its
members."); Polsby, supra note 439, at 61 (under the Chafee bill "existing handguns would have to be sur-
rendered.").
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In sum, Gun Crazy's claim that "[v]irtually no one in the gun control
movement calls for confiscation," '539 reflects either ignorance or deceit. The
dominant forces in the anti-gun movement see self-defense as a moral wrong
indistinguishable from criminal violence and they want to impose that belief
on the American people by enacting laws to effectively preclude armed self-
defense. Accusing those who take them at their word of paranoia is to add
insult to injury.
CONCLUSION: SHOOTING THE MESSENGERS
It may reasonably be argued that the Second Amendment does not preclude
such gun regulations as registration, licensing, background checks, prohibition
of arms to the deranged, children, and people with felony or violence convic-
tions.' What seems no longer open to dispute is that the Amendment guar-
antees every law-abiding, responsible adult a constitutional right to choose to
possess arms.
In 1989, Sanford Levinson speculated that the then-comparative paucity of
writing by law professors on the Amendment might reflect "a mixture of
sheer opposition to the idea of private ownership of guns and the perhaps
subconscious fear that altogether plausible, perhaps even winning interpreta-
tions of the Second Amendment would present real hurdles to those of us
supporting prohibitory regulation [of firearms]."'" Nonetheless, Akhil
Amar, William Van Alstyne, and a host of other scholars have now consid-
ered -the issue. Almost unanimously, scholars have concluded that the
Amendment does indeed present real hurdles to the banning of guns. If there
is an intellectually viable response, it has yet to be made. Certainly the resort
to character assassination, guilt by association, and the other trappings of
McCarthyism instead of legal reasoning is not an intellectually viable re-
sponse. It amounts to shooting the messenger because one does not like the
message.
, Gun Crazy, supra note 7, at 89 n.126.
'~' It is not our purpose here to analyze the constitutionality of various gun regulatory measures. For
two conflicting discussions of this topic, see Kates, supra note 232; and Halbrook, supra note 260.
"z Levinson, supra note 13, at 642.
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